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NTZIG AND POLAND 





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DANTZIG & POLAND 


BY 


SIMON ASKENAZY 


TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL POLISH 
BY 


WILLIAM J. ROSE 


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GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD. 
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PREFATORY NOTE 


Tuts book appeared in Polish at the beginning of I9I9Q, 
and later on in French and German. Its reminiscences 
of Dantzig’s past were intended to foreshadow the future 
of the city in a restored Union with the restored Polish 
Republic. Only such a solution could have given satis- 
faction to the interests of Dantzig, Poland and Europe, 
and, quite certainly, to those of the old friend of both 
Dantzig and pland—Great Britain. Things, however, 
have turned differently. Instead of being reunited 
to Poland, Dantes has been kept apart from her, and 
even to a certain extent has been put into an attitude of 
opposition. Such a solution is against the interests of 
Dantzig, Poland and Europe. It is, in truth, equally at 
variance with the real interests of Great Britain herself, 
although Great Britain was not irresponsible for its 
materialization. An English edition of this work, there- 
fore, may seem only the more seasonable, as it may foster 
reflection and help to repair the mistakes which have been 
committed. 


ASKENAZY. 


GENEVA, First ASSEMBLY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 
December, 1920. 


R4AGn4 7 


CONTENTS 


I 


PAGE 


THE HEEL OF THE TEUTONIC ORDER ‘ : . Pah: 
II 

UNDER THE POLISH THRONE , ; i 4 i 
III 

THE DECLINE OF THE REPUBLIC . ; 4 ; . 24 
IV 

THE PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION . ‘ ; ; j . 32 
Vv 

A FREE CITY. ‘ : F : ; ; ; : 58 
VI 

IN THE HANDS OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY 7 7 a 


NOTES ; ; 3 ; : J y ° - 103 


DANTZIG AND POLAND 


I 
THE HEEL OF THE TEUTONIC ORDER 


DurRING the very first period of its existence and growth, 
Dantzig passed through widely diverse experiences and 
severe historical trials From being at the start a coastal 
colony, this native old-Slavic fisher-folk developed with an 
inevitable admixture of Polish blood. Good relations 
were maintained with Poland under the rule of her first 
dynasty, the Piasts; and it is evident that for a time - 
at the end of the tenth century the city was under the 
direct influence of one of Poland’s most illustrious kings, 
Boleslaw the Great, uncle of Canute of England.2 In 1148, 
by a Bull of Eugene III, it was placed under the spiritual 
guardianship of a Polish bishop, being assigned to the 
diocese of Wloclawek, where it remained for several centuries.3 

Under the rule of the Slav princes of Pomerania, Dantzig 
grew and was transformed step by step—thanks partly to 
the introduction of industrious German colonists during 
the thirteenth century. When at the close of this century 
the line of these princes died out, the city welcomed the 
Polish King, Wladislaw Lokietek, as its lawful lord, and 
that with rapturous homage. Thrice did it entertain him, 
1298-99, 1306, when he came to lay his hand on Pomerania 
and put an end to the dissensions that were tormenting 
the country.4 — 

From time immemorial this busy and enterprising town, 
developed from a fishing-village, did business with Poland 
and gained from the Polish lands its livelihood. And in 
those far-away savage times it found among the Polish 
lords and chieftains worthy customers as buyers and sellers, 

7 


8 -_ * DANTZIG. AND POLAND 
men ‘whe were at’ oncé ‘scrupulous and reliable. It found, 
too, “just and ready protection, which guarded carefully 
the interests of foreign merchants.’”’ Thus much a modern 
Prussian historian, who was no friend of Poland, has had 
to affirm: and that on the evidence of the oldest aldermanic 
records of the city.5 

Scarcely, however, did the city begin to flourish, when, 
early in the fourteenth century, the mailed fist of the Teutonic 
Order fell upon her people. The ravenous brothers of this 
Order, with the white cross on their black mantles, were 
hardly settled on the right bank of the Vistula when they 
prepared to cross to the other and, by doing so, to get 
hold of the key to river, coast, and country—the city of 
Dantzig. At the ifvitation of the credulous inhabitants 
themselves, the deceitful, merciless, and greedy Knights 
first settled themselves in the castle, and then at once 
provoked a deliberate quarrel. The city was taken on 
a dark November night (1308) by a sudden murderous 
attack. Part of the people were slain, the survivors driven 
out. The peaceful habitations were destroyed and levelled 
to the earth. Nothing but desert and ruins was left.® 

In the whole conception of this assault, an extraordinary 
one even for those times, and apart from the ostensible 
plan of execution with its treachery and violence, there 
are two significant politico-psychic traits which deeply impress 
us: terrorism and hypocrisy. Chill terrorism, as a conscious 
means of conquest, made its appearance. The Order in- 
tended, as Dlugosz, the ancient chronicler, put it, “ that 
the far-sounding echo of this cruelty should so affright the 
hearts of men in other towns and fortresses, that no one 
would dare to oppose it, and so that the task of further 
occupations would be easier and safer.” Again, as a further 
political instrument, we have here bottomless hypocrisy, 
and the gratuitous denial of perpetrated crime. The Head 
of the Order had the courage later, in a letter of self-defence 
to the Pope, to call the whole villainy committed upon 
Dantzig an act of summary justice. He mentioned the 
killing of some dozen or more “‘robbers’’ (latvones). What 
is more, he dared to assure the Pope that “ the people of 
the city, of their own free will (propria voluntate), laid waste 
their homes, and settled in another place.” 


ie 
THE HEEL OF THE TEUTONIC ORDER 9 


It is very significant that, right to our own day, 
this fearful tragedy of Dantzig was either presented as 
doubtful by the Prussian historians or else only mentioned 
as of no importance; it was even set in‘a specially pro- 
pitious light. A modern Prussian professor of history, 
even though he questions the number of victims given as 
ten thousand by the sources, cannot deny the fact of a 
cruel slaughter, to which fell victims, as he puts it generally, 
“a certain number of Polish knights, many citizens, and 
a host of other people.” 

The latest historian of the fortress of Dantzig, a Prussian 
General, writing for the jubilee of the possession of the 
fortress by Prussia, admits freely and with the greatest 
frankness the work of destruction done by the Order, both 
explaining it as a military expert and justifying it as a 
politician.7 

“In the action of the Order with regard to Dantzig 
and Tczew (Dirschau) we have the usual Mongolian method 
of warfare. Dzhengis Khan did the same sort of thing 
on a larger scale . . . when he had not enough troops to 
allow him to garrison larger cities. In view of the slender 
armies at its disposal, the Order could not help itself in any 
other fashion.” 

This sort of reasoning need not, of course, surprise us 
in the work of a modern learned specialist, who is a Prussian 
Major-General, especially when we recall the fact that 
the work was published on the anniversary of the seizure 
of Dantzig by Prussia, and dedicated on the title-page to 
Wilhelm II. As a matter of fact, that chivalrous and 
eloquent monarch is notorious for having openly become 
the apologist and restorer of the too long neglected tactics 
of the ancient “‘ Huns,” and that for the profit of the modern 
art of war. 

The conquest of Dantzig was an event of the first im- 
portance for the further development of the Order. In 
the very next year (1309) the Grand-Master, who had hitherto 
had his seat in far-away Venice, declared the time to be 
right for transferring his final residence to Marienburg. 
Thus, Dantzig found itself involved in permanent slavery 
to that citadel of the Order. The native Kashubian-Polish 
population suffered most from the fearful visitation which 


10 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


harassed it. Driven into the surrounding marshes, forced 
steadily into an ever lower industrial and social state, it 
was impoverished, Germanized, trodden down: and yet 
throughout it refused to be stamped out, but became per- 
- meated with an easily understood hatred of its Crusader 
oppressors. 

In the same way, the neighbouring German colonists, 
although supported by the Order and indispensable for its 
future success, repaid the selfish favour granted them, united 
as it was with ruthless exploitation and open disdain, with 
feelings of hate, a hate that was deep and secret. For 
nearly a century and a half Dantzig had to hold out under 
the harsh rule of the Order, under the Teutonic sword. 
It goes without saying that it was deeply harmed, and was 
checked in the course of a healthy industrial development— 
this purely commercial town in the midst of the purely 
military organization of the Crusader State. 

In the economy of things, the city really remained, 
through this almost fatal period, thanks to its exceptionally 
fortunate geographical position, an important centre of 
commerce in Europe, welcoming at its docks a couple of 
hundred British merchantmen, reckoning its turnover by 
millions, and winning its way to the headship of all Prussian 
cities. Yet this natural growth of the city’s well-being 
was sensibly retarded and checked by the harsh and ex- 
ceedingly covetous hand of the Order. For the latter was 
as greedy of riches as of power, and oppressed people for 
the sake of gain. Thus it was not content with grasping 
Dantzig in its iron hand, nor yet with levying high dues 
on its trade: but as a finishing stroke the Order itself 
organized trade, and that on an ever-increasing scale. It 
thus became no more a protector, but both an oppressor 
and in addition a rival of Dantzig: an intolerable one, too, 

because of its hegemony, which gave it special privileges.® 
| No wonder, then, that under such circumstances the after- 
| math of the great victory of Poland over the Order won by 
| Wladislaw Jagiellon at Tannenberg was welcomed with joy 
in Dantzig, as a blessed earnest of emancipation from the 
' Teutonic yoke. True, the people of the city had to provide 
their masters with a division of levies for the battle of 
Tannenberg. But there was no more rejoicing in Poland 


THE HEEL OF THE TEUTONIC ORDER 11 


itself because of that triumph than in Dantzig. When, 
after the disaster, part of the surviving Knights began to 
seek shelter in the city, “‘ the folk became furious.” They 
at once rang the bells, fell upon the hated guests, and beat 
them up, killing some and driving the rest from the city.9 
Further, the mayor and burghers at once hastened to appear 
in the camp of the victor, Wladislaw Jagiellon, for service 
(1410) : an act too gallantly conceived, for it exposed them to 
the mortal vengeance of the Order, still armed to the teeth. 

ey were kindly received, and their city was guaranteed 
great and liberal privileges. But the result was unlucky, 
for they had hastened to do homage to the Polish King 
when the time was not yet ripe.t 

The terrible vengeance of the Order awaited them on 
their return. It is well known that the bloody Count Plauen, 
brother of the Grand-Master, who was in possession of the 
castle of Dantzig, invited to his friendly roof-tree those 
imprudent mayors, Konrad Letczkow, Arnold Hecht, and 
the alderman Bartholomew Gross; that he murdered them 
without compassion, and then returned their corpses to the 
terrified city after keeping them a week (1411). The ancient 
chronicler tells well how the citizens, smitten with fear, 
stood silent before the disdainful Commander; and only 
one, the wretched mayoress Anne Gross, broke out in des- 
perate reproofs : 


“If you were a man, as you are a woman,” the angry Commander 
said, “‘I should do with you as I have with your spouse and your 
sire.” 

“If I were a man, as I am a woman,” was the reply, “‘ and I could 
meet you face to face on the field, sir Commander, I should avenge 
them both on you with this arm of mine.” 


After which, she lifted up her voice, greatly wailing, 
says the chronicler. ‘‘I lay complaint before God in the 
high heaven for this frightful brutality and injustice which 
has come upon me, a wretched woman, and upon my 
children, against God and righteousness. I and my orphan 
children have lost father, husband, home and privileges, 
without any guilt on our part, without any verdict given. 
Do Thou, Almighty God, have pity and send the fitting 
punishment for such a mighty wrong.” * 


12 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


At last punishment and satisfaction came. When the 
Prussian Estates seeking the protection of Poland declared 
war on the Order, the people of Dantzig appeared at once 
in the van, remembering in their hearts so many injuries 
inflicted. As no others could have done, they set themselves 
to compass the ruin and end of the Order. In a twinkling 
they took their hated Teutonic castle (1454). They did 
not leave one stone on another. They razed to the ground 
that nest of beasts of prey, just as their city had been razed 
aforetime. In the Thirteen Years War between Poland 
and the Order they grudged neither blood nor money, if 
only they might help the Polish King utterly to wipe out 
the might of the Crusaders. Tireless in their voluntary 
service, which meant help to Poland and satisfaction and 
deliverance for themselves, they were most active to the 
very end. : 

They played a gallant part in the taking of Marienburg: 
witness the picture preserved even to-day in the Artushof 
in Dantzig, and the ancient rhyme underneath. Together 
with the Polish knighthood they scattered at Puck the last 
‘hosts of the Order. They kept during the struggle 15,000 
at their own cost. They spent on the war nearly half a 
million florins, which means according to our values over 
30,000,000 Polish guilders. 

When for the first time the victorious Polish King 
Casimir Jagiellon came to Dantzig (1457), the city, delivered 
from the Order, not only welcomed him in triumph, 
but it made him a considerable contribution, greatly em- 
barrassed as he was for lack of funds, to the immediate costs 
of the war: an essential contribution if the remaining strong- 
holds of the Order were to be taken. From all sides the 
men of the city brought gold and silver to the King; and 
even the fair matrons came with their jewels. The King 
was touched, and is said to have assured them “ that they 
shall have a royal reward.” It was a handsome and kingly 
recompense they got for loyal, unstinted, and manly service, 
as the learned scribe and historian of the city averred with 
just pride. From the hand of the grateful Casimir they 
received at once the two chief statutes of the city for its 
incorporation (Privilegia Casimiriana 1454, 1457).% 

On the strength of these two statutes, supplemented 


THE HEEL OF THE TEUTONIC ORDER § 18 


later on, they obtained far-reaching internal autonomy 
and generous trade rights, some of the guarantees being 
almost sovereign in their character. They obtained the 
right to enact and execute their own laws, the right to coin 
money, the right to treat with foreign powers, a crown in 
their coat of arms, and the red wax in the mayor’s seal. 
They were given considerable increase of lands for the city 
and suburbs. The basin of Dantzig, with the peninsula 
Nehring, was given to them, as well as the heights above 
the town. They were further granted the site of the castle 
of the Order, a reduction of two-thirds in their dues, and 
the right of taxes on the mills. They could maintain a 
fortress, open and close at will the port of the Vistula, control 
completely the bay, which meant, however, the reservation 
for the Polish State of the sovereignty of the sea.3 

In a word, apart from their new relation to Poland, 
they gained the invaluable rights of a free city, and certain 
guarantees for a splendid development in the future. 


II 
UNDER THE POLISH THRONE 


Now at last, after a century and a half of bondage to the 
Order, the people of Dantzig entered into a period of freedom 
and growth, lasting nearly three hundred and fifty years, 
under the Polish sceptre. This happy union with Poland 
was finally consummated in the Treaty of Torun (1466). 
Once more Casimir Jagiellon was heartily welcomed in 
the city, both as the conqueror of the Order and the 
benefactor of Dantzig. From him the city received the 
supreme dignity of ‘‘ Admiral of Poland,” and full privileges 
of free shipping. The banner of Dantzig, two white crosses 
covered by the Polish crown, on a red background, waved 
from this time on the Baltic, and right away to the western 
and southern seas. In a trice the number of vessels calling 
at the port was doubled and trebled. 

The city’s trade with Holland speedily increased. It 
reached as far as Portugal, Spain, and even to Turkey. 
Especially did it increase with France and England. The 
English had known Dantzig from the oldest days, and 
afterwards under the Crusaders had been invited by the 
Order, together with the French, to help in expeditions 
against the ‘‘Saracens” of the north, the Lithuanians 
and the Poles. Even at the end of the fourteenth century 
such noblemen as the Earl of Derby, afterwards King 
Henry IV, and Marshal Boucicaut passed through Dantzig, 
on these expeditions, in the best of good faith and inno- 
cence. Their task was represented to them as a wholly 
pious one, although it was in reality a pillaging expedition 
of the Order. All this ended with Tannenberg.™4 

From this time purely peaceful trade relations became 
fixed between Dantzig as the port of Poland, and London, 

14 


UNDER THE POLISH THRONE 15 


Hull, Nottingham, and other English sea-ports and industrial 
centres ; while they kept developing in the most successful 
manner. Through the city the products of English industry 
found their way into Poland, chiefly drapers’ wares. To 
England went grain, flour, oak and pine timber, which latter 
came to be used almost exclusively by the English fleet. 
Similarly the trade of Dantzig with France grew markedly 
at the end of the fifteenth century, especially during the wars 
of Karl V with Francis I, when the Hanseatic towns had to 
abandon their French trade. Dantzig was not slow to 
profit by this development. In the city the chief articles 
of trade were wines, oils, and French silks, which were 
exported in return for grain, timber, and Polish cloths. 

Amid such conditions Dantzig’s trade returns grew 
more and more imposing. The yearly export of grain 
alone soon reached 60,000 “ lasts” (a measure of 2-24 tons 
weight), to the value of 20,000,000 thalers. Only Amster- 
dam could compare with Dantzig at that time as an em- 
porium of world-wide trade in corn. A modern historian 
of commerce, wishing to define the ancient position of these 
two cities, has assigned them a réle corresponding to that of 
London and New York in our time. 

“Tf, then, these Dantzig people get on so well with us,” 
wrote a member of the Polish nobility with justice, ‘“ and 
get rich, thanks to our commercial dealings, they would be 
unnatural fools to think of changing their overlord.” 15 

But they had no such thought. Their connexion with 
Poland, the natural mother and nurse of their native-city, 
brought them endless gain, not only as merchants in the 
way of trade, but as citizens in the way of dignity. They 
were indeed subjects of the Polish King, but they were also 
his electors. Their delegates, “the lords from Dantzig,” 
took part in the Diet which elected Sigmund I and sat by 
the side of the bishops, palatins, and castellans of the 
Kingdom of Poland.* 

Of a surety all this did not happen, nor could it, with- 
out involving sharp and even bloody differences. The 
religious and social unrest in the city, which came early in 
the fifteenth century with the opening of the Reformation 
era, led to a fateful explanation with the King. 

“We have thought it more in keeping with our Grace,” 


16 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


replied Sigmund I to the now penitent men of Dantzig, 
“to deal with you rather in the manner of a physician who 
supplies remedies than as those who exact vengeance for so 
many transgressions.” As a matter of fact, the Statute of 
Sigmund I (1526) set limits to the caprice of the City Council, 
as Supreme Committee (Ovdnung), establishing on a firm 
footing, a Second Committee, that of Aldermen, and still 
more, adding a Third Committee, to the already set number 
of a hundred representatives. These reflected in outspoken 
manner, even though they were nominated by the Council, 
the general and settled will of the people. Thus the Statute, 
securing a more democratic order of administration and 
public safety, in the long run redounded only to the good 
of the city.?7 

A little later, with the growth of the Reformation in 
Dantzig, the religious Statute of King Sigmund Augustus 
(1557) tactfully regulated the troublesome question of creeds 
—in a temporary fashion it is true, but as practically and 
satisfactorily as was possible. And the last of the Jagiellons 
was likewise able to break the opposition of the city to a 
real union with Poland (1569-70), along quiet and peaceful 
lines. It was all done without bloodshed, but with unbending 
decision of purpose.'® 

At that very time, in the course of the last disagreement, 
the wisdom of the Statute of Sigmund I was revealed. The 
significant fact came out, and was noticeable until the end - 
of the Polish authority, that the Polish regime had won for 
itself by its kindness and beneficence solid support, both 
moral and political, in the township of Dantzig, even in the 
teeth of the City Council. It happened that a slender 
group of the patricians of the First Senatorial Committee 
was ready at times to make trouble for the Polish govern- 
ment. But the broad masses of the population represented 
in the Third Committee, while nominated by the Council, 
constituted the proper representation of the four quarters 
of the city. They were made up of the four great guilds, 
the butchers, the shoemakers, the smiths, and the bakers, 
sand they naturally gravitated beneath the high guardian- 
ship of the Polish King, thus presenting an ever-increasing 
antidote to every separatist tendency of the Council. 

It was clear that this citizen-class, merchants, apprentices, 


UNDER THE POLISH THRONE 17 


and factory-workers, who had the largest share of ancient 
Kashubian-Polish blood in their veins—above all, the petty 
traders, artisans, the fishermen, the simple folk drawing 
their livelihood from the port, the river, and the sea—these 
all not only felt bound by a personal union to their King, 
but they also regarded themselves as united with the Polish 
Republic by ties that were material and real. 

Once, and once only, was Dantzig to enter on a bitter 
conflict with the whole Republic, and that with King Stephen 
Batory, whose election they had not confirmed (1577). 
The city defended itself stubbornly, but finally surrendered 
without disgracing itself, without any regrets, but with 
honour and complete loyalty. For this it received, not 
punishment, nor yet vengeance in the fashion of the Teutonic 
Knights, but the confirmation of all its privileges, and 
even fresh and precious evidences of favour at the hands 
of the victor, King Stephen.19 

From this time onwards the splendid progress of the 
gallant and industrious city continued at an accelerated pace. 
Never again did it lend ear to the deceitful whisperings of 
strangers, whether Hanseatic or Brandenburg, against Poland. 
It did not allow them to divert it from the path of natural 
development, prescribed for it by this political and com- 
mercial union with Poland. From year to year Dantzig 
grew and became more opulent, especially towards the end 
of the sixteenth century. 

Men began to observe that it was getting too rich. The 
famous Latin poet and diplomat of Poland, Jan Dantiscus, 
native of Dantzig and Bishop of Warmia, favourite too 
of Sigmund the Elder, prophesied in stern verses the fall 
of his native city, as a result of her exaggerated prosperity. 
The poet Klonowicz, floating down with his wooden raft 
to Dantzig (or rather, as he said, to “ Chlanzic ’’—city of 
gluttons), thundered against the greedy city, \which 
encouraged by its trade covetousness, extravagance, and 
moral depravity.?° 2% 

But these plaints and homilies of moralists could not 
hide the enormously active part which Dantzig, as a powerful 
and indispensable “‘ wind-pipe,” played in the political 
_ and commercial organization of the Republic. To every 

criticism of the poet the best answer was the dry record 
2 9 


18 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


of the steadily growing import trade and still more the 
export trade of the city. On the eve of the Thirty Years 
War the export of grain from Dantzig reached close upon 
I20,000 measures, which means civca 10,000,000 bushels 
yearly—an enormous figure for those days.?? 

Happily united with Poland, and that in its own well- 
understood interest, the city achieved a full and natural 
measure of well-being and splendour. It recovered its 
proper character, for which nature destined it: becoming 
the distributor of the natural resources of the broad and 
fertile land of Poland, her fields, her forests, her prairies, 
her corn, her timber, her cattle ; and, on the other hand, the 
provider of the produce of the tropics as well as of all that 
foreign factories supplied. She was the link and the medium 
connecting the agricultural life of Poland with the manu- 
facturing world of the West. 

The Republic did not grudge the city new privileges 
which would specially guarantee her prosperous indus- 
trial position. There came in free “corn, flour, products 
of the forest, and all else necessary for the upkeep of the 
nobleman’s own home.” There came oxen for draught 
and for slaughter, there came oaks for masts for Holland 
and England. Simultaneously, too, the city was given 
the precious monopoly of ‘“‘stamping’’: the exclusive 
right to admit through the one port English, Flemish, and 
other foreign goods and to stamp them, “under peril of 
confiscation of their goods, if any dare to admit or import 
cloths by another way or without the stamp of Dantzig.” 

It is thus small wonder that the city which aforetime, 
suffering losses and wrongs, had torn itself free from the 
exploitation of the Order, but which now, under changed 
conditions, was enjoying comfort and liberty, should bind 
itself daily more firmly to the Republic which brought it 
wealth and shelter. 

In truth, the worthy men of Dantzig did not cease from 
that time onwards to give the fairest proofs of this fruitful and 
unshakeable connexion with Poland. Still earlier they had 
sent voluntary assistance time after time to the Poland of the 
Jagiellons in her military distress. As already recorded, they 
helped King Casimir Jagiellon of their own free will in his 
bitter need. In the same way they offered Sigmund Augustus 


UNDER THE POLISH THRONE 19 


three casks of gold for his war with Moscow. Likewise 
they provided help for Stephen Batory on his Moscow 
expedition, in money, heavy guns, and ammunition. Again, 
during the hard experiences of the seventeenth century, 
they stood by the Republic, weapon in hand, in the face of 
a foreign invasion of Polish domains. Accordingly, when 
blockaded in the first Swedish War (1626-29) by the grim 
might of Gustavus Adolphus, the people of Dantzig did 
not let themselves be carried away by the fair words of 
the great champion of Protestantism. Deaf alike to his 
temptings and to his threats, they held the field against 
him, and inflicted on him a serious defeat. In the issue 
they even made fun of the baffled Swedish tempter and 
“ terrorizer,”’ in mocking verses addressed to him. Thus 
keeping their word of good-faith sworn to the Republic, 
they earned words of high praise and thanks from King 
Sigmund. In three consecutive “ proclamations’”’ of the 
Diet (1627, 1628, 1629) deserved praise was awarded in the 
name of the Republic for the unbroken loyalty of Dantzig 
toward the Polish Crown.?3 24 

Again, during the Great Northern War, the gallant 
city.did not hesitate a moment in face of the siege-craft 
of the Swedish King, Carolus Gustavus. During the whole 
period (1655-60), one marked by the most cruel transi- 
tions and the most lamentable desertions in the history 
of Poland, Dantzig alone stood like an island amid the 
flood. We have here one of the fairest pages of Dantzig’s 
history. The cautious citizens set their own suburbs on fire, 
burned their own prosperous farms and suburban villas, if 
only to hinder the Swedes from settling there. Then, full of 
daring, though surrounded by the foe, they made his ears 
tingle with salutes of their cannon and muskets on’ the 
walls and in the market-place, when they heard the first 
glad news of the return of their true monarch, Jan Casimir. 

It was then that the simple townsfolk, with sober 
deference but with wise dignity, returned to Carolus Gustavus, 
who was storming the entrance to the port (Weichselmuende) 
at the time, and who kept urging them persistently to give 
themselves up to his “ kindly care,” as he was a fellow- 
Protestant, not only a definite refusal, but also a stern 
and splendid remonstrance, 


20 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


“From the moment when Dantzig became subject and 
loyal to the King of Poland, the city has always held in 
due honour the Swedish sovereigns. ... But alas, the 
sad news has come that the most gracious King to whom 
it had sworn fealty, has been fallen upon by King Carolus, 
that Swedish troops are plundering Poland, and that many 
lands, cities and strongholds have been laid waste... . 
The city has great respect for His Majesty the Swedish King, 
and does not wish to inquire and dispute as to whether 
he has rightly made war on Poland or not. That only the 
Most High, who dwells above, and is our judge, can decide. 
Yet, no doubt, He recognizes that no one on earth can 
affirm that the Swedes have a just ground for making 
war. The citizens know well what advantages will flow to 
them from reigning sovereigns, and especially from the favour 
of His Majesty, Carolus Gustavus ; but their loyalty to their 
most gracious King will not permit them to accept his terms. 
Their King has been given them by God, and through a 
free election. He is their lawful Lord, whom they have 
bound themselves by an oath to serve. 

“ This loyalty they have kept unbroken for two centuries, 
from the time when they were incorporated in the Re- 
public of Poland. If they have fallen on an evil day for 
the time being, it is because they have gone the right path 
their fathers went, and willed to have a clear conscience 
before God and a good reputation among men of unbiased 
judgment. These are the reasons why they have resorted to 
arms. If His Majesty the Swedish King appreciates these 
reasons, they have no doubt that he will exonerate them. 
Let him not forget that he too is of the Protestant faith, 
and let him not permit them to be hindered in the performance 
of what the teaching of the New Testament enjoins upon 
all Christians. . . 

‘Let him also bear in mind that the blow which has fallen 
upon Jan Casimir, in every way a very gracious and kindly 
Lord, as well as upon his kingdom and domains, may also 
at some future day fall upon Carolus Gustavus himself. 
And if in that event his senators, or subjects, or some city, 
shall stand by its rightful Lord with unwavering firmness, 
being led astray neither by bribes nor deceit, nay, 
though it should take up an even more hostile attitude 


UNDER THE POLISH THRONE 21 


than at present Dantzig is taking, could the King deny that 
such valour would be praiseworthy in subjects and honourable 
even in foes? For the rest, relying wholly on the Providence 
of God, the Commoners, Aldermen, and Council of Hundred, 
and the Three Estates of the City of Dantzig, except in so 
far as their duties towards Poland are concerned, remain 
the most obedient servants of His Majesty the King of 
Sweden.”’ 

Once more on the morrow a Protestant divine, sent 
from the Swedish camp, renewed the temptation, appealing 
directly to their business interests, as being the first and 
chiefest ground why they should submit. Forthwith, deeply 
annoyed, the Commoners enlightened the delegate-bishop 
in regard to “the customs and principles on which the 
city has governed itself for ages,” with these prudent and 
beautiful words: 

“Our fathers were attached above everything, to the 
Gospel of Christ. After this, their next attachment was 
to their Kings, as being those whom God Himself set in 
authority over them. In the third place, they were careful 
not to sever themselves from the Polish Kingdom, with 
which they were incorporated. Fourthly, they defended, 
while strength lasted, their rights, privileges, freedom, and 
customs. Lastly, they applied themselves to the improve- 
ment of trade, industry, and their own well-being. 

“But these latter duties never took precedence over 
the former. Profit and business never stood before truth 
and goodness. No man, surely, will believe that God is 
pleased when people break the faith due to their King in order 
to further the cause of religion. The inborn understanding 
of the people of Dantzig, weak as it is, teaches them that 
nothing so impresses religion on the heart, or establishes 
it more securely in the life than simplicity of spirit and that 
peace for which all hearts and tongues should pray to Jesus 
Christ.” 

And they carried their point, at the cost of great exertions, 
of good citizen blood, of huge losses in buildings and trade, 
as well as of four and a half million Polish guilders in cash, 
given as a war contribution to the Republic. They awaited 
the solemn approach of Jan Casimir to set their city free (1656). 
In the speech of welcome to the Syndicus of Dantzig Fabricius, 


22 DANTZIG AND POLAND > 


they heard the high declaration from the lips of the Lord 
High Chancellor of Poland, that ‘‘ by this city alone, in spite 
of the superior might, tyranny, and deceit of a cruel foe, 
the whole Republic has been conserved.”’ They heard from 
the lips of the King and many Polish senators in the following 
Diets (1659, 1661) repeated and warm recommendations of 
worthy rewards for Dantzig from the Republic, in order 
“to rejoice her,’”’ and “the better to rouse the city to 
maintaining itself in such obedience, thus deeply rooted 
for all time.’’ 25 26 

During the next reign Dantzig was privileged to welcome 
in its midst for the longer space of some seven months 
the great King Jan Sobieski (1677-78). In addition to 
the numerous matters of finance and politics bound up 
with this longish royal visit, there arose also the matter of 
arranging the internal affairs of the city. Here again, as 
before so often, the common people turned for protection 
to its Polish King, as against its own oligarchic council. 
“Deputations of the guilds of Dantzig, especially of the 
shoemakers and the butchers, literally besieged Sobieski 
with complaints against the Council.” The shoemaker 
George Meyer, leader of one of these deputations, told the 
King straight that ‘‘he would accomplish and realize more 
in Dantzig with the help of the guilds than Batory with 
the sword.” , 

“God in heaven!” exclaimed Sobieski, moved by the 
attachment shown towards him by this worthy Dantzic 
shoemaker, ‘‘ the man is a plain fellow, and yet with what 
eloquence does he speak, and address himself to me.” 

The King then granted the request of the guilds, and 
heard their complaints about the abuses of the City Council 
in the matter of the election and vote of the Third Committee. 
At the same time he considered in detail the wants of the 
Catholic elements in the guilds’ associations of the city, 
which were especially devoted to him and the Republic. 
Finally, by his decree (Decretum Joannis III, 1678) the 
powers of the Third Committee were extended, and a definite 
number of artisans were included; and this was all carried 
out in the same democratic spirit which the royal Polish 
authority steadily kept in view throughout the whole of 
the stay in Dantzig.?7 


~ 


UNDER THE POLISH THRONE 28 


When at length, after many years, the men of Dantzig 
met for the last time the might of the Swedish Charles XII, 
the conflict took place amid virtually new conditions. For the 
rest, though they supported King Stanislaw Leszczynski at 
his first election (1705), they did not make serious trouble 
for August II] the moment he was made rightful lord by 
the whole Polish nation. It then happened that, during 
the new war in the north, the people of Dantzig had twice 
to welcome the new ruler of the East, Peter the Great (1716, 
1717). He was received in the Council-hall with the brilliance 
worthy of a crowned head. His speech, made in the Polish 
tongue, was listened to with fitting respect. They could 
not, indeed, keep the common people from less favourable 
manifestations. The Czar, with his numerous attendants, 
drank much, took great liberties, and brought much expense 
on the city, as the native historian recorded with a sigh.?8 

It was the first time that the covetous eyes of a Czar 
rested on Dantzig. Even then the City Council had to 
be .on the watch against the espionage of his attendants, 
and even against a sudden armed attack. From this time 
the idea of reaching out after the wealthy Polish-German 
city became a part of Russian politics. It rose to the 
surface time after time later on, under Czarina Elizabeth, 
and again under Czar Alexander. 


Iil 
THE DECLINE OF THE REPUBLIC 


AT the great election contest of Poland, which followed 
closely after, the men of Dantzig had an opportunity of 
affording striking proof that they were truly at one with 
the national temper of the Republic, not only in material 
but also in moral affairs. 

The occasion was that of the second election of Stanislaw 
Leszczynski (1733). The unhappy Stanislaw “‘I and Il” 
was scarcely elected when he was driven out of Warsaw 
by the election of August III, carried out with the help of 
Russian arms. Forsaken by fortune and his supporters, 
he took refuge from pursuit behind the walls of Dantzig. 
The city had no obligations towards him. It had nothing 
to gain by welcoming an exile king, without authority, or 
troops, or even funds. Moreover, it could not doubt the 
necessity of thus assuming responsibility for his desperate 
cause, which was from the start hopelessly lost. All this 
meant risking serious conflicts, no small losses, and a 
dangerous and hopeless trial of arms. 

But Leszczynski had all the same the weight of public 
opinion in Poland behind him. He was the rightly elected 
monarch, and thus the rightful sovereign lord of Dantzig. 
So the noble councillors of the city, after ripe deliberation, 
followed the unanimous decision ,of their citizen-body ; 
and, with a loyal feeling of their solidarity and their duty 
as subjects, not only did they not refuse the exile hospitality, 
but took him in, and made it a point of honour to stand 
by him to the last—“‘ to defend to the end the sacred person 
of His Majesty the King.” 

‘““ Welcome, beloved Sovereign, to the good city of 

2 


THE DECLINE OF THE REPUBLIC 25 


Dantzig! It alone has the great joy of seeing its King 
with its own eyes in its midst!” 

Thus did the ‘‘ Joyful Dantzig ’’ welcome the Polish 
King, with the rugged rhyme of a native singer. These 
curious and amusing expressions of regard for Stanislaw, 
in verse and prose, are worth reading. Much, indeed, was 
issued at the time in the same strain by the ancient presses 
of the city. Amusing they were, beyond a doubt, with their 
pedantry of sentiment and exaggeration. Yet they were 
certainly curious, even moving; especially if one recalls 
the honest intentions from which they sprang, and the 
special environing circumstances, such as the beating of 
alarm-bells, the shouting of enemy columns assaulting the 
city, the noise of bursting bombs, and the thunder of heavy 
guns of the Saxon and Russian besiegers. 

In fact, as was to be expected, the city was enveloped 
by the iron ring of the Czarina’s troops, in pursuit of the 
King. The pressure brought to bear by the famed Russian 
Commander-in-Chief, Muennich (1734) became daily severer. 
But Dantzig defended itself against the siege-craft of the 
Russian Field-Marshal with the same stoutness and stubborn- 
ness it had shown against the Swedes. It was fighting for 
a cause openly regarded as lost. Cut off from Poland and 
the world, it could not really hope for relief. From one 
source alone, from France, came valiant help, but in vain. 
Louis XV sent it—the son-in-law of the exile Stanislaw. 
Once, in the seventeenth century, when hard pressed by the 
Swedes, Dantzig had been helped by the Dutch fleet. Now, 
still harder pressed by the Russians, it saw for the first time 
the war-ships of France approaching, alas! with too weak 
succour. Then it was that, under the walls of Dantzig, 
French blood was spilt for the first time for Poland, under 
the leadership of the gallant young Count Plélo, who was 
killed here by a Russian bullet. The debt has since been 
paid back a hundred-fold by Polish blood, shed in the 
cause of France. 

The French attempt at relief failed: but the city, left 
to its own resources, did not lose courage, but stoutly with- 
stood the superior Russian army. Without distinction of 
class or guild, the wealthy patrician leaders at the side of 
the simple dock-workers, day and night served with per- 


26 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


severance, bravery, and watchfulness, manning the guns 
and also taking turns at outposts. Even the gallant matrons, 
vigorous burgher-women, are said to have tried their hand 
at the art of war in this time of stress. ‘‘ Ye womenfolk, 
matrons and maidens! Let the foe see your womanly 
valour!” Thus did the enthusiastic bard, Stanislaw’s 
partisan, challenge the city’s sisters and mothers to the 
conflict. 

The truth is that the wretched Stanislaw was wearied 
by the refractory magnates and noblemen of Poland whom 
he had with him in the beleaguered city, and who, having 
lost heart altogether, were reproaching him daily for their 
common disappointment. He enjoyed infinitely more respect 
at the hands of the simple, generous, and loyal citizen body, 
which did not cease to honour in his person the sacrosanct 
majesty of the Republic. The consequence was that when 
the King at length fled from the city in secret, the unexpected 
news struck the burghers like a thunderbolt. It roused in 
them, not the feeling of relief one would have expected, but 
one of sincere regret, and of something like despair. 

Then, and only then, when they had no longer anyone 
to defend, the city surrendered. They did it with honour, 
after four and a half months of siege, after surviving more 
than four thousand bombs, at the hands of some fifty 
thousand troops led by the ablest general of his time. They 
had to send a mission on purpose to St. Petersburg to beg 
the Czarina’s pardon in the name of the city. The price 
paid was a heavy one: some of the best blood of the 
town, widespread ruins in its borders, and a war contribu- 
tion amounting to millions. But they proved finely, once 
again, by this stout act of fidelity, that they were worthy 
citizens of the Polish Republic.9 

It was not to be expected that the mutual relations 
between the new King August III, the second of the Polish 
Saxon dynasty, and the valiant city which had defended 
the royal rival stubbornly to the very last, would shape 
themselves quite satisfactorily. The fact is therefore the 
more noteworthy that, in spite of what had happened, the 
people of Dantzig trustingly placed themselves under his 
care as if by an age-long instinct. It was once more 
the common people of the city, accustomed to the 


THE DECLINE OF THE REPUBLIC 27 


solicitous protection of its Polish King, who supported 
this step. 

Delegates of the Third Committee turned as of yore 
to August for help against the patrician caprice of the 
Council. And they actually evoked the new Royal Decree 
(Ordinatio Augusti III, 1750), with its democratic temper, 
which broke finally with the autocracy and dealt a decisive 
blow at the preponderance of the patrician Council. Instead, 
it confirmed, defined clearly, and extended the franchise 
granted to the common people, so that it worked admirably. 
In return the grateful Third Committee, together with the 
merchants, set up a magnificent marble statue of the King, 
which is still to be seen in the old Artushof. 

The wretched Lengnich, then Professor of history and law 
in the academy high school of the city, and later Syndicus 
of Dantzig, being famous as a jurist and historian, had to 
justify in writing the just demands of the Third Committee 
at the command of the King himself, although he himself 
inclined rather in spirit to the side of the Council of patricians. 
He was a learned man, the glory of Dantzig, a member of 
the Imperial Russian Academy, and Councillor of the Saxon 
Embassy. Both these titles, he tells us himself, ‘‘ I quite 
declined to avail myself of after good consideration.” He 
was an able and cautious diplomat, called by those who 
did not like him “‘ the Prussian Tacitus,” since by his taci- 
turnity he, a historian, won his way to the Syndicateship. 

He was exceedingly zealous and stubborn in his per- 
petuation of all Dantzig’s legal fictions, especially those 
against the parliamentary Polish estates, and bound by 
the deepest affection to his own native city-state. Never- 
theless, when all is said and done, the old man remained 
a loyal and attached son of his greater motherland, the 
Polish Republic, although he maintained more than one 
legal distinction and harboured more than one grudge. 
His first work of learning was ‘‘ The Polish Library,” written 
in German. Yet on the title-page of the book he specified 
the place where the book was published in a marked manner : 
“ Tannenberg, where Wladislaw Jagiellon smote the Teutonic 
lords.’”” He voices many subtle distinctions, e.g. that 
Dantzig should be “ loyal’’ to the Polish Kings alone, and 
is bound only to “ further the well-being” of the Polish 


28 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


Crown (hinting at the antithesis between a personal union 
under the King and a real political union with the Republic). 
He gets deeply angry at Poland for assuming towards 
Dantzig the name domina. But he records in detail and 
with pride and affection the services done by Dantzig for 
Poland, and vice versa. 

He takes pleasure in recording which Polish Kings 
“honoured the city with their presence, and stayed here 
either a shorter or longer time’’—‘‘ Casimir twice, Sig- 
mund III six times, Wladislaw III as sovereign three times, 
Jan Casimir the like number, August II four times, Alexander, 
Sigmund I, Sigmund Augustus, and Jan III Sobieski, each 
once.’’ As for those kings who, alas, did not pay Dantzig 
the favour of a visit, the loyalist Lengnich notes that King 
Jan Albert died on the way to the city, Stephen Batory was 
just starting for it when he passed away, King Henry Valois 
was kept from a visit by the lack of time for it, and King 
Michael by internal and external complications, “ although 
the Queen manifested a keen desire to see our city.”” The 
distinguished patriot of Dantzig, without being conscious 
of it, and even in spite of his local connexion, became a 
finished Pole. | 

It should be added here that all the famous men of the 
city who achieved repute in Europe belong without exception 
to the period. of Dantzig’s union with Poland, and neither 
to the former Teutonic time nor to the later Prussian one. 
Such were the native-born John Hoeffen-Dantiscus already 
mentioned (born 1485), Latinist and statesman; John 
Hevelius, famous astronomer (born 1614), the friend of Jan 
Sobieski, and who called the heavenly constellation he 
discovered Scutum Sobiescianum, in honour of the Polish 
King; the illustrious scientist Gabriel Fahrenheit (born 
1686) ; the able lawyer and historian mentioned, Godfrey 
Lengnich (born 1689); and the master of painting and 
drawing, Daniel Chodowiecki (born 1726) .3° 

We must also note that in the ancient city, besides the 
admittedly prevailing German culture, there existed, and 
even progressed, a Polish current joining in one stream with 
the original Slav sources of the city and its surroundings, 
and unceasingly strengthened by the ever closer relations and 
union with Poland. This Polish element, flourishing right 


THE DECLINE OF THE REPUBLIC 29 


up to the final separation of Dantzig from the Republic 
fragmentary as it was, made itself felt not only in the 
practical spheres of life, but also in those of the intellectual 
evolution of the city. Polish literature played an illustrious 
part in ancient Dantzig, where, from capital printing-presses, 
from the beginning of the sixteenth to the end of the 
eighteenth century, many a Polish book was issued. Here, 
too, very early, after the famous Swedish menace (1656), a 
Polish paper was printed under the editorship of the native- 
born Jacob Weiss.3! 

As a matter of fact, according to the word of an honest 
German historian of Dantzig, ‘‘the Polish language must 
have been as common at the time (sixteenth century and 
after) on the lips of the people as the German. The result 
was that in many churches, especially in St. James, St. 
Bartholomew, and St. Catherine, Polish preaching was 
the custom.’”’ Again, according to the same unquestioned 
witness, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, until 
the seizure of the city by Prussia, “‘ knowledge of Polish 
was still indispensable for every citizen of Dantzig, so that 
the sons of the first families, before entering the city high 
schools, used to be sent for a time to some one of the small 
towns or villages of the neighbourhood, where Polish was 
the prevailing tongue.’’ This last detail, worthy of the 
gravest attention, clearly demonstrates the fact that until 
the fall of Poland its language was maintained in its purity 
in Dantzig, and that the communities round about were 
ethnographically Kashubian-Polish.34 

Meanwhile, during the reign of August III, Dantzig’s 
affairs with those of the entire Republic fell under the ominous 
influence of its most dangerous neighbour, the new Prussian 
King, Frederic the Great. His Silesian wars, and the fact 
that during these wars trade was no longer safe, reduced 
the export of corn from the city to a bare 20,000 
measures a year. It soon recovered, with the conclusion 
of peace, and in the following decade went up again to 
50,000 measures.33 

It was at this time that Dantzig, on the tercentenary 
of its union with Poland, had an opportunity of expressing 
publicly its unwavering adherence to the Republic. At the 
two former anniversaries, the religious and political quarrels 


30 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


in the sixteenth and the disastrous years of war in the 
seventeenth century had made joyous memorial celebrations 
impossible. The more eagerly, then, did Dantzig set itself, 
at the middle of the eighteenth century, to commemorate 
the three hundredth anniversary of its happy connexion 
with Poland. During this proud celebration (1754), and 
in the eloquent orations of the learned Professor Gottlieb 
Wensdorff, Pastor Titius, and others, in the verses written 
in Latin and German, and in the hearty proclamations of 
the Council and the Committees, there found vent both 
the feelings of irreconcilable dislike of the Crusader yoke and 
those of loyal gratitude and attachment to Poland.34 

A couple of years later troublesome times came again 
to the city, as the result of the Seven Years War set in 
motion by Frederic the Great. And yet the danger of 
the moment was one which threatened not only from the 
side of Prussia, but still more from that of his enemy the 
Czarina Elizabeth. In fact, at this time, a quarter of a 
century after the trouble over Stanislaw, rumours of war 
began to reach Dantzig from the east. Again the same 
Russian menace appeared, though under another form. 

It was in the second half of the Seven Years War. 
Dantzig had in the main not only not lost by the war, but had 
rather profited from it. It was an inexhaustible storehouse, 
which supplied for good money, grain and forage for the 
needs of both sides. But the medal had its reverse side. 
Both warring parties, Prussian and Russian, carrying on 
the conflict round about the city, conceived the fatal tempting 
idea of getting it into their hands. The Prussians had 
had it of old, as an inheritance from the Teutonic Order. 
At this time, however, the desperate military situation in 
which Frederic found himself made the thing impossible. 
It was shown above how the same plan was in the mind of 
Russia from the time of the visits of Peter the Great. 

It now seemed as if Russia could achieve her wish, 
because at the end of the Seven Years War the power of 
Prussia appeared to be falling in ruins. Thanks chiefly 
to the pressure of the Czarina’s armies, Frederic, appar- 
ently quite beaten, yielded to the superior numbers of his 
adversaries. The whole of Prussia proper was in Russian 
hands, The oath of allegiance had been exacted already 


THE DECLINE OF THE REPUBLIC 31 


in Koenigsberg to the Czarina Elizabeth, and in the cathedral 
there, during three years (1758--62) the Russian Archimandrit, 
Tichon, spoke for Elizabeth as if for the mistress of Prussian 
lands.35 

In the Russian camp, men began to think seriously of 
annexing Dantzig. The plan, worked out by the Commander, 
Field-Marshal Buturlin, was suddenly to be executed by 
the Lieutenant-General Tchernyshew. With this end in 
view he was to occupy the suburbs of the city, under the 
pretence of a temporary strategic necessity. The Vice- 
Chancellor Woronzow even began secret negotiations about 
the matter at the Court of Versailles. 

The official correspondence of that time between Saxony 
and Poland proves that August III was seriously alarmed 
by the news of the secret Russian attack on Dantzig. The 
King was in Warsaw at the time. Fortunately joint 
influences brought to bear on the allied Court in St. 
Petersburg, and especially with the Czarina herself, were 
successful. The project to seize the city was not, as far as 
can be judged, properly worked out in the Russian Cabinet, 
but arose rather in the camp, as simply an opportune idea. 

For the rest, the whole military and political situation 
was completely changed. Frederic recovered his power, 
and a general time of peace-making ensued. It sufficed 
that the danger threatening Dantzig from the Russian 
quarter was removed for the time being without further 
harmful consequences. And although later on similar dangers 
were to menace her from the east, they never were able to 
reach the stage of final execution. 


1V 
THE PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION 


MEANWHILE in another quarter an infinitely more serious 
storm was gathering over Dantzig, a nearer peril from which 
there was no escape, a danger that might be averted for 
a time, but could not be escaped. It was the Prussian 
peril. The Prussian King, heir of the Order, appeared as a 
candidate for the prey of four centuries ago, lost then by 
the Knights. 

For long enough the Hohenzollerns, one after the other, 
had paid passing visits at various times and had a look 
at Dantzig. On their accession to the throne, journeying 
from Berlin to the coronation city of Koenigsberg, they 
were wont to make a halt in that town, and though they 
were not yet able to lay a covetous hand upon it, they at 
least surveyed its riches and beauty with eager eyes. Thus 
the Great Elector, Frederic William, passed through in 1662. 
Frederic I passed through five times (1690, 1697-98, 1701), 
Frederic William I twice (1714, 1739). The latter used his 
opportunity to entice away for his suite some tall grenadiers 
of the city, who had been assigned to him as a guard of 
honour. Lastly Frederic the Great visited Dantzig four 
times, first as heir to the throne, and then as King (1735, 1740, 
1753). | 

This last, most distinguished as well as most dangerous 
guest, did not indeed strive to carry out in person the design 
of seizing Dantzig. Nevertheless, he was to work out most 
precisely the plan of occupation, and start it on the way 
of direct and brutal execution. For long he had had his 
eye on the city, and desired it from the time when, as heir 
to the throne, he saw how it defended its beloved King 
Leszczynski. He wished to be joven by the people of Dantzig, 


THE PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION 33 


and had his own peculiar way to compass this end. He 
wanted to be loved because of excessive hatred. He wanted 
the people so to hate mightily the enemy in him, that they 
would at last be forced rather to love in him the ruler. He 
wanted to strangle them so long as neighbours, that they 
would finally prefer to enjoy peace as his subjects. 

This unexampled design of extortion on the part of 
Frederic the Great towards Dantzig, with all its refinement 
of detail, began with the first entrance into power of Poland’s 
last King, Stanislaw August Poniatowski. From the 
King’s election-day Frederic began ceaselessly to sap the 
strength of the defenceless Republic, and especially the city 
of Dantzig. Thus, under diverse pretexts, now temporary 
reprisals, now averred titles of overlordship, the Prussian 
King began to strangle the town cleverly and deliberately, 
and all with conscious consistency and calculated masterliness. 
As a first pretext he used the proclamation of universal 
tariffs by the Diet assembled at Warsaw 1764 for the election 
of Poniatowski. Although the matter was a purely internal 
one for Poland, and the tariff involved all her boundaries 
alike as well as her trade relations with all her neighbours, 
yet Frederic felt himself injured personally, and justified 
in making good the fancied wrong with his own hand, and 
according to his own sweet will. He made it good, of course, 
chiefly at the cost of Dantzig. 

The city lived on its trade with Poland, thanks to the 
free course of the Vistula. Frederic established a station 
below Kwidzyn-Marienwerder, in the middle of the river ; 
instituted unheard-of transit duties, introduced intolerable 
rights of search, planted his soldiers and set up his cannon 
(1765). Having thus pressed under his heavy hand the 
life-giving artery of the city, he began systematically to 
draw it tighter, without any mercy. It was plain robbery, 
but it brought Frederic in considerable returns. For 
this reason he paid no attention to the powerless protesta- 
tions of the Republic of Poland and of Dantzig itself. 
Fortunately, intervention came from a stronger Power, 
that of Russia. Catherine II could not be deaf to the 
desperate complaints of the Polish King in this regard, 
since he had been elected under her zxgis, and Poniatowski 
was her own candidate. As a result of her interposition 

3 


34 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


Frederic had to yield, and remove his station in the Vistula, 
which brought him so much gold. 

But matters endlessly greater soon came along, which 
thrust that of the tariff into a corner. Complications of a 
political and religious nature arose, of which the final outcome 
was the First Partition of the Republic. Frederic now put 
forth his whole skill, first as tempter, then as negotiator. At 
first his purpose was, either by pretences of favour, or by 
crushing them with unbearable oppression, to sever the 
people of Dantzig from Poland, to draw them toward himself, 
and to reconcile them to an occupation. His next purpose 
was, after getting to the point of negotiations for a partition, 
at the same time, and as a part of the treaty, to obtain 
Dantzig for his own possession as an addition to his other 
gains from the transaction. 

He began then first to make overtures to the people of 
the city. At a time when he was kindling in Poland the 
question of religious dissension as a step toward the partition, 
the zealous Protestant King, who had just laid his tribute on 
the earnings of his fellow-believers the Protestant citizens 
of Dantzig by confiscating their wares, now began all at 
once with zealous energy to appear in the réle of champion 
of their religious liberties against Polish fanaticism. And 
to attain his ends, he began in the name of the common 
Protestant faith to urge the people, through his clever 
agent in Dantzig, to link up with the Confederation of 
Dissidents in Poland. 

The honest councillors of the city defended themselves 
against uninvited guardianship. They swore that their faith 
was suffering no wrong, that they had no need to complain 
of any of their burdens as Dissidents to the Polish Crown. 
Finally, and really under compulsion, they joined the Con- 
federation as ordered; but in the moment of entry they 
entrenched themselves under the most express reservation, 
that ‘“‘ they do not commit themselves to anything which 
would compromise their loyalty owed to His Majesty the 
King of Poland, and to the Most Serene Republic ’’ (1767). 

A couple of years later, when the project of the partition 
was ripe, Frederic adopted other tactics toward Dantzig. 
From the réle of seduction he returned to that of oppression ; 
from being a gracious master to being tyrannizer. Under 


THE PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION 35 


pretence of searching for deserters, he sent to the city re- 
cruiting contingents, and took by force from among the 
people recruits for the Prussian army. The unbounded 
deceit of these pretensions was evident to all. He insisted 
on taking four thousand conscripts who had “ deserted,” a 
scandalous pretence, which would have involved a fair part 
of the whole male population of the city. Using similar 
trumped-up claims, he placed Prussian regiments on the city’s 
territory, and under the pretext of some recompense due 
to him he exacted a wholly arbitrary contribution from 
the inhabitants of 200,000 ducats (1770). 

As executor of these crying injustices, he placed in Dantzig 
his agent, the notorious Legation-Councillor Junck, a pro- 
fessional thief and provocateur, about whom even a modern 
official Prussian historian had to admit that his chief business 
was “‘ to provoke the people of Dantzig.”” Having exhausted 
these pretensions as to deserters and recruits, Frederic, who 
was never at a loss for devices, thought out a new plan. 
With the beginning of the new year he invented an 
“epidemic ’’ as a reason for investing the city with a 
hygienic “ cordon’’ of troops, in return for which service 
he obliged the city to pay him during the two years 
1771-72 100,000 ducats. 

Meanwhile the negotiations proper began about the 
First Partition of Poland. From the start Frederic had 
his mind set on Polish Prussia, but he did not forget 
Dantzig. This neighbour and friend, the King of Prussia, 
the zealous defensor fidei, the uninvited champion of the 
Protestant faith of the people of Dantzig, as well as of their 
physical health, now graciously designed to express his 
willingness to receive them wholly beneath his sceptre. 

It is true they were in no hurry to hasten under the 
wings of their fellow Protestant black eagle, for they knew 
very well his insatiable appetite for Customs dues. But 
Frederic insisted on converting them to the Prussian faith 
in his own way. And one must do him the justice to admit 
that he did not let any possibilities slip. Now he was fawn- 
ing, now vehement, now menacing, but ever full of resources 
both in wealth of his tactics and in his eager persistency. 
This greed and persistency struck his contemporaries forcibly. 
Voltaire remarked to him tauntingly that if the Czarina had 


86 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


thoughts of Byzantium and Athens, he did not cease thinking 
of Dantzig. ‘‘ Your Royal Majesty would prefer the port 
of Dantzig to that of Pirzus: and rightly !”’ 

Frederic went to work like a master. At the outset, 
when the first negotiations were on, he pretended to give 
up Dantzig entirely, reserving himself, of course, “ suitable 
recompense for that city.’’ Then, after assuring himself 
of quite plenteous ‘‘recompense”’ for a thing which did 
not belong to him at all, he began afresh to remember the 
city, this wondrous treasure, and that with increased vehe- 
mency. During the negotiations about the partition in 
St. Petersburg he kept urging his claim to get control of 
the city right to the end, before the principal mistress of 
the business, Catherine. He was bound to have from her 
adjudged that indispensable, trifling, addition of Dantzig 
to his share of Poland. 

“As far as Dantzig is concerned,’ he wrote to his Am- 
bassador in St. Petersburg, ‘‘ I regard the matter as quite 
simple. Why, Avignon was once the Pope’s, and the 
French took it. Strasbourg was a free city, and it was 
incorporated by Louis XIV. History shows many other 
such cases. For the rest I should not care about any such 
insignificant trading town. But one can see at a glance 
on the map that it cuts in two all my possessions.” 

He was deeply offended that ‘‘such a row is made”’ 
about poor ‘‘ Dantzig, which would be only a nuisance 
(une niaiserie) to the Russians.’’ He even threatened, if 
refused, to break his alliance with the Empress, taking 
advantage of her difficulties with the Turks, and frightening 
her with the threat of getting Austria to intervene. “Il am 
a business man,’ he wrote to St. Petersburg. ‘“‘ Ye come to 
me to buy goods, to get help, and subsidies. I say, Please 
pay me so and so much, and in such coin. Ye reply, We 
do not wish to pay in this coin. In this case the merchant 
bows low, shuts up his wares, and prefers to betake himself 
elsewhere. How, then, my lords Russians! Do you want 
me to run risks? Do you want reinforcements from me ? 
Agreed, but Polish Prussia and Dantzig—-that is the 
price of my help! You see, my beloved Russians, you 
must decide whether you need my wares or not. Can you 
get along without them? Perhaps Dantzig, which you 


THE PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION 37 


love so dearly, can give you what I am selling too dear. 
Indeed I find it hard to believe that such a vanity (une 
miséve) as Dantzig is should detain for a moment the clear 
and wise mind of the great Empress.”’ 36 

All this eloquence availed for the time being naught. 
It was premature. The unhappy Frederic could not yet 
reach Dantzig. The resistance of the people of the city 
themselves was naturally not insignificant ; they defended 
themselves desperately against their hated Prussian neigh- 
bour. They raised an alarm throughout the whole of 
Europe. They turned for aid to their former trading 
comrades and patrons, the General Estates of Holland. 
They turned also for help to Great Britain.%’ 

We have noted that the relations of Dantzig with England 
were of very early date. Of yore England fed her people 
with Polish grain brought by way of Dantzig, supplied her 
fleet with magnificent timber for masts from Polish forests, 
and in return kept Poland provided with her fine cloths 
and the savoury products of her overseas colonies. In the 
days of Elizabeth George Carrew reached Dantzig as the 
Queen’s special messenger, bearing a declaration of her 
favour and of her commercial preferences (1598). Dantzig 
in return sent an embassy to King James I. 

It is true that at times passing disputes arising out of 
local commercial rivalries grew into fairly sharp quarrels 
between Dantzig and England; but they were arranged 
without difficulty to the satisfaction of both parties. The 
agreements made between the delegates of the English 
Company and the Senate of Dantzig led to a mutually helpful 
Commercial Treaty (1631). The men of Dantzig secured 
from Charles II an interpretation of the universal English 
Navigation Act, which gave them special advantages (1668). 
John Robinson, Envoy Extraordinary of Queen Anne, came 
to Dantzig, and concluded in her name an Anglo-Dantzig 
agreement, very advantageous to the city., Settled in 1706, 
it regulated mutual trade relations for the whole century, 
and has never been properly done away with to this 
very day. 

It was just because of violence done to this last agree- 
ment by Frederic, that Dantzig turned with complaints to the 
English Government. At once the citizens set forth elo- 


38 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


quently through the Polish Ambassador in London, Bukaty, 
the peril that hung over their town—not only of plundering, 
but even of seizure by Prussia. These exertions called forth 
at least a certain moralreaction. Bukaty’s memorial, printed 
in English in London, drew the attention of the public. 
The young Edmund Burke time after time raised his voice 
against the violence being done to Poland, in his ‘‘ Annual 
Register,” in the years 1772-73. 

Frederic became uneasy. He tried through Maltzan, his 
Ambassador in London, to check the interest shown in 
Britain for Poland in general and Dantzig in particular. 
“England,” he wrote, “‘ has no reason for worrying about 
Polish matters. They are really strange to her, and cannot 
have the least effect either upon her position or her 
interests,’’3* 

Unfortunately, the then English Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Lord Suffolk, rightly branded at a later time by the 
great Chatham as an “ unconstitutional, inhuman and un- 
christian ’’ politician, did not make a successful defence 
of Poland, which was being torn in pieces, nor yet of 
unhappy Dantzig, exposed as a victim of Frederic the 
Great’s extortions. The bold and far-seeing writer J: Williams 
estimated better than the Minister the unworthy conduct 
of the Prussian King, ‘‘ whose family has received their all, 
except the lakes and sand banks of Brandenburg, from the 
Crown of Poland,’ and has never ceased to repay the 
Republic with the bitterest hatred and the gravest injuries. 

In such a pass the people of Dantzig, who could not rely 
either on the help of powerless, plundered Poland, nor yet 
on the distant, platonic sympathy of Holland and England, 
once more appealed,to the mighty and near-lying Russia. 
Here once more they did in fact find a certain temporary 
support. Of yore Czarina Anna had promised in a special 
amnesty (1736), after the city had been taken by Muennich, 
and the Dantzig delegation had begged for pardon in St. 
Petersburg, ‘‘ her most Serene intervention for maintaining 
the present rights and liberties of Dantzig, religious and 
other.” Later, after the city had been forced to identify 
itself with the Confederation of Dissidents, the same decree 
was confirmed by an ukase of Catherine II in Dantzig’s 
favour (1767). 


THE PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION — 39 


This réle of ee which Russia played toward the 
rich seaport, was naturally dictated by deeper selfish 
considerations. The policy of Catherine was as little 
inclined to give up the purpose of getting possession of 
Dantzig as had been that of Peter, or Anna, or Elizabeth. 
There was thus the less disposjtion in the Cabinet to let the 
rich spoil of the city go towards enlarging the Prussian share 
from the partition of Poland. As it was, Frederic was to 
extend this share far and away beyond what the treaty 
gave him, by use of unheard-of violence and by deceit in 
setting the boundaries. 

The cautious councillors of Dantzig were wise enough 
to profit by all these circumstances, in pleading the cause 
of their safety before the Czarina against the Prussian 
King. The skilled and energetic Willebrandt, who was 
then Dantzig’s agent in St. Petersburg, was able to reach 
several men of influence: Count Orlow, who had been 
Catherine’s favourite, the influential Saldern, Prince Golizyn, 
and others. He succeeded in weakening the influence 
of the Prussian Ambassador on the Neva, Count Solms, 
and parried his claims to Dantzig. At the same time the 
Dantzig agent in London, Anderson, invoked his connections 
in the merchant world of the City, and gave rise to rather 
more express instructions from Lord Suffolk for Gunning, the 
English Ambassador in St. Petersburg, in defence of Dantzig. 
Willebrandt’s efforts and the favourable representations of 
Gunning, were supported also in lively fashion by the friendly 
and long-acknowledged influence of Holland. Thanks to 
this, the State Council in St. Petersburg tabled a thoroughly 
sharp protest against the Prussian designs upon Dantzig. 
At the end Frederic had to yield. 

He did it in his own way. He yielded outwardly, in 
order the better to spring later on the desired booty, and 
meantime he took special pay for his concession. Meeting 
a decided opposition from Russia in the matter of Dantzig, 
the Prussian King set forth his formal declaration in the 
Treaty of the First Partition (1772), that ‘‘ for renouncing 
all rights to the city of Dantzig and its lands, he takes 
by way of recompense (en guise d’équivalent) the rest of 
Polish Prussia.’ 39 

But Frederic the Great did not give up so easily. He 


40 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


never cared for the most sacred treaties, but, just as in the 
two Silesian and in the Seven Years War, he broke them again 
with brutal violence. He was the less disposed to bind 
himself by the first Treaty of Partition, which was in truth 
nothing else than an act of open international robbery, 
consecrated by diplomacy. He therefore set about for 
himself to extend the portion of the spoil his collaborators 
had assigned to him. The moment he had renounced 
Dantzig solemnly in the Treaty, he proceeded to demand 
its seizure. The trouble was that, although the three 
Powers dividing Poland had signed the contract, a year 
had to pass before this was sanctioned by the plundered 
Polish Republic. By that time Frederic thought to better 
his terms, by forcing the people of Dantzig to renounce 
Poland and submit to his sceptre. 

The refined cynicism with which Frederic set about 
this compulsory torturing of a defenceless city so long and 
so cruelly, that it must sometime surrender to his authority, 
has few parallels in modern history. Injustices have been 
done, far worse from a material point of view, and bloodier ; 
but there never was a meaner one morally. Frederic began 
with what the Treaty of Partition had suggested, the im- 
mediate taking over of that part of Poland known as 
Royal or Polish Prussia (West Prussia) and Polish Pomerania, 
which was assigned to him, and by which he could thus 
encircle Dantzig. Free from scruples toward the “territory of | 
Dantzig,’’ guaranteed by the Treaty, he advanced on the 
spot to its very gates. He forced his way into the suburban 
communities, and took unquestionably city properties 
under the sway of Prussia. With his toll turn-pikes he 
beset the roads from the gates, annoyed the citizens on 
the way to their suburban villas, and hindered the supply 
of food from the district. It was a formal blockade of 
Dantzig. In this way he hoped to crush opposition, and 
incline the inhabitants to accept his patriarchal lordship. 

This was all, however, only the prelude to the most 
serious blow with which the King meant to surprise and 
humble the stubborn city. Together with West Prussia 
and Pomerania he had already taken possession of the 
twelfth-century monastery of the Cistercians in Oliva, 
near Dantzig, which contained the tombs of the ancient 


THE PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION 41 


Pomeranian Princes. In his new rdle as pious successor 
of the abbots of Oliva, Frederic now appeared with the 
gratuitous claim that the whole left bank of the lower Vistula 
belonged to the monks; and on this principle, with the 
support of his worthy Minister Hertzberg’s learned exposi- 
tion, he put into effect the liquidation of all this fancied 
monastic heritage without delay. 

Thus in a trice, in the utterest secrecy toward his partners 
of the Partition, Russia and Austria, the Prussian troops, 
by the middle of September 1772, had broken into Dantzig’s 
borders, taken Langfuhr and Altschottland, even got con- 
trol for the time of the peninsula of Hela, and, most 
important of all, became lords of the port itself. In the 
Neufahrwasser they hung out the Prussian Eagle, established 
a Prussian control-station, and began to exact dues from 
vessels for the benefit of the King’s treasury. This meant 
striking at the very heart of Dantzig. 

Joanna Schopenhauer, mother of the famed philosopher, 
herself a writer of distinction, a member of an old patrician 
family, writes thus on that day, describing this unheard-of 
violence, the seizure of the harbour of Dantzig by the 
troops of Frederic in time of complete peace: “ Like a 
vampire the Prussian King had fallen upon my unhappy 
city, committed to destruction, and has sucked out of it 
its life-blood. This for many a year, until it is fully ex- 
hausted.”’ 

Under this iron oppression the people of Dantzig soon 
began to lose their breath. All the time Frederic, without 
ceasing to strangle them, kept up his system of offering 
tempting terms as well. The ugly Benoit, his envoy in 
Warsaw, bought over for him the Commission of the 
Warsaw Diet, set up by the Three Powers to get the Partition 
approved, and incited it against Dantzig. The same Prussian 
envoy, at the same time, did all in his power to incline the 
agent of Dantzig in Warsaw, Gralath, against Poland and 
to surrender his city. In the reports sent by Gralath to 
the Senate in Dantzig (1773) there is constant mention of 
Benoit’s vehement persuasions “‘ to this frightful step,”’ 1.e. 
of cutting off Dantzig from Poland and uniting it with 
Prussia.4° 

All the time Reichardt, the Prussian Ambassador in 


42 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


Dantzig, was doing his utmost by persuasion and threat, 
to incline the City Council itself to submission. ‘‘ My King,” 
he declared cynically, ‘‘ will have little profit from the 
trunk, i.e. West Prussia, if he does not also get the head,” 
i.e. Dantzig. In any case Frederic was resolved to maintain 
the suzerainty thus secured over the port of Dantzig, as it 
brought him rich returns, and had some day or other to 
bring with it the falling of the city itself into his talons. 

This last was delayed for the time by the desperate 
protests of the citizens, their appeal to Holland and England, 
and chiefly their appeal to Russia. It was the decided 
opposition of the latter Power that checked Frederic’s plan 
of swallowing up Dantzig for the moment. Yet the thing 
that helped most of all was the unvarying opposition 
of the inhabitants themselves. The common people of the 
parish, especially, manifested the most obstinate stubborn- 
ness, even when the Senate began to weaken and yield under 
obvious pressure. The beggared City Senate and Aldermen 
were already decided to agree to the fateful submission 
forced upon them, to accept Frederic’s sovereignty over city 
and port. The affrighted Polish King, poor Stanislaw 
August, from Warsaw, urged them through the a of 
Gralath to make this last step. 


“But the Third Committee would not sais of it. 


On the other hand, it notified the Merchants’ Exchange 
and the guilds, who gathered at once, and had proclaimed 
in the public squares that they would rather be buried 
in the ruins of their city, than have to submit to such 
sovereignty. The crowd threatened with death any one 
who dared to act otherwise, and even threw themselves 
in rage on the Prussian agent and commissioner, whenever 
these officials showed themselves on the street.” 

This simple citizen people, partly of Polish extraction, 
who had drawn a living from Poland for ages, and in 
whose memory the still ineffaced memory of the murderous 
Teutonic crimes of old and more recent Prussian brutalities 
and extortions lived, held to the Republic by unerring in- 
stinct, and shrank desperately from the Hohenzollerns. 

In view of this attitude of the simple folk of Dantzig and 
of the Russian objections, Frederic could not realize to the 
full his plan for Dantzig. His fury knew no bounds. In 


THE PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION 43 


his first moment of disappointment he thought of new 
violence. He hit upon the hellish plan of cutting off the 
city from drinking-water. He ordered the course of the 
Radunia, from which Dantzig had fresh water, to be de- 
flected, and the water-mains to be cut, in order by this 
heroic means to bring the city to its knees. On second 
thought he shrank, however, from the European scandal 
which would surely have resulted, and two weeks later 
withdrew his commands. He finally renounced the idea of 
Dantzig, so far as he himself, but not so far as Prussia was 
concerned ; and in the Treaty of Partition concluded with 
the Republic he renewed his promise to renounce solemnly 
for all time his claims to the city.4 

Yet he did not cease victimizing the unhappy city to 
the end of his life, fourteen years later. There was no end 
of exploiting, of humiliating, of starving it out, with the 
help of the burdensome Commercial Treaty with Poland. 
This had been forced upon the latter by the pact of Partition, 
and excluded Dantzig, as though it were a foreign city, 
by numberless, savage pretences, taking now one, now 
another form—cruelties, tariff excesses, police abuses, and 
abuses in the matter of recruiting. But his chief task, the 
seizure of the city, Frederic left to his successors. When 
in his Political Testament he advised them to gather the 
Republic, as if it were an artichoke or a cabbage, “leaf by 
leaf, city by city,” he had in mind above all the tasty leaf, 
Dantzig. 

Frederic William II, his nephew and successor, re- 
membered the advice. Pretending to knightly nobleness, 
he was at first welcomed with confidence by the wretched 
people of Dantzig, who hoped for a respite after the night- 
mare of his uncle’s presence. He was hospitably entertained 
in the city on passing through, after his uncle’s death, 
to his coronation in Koenigsberg (1786). But the new King 
was destined rudely to shatter the confidence thus reposed 
in him. Guided by his first Minister Hertzberg, his uncle’s 
helper in the most shameful attacks upon Dantzig, he went 
the same way of occupation, although he veiled it by pre- 
tended friendship for Poland. Thus, in his friendly nego- 
tiations with the Great Diet of Warsaw, he kept putting 
forward his wish to have Dantzig as his reward. But the 


4h DANTZIG AND POLAND 


Poles had learned to prize at its true value their jewel, 
Dantzig, and the city prized more than ever its happy 
relation to Poland. The consequence was that it disliked 
more intensely the prospect of being annexed by the hated 
Prussia, after all the refined martyrdom it had suffered for 
sO many years at the hands of Frederic the Great. 

Once more it turned out that the common people of 
the city, the traders and the working-men, were permeated 
with the most insistent repugnance to Prussia, and the 
most loyal temper toward Poland. They had in their veins 
a large admixture of the ancient, stubborn Kashubian 
blood and retained the old traditions of bloody encounters 
with the Order. So the Third Committee sent two 
delegates of its own accord, two worthy members, Barth 
and Richter, to the Great Diet, and to King Poniatowski. 
They brought to Warsaw a solemn appeal, signed by “the 
most obedient and hard-beset subjects of His Majesty,” 
fifteen speakers for the city, sixty-four members of the 
Four Quarters, as well as the Elders and Companions of 
the Third Committee. 

““Most Serene and Most Gracious Sovereign ! ’’—such 
was the way in which the defenceless Dantzig turned to 
the last Polish King, almost in his last hour as Sovereign— 
‘“‘ The tiny people of Dantzig, whose home on the face of the 
earth scarcely looks bigger than an ant-hill, has long been 
unhappy. Panting heavily we await help and relief, and 
as yet we have not submitted. ... A piece of bread and 
Freedom !—that is our cry. Most Serene Lord, our land 
has been torn in pieces. Our harbour, the rights to which 
the city has never renounced, is in foreign hands, another 
is lord over it. ... We cannot exist longer, unless our 
territorial possessions that have been taken, together with 
the port, are returned to us. Most Serene Lord! We 
stand desperate on a brink, with a madly raging sea of 
fire round about us. Unless you point us back to the path 
we were treading until we lost it eighteen years ago (at the 
First Partition), we must surely fall down into this fiery 
abyss.” 

These fears of the citizens were fully justified. It is 
true that with the death of their worst persecutor, Frederic 
the Great, they had a somewhat easier life. The export 


THE PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION 45 


of grain had fallen, thanks to that monarch’s crimes, to 
9,000 measures in 1782, but it began by degrees to go up 
again. During the period of the Great Diet it attained an 
average of some 25,000 measures a year (1789-92), and 
that when the market prices of rye and wheat were extra- 
ordinarily high. | 

Only the more, however, with these evidences of reviving 
prosperity did the impatient appetite of the Prussians 
for Dantzig grow from more to more. The matter of the 
city became a veritable stone of stumbling in the dealing 
of Poland with Prussia at the time. Above all it stood in 
the way of the desired Polish-Prussian alliance. Frederic 
William II, his sly Minister Hertzberg, and Lucchesini his 
artful Ambassador in Warsaw, made use of every opportunity 
to get Dantzig from Poland as speedily as possible, without 
at the same time losing the latter’s goodwill. They were 
even able to throw dust in the eyes of the English Govern- 
ment. 

They succeeded in getting the Younger Pitt, then head 
of the Government, to advise Poland to cede Dantzig to 
Prussia (1790-91). On Pitt’s recommendation, Hailes, the 
honest and friendly but shortsighted English Ambassador 
in Warsaw, declared himself for this fatal step in repeated 
public appearances and writings. This all was directly 
opposed to the ancient friendly relations existing between 
England and Poland. It was even opposed to England’s 
own interests, and it can only be explained by the false 
suggestions made by the Berlin Government, the pretended 
loyal ally of England and of Poland. 

Neither the Warsaw Diet nor Polish public opinion, 
however, fell a victim to these suggestions. They were 
guided by a safe and healthy conviction of the national 
interest in the matter of Dantzig. It is true that, while 
negotiating with the Berlin Government about a new trade 
agreement, which would lower the murderous tariffs set 
up by Frederic the Great, in the trade agreement made 
fifteen years before, and forced upon the already divided 
Poland, mention was also made of Dantzig itself. But 
this was done in order not to provoke Frederic William for 
the moment, since his support and alliance was absolutely 
necessary against Catherine. Warsaw had to free itself 


46 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


from the concerted Russian yoke, and carry out needed 
reforms in administration, in finance, and in the army. 

In spite of this, none of the advocates of an alliance with 
Prussia wanted really to buy it prematurely at the price 
of Dantzig. Not only did the pro-Russian minority, 
opposed to the Prussian alliance as such, take its stand 
fiercely against such a bargain, through the medium of 
speeches in the Diet, public pamphlets, and proclamations 
strewn through the streets, but the great patriot Staszyc 
did the same, though he was on principle in agreement 
with the majority in the Diet. 

‘Let us get us allies,’ he wrote in his celebrated pamphlet, 
‘Warnings for Poland.’ ‘‘ But let us not buy them. 
Better pay double taxes. . . . Better pay duties at the 
highest rate, chosen by our traitors from three lower ones. 
But let us keep an outlet to the sea.”’ 

And so it was. The tariff preference and the trade 
agreement were renounced, but “ the sea was kept.’’ Both 
the Diet and the Cabinet declared most decidedly that 
Dantzig must irrevocably belong to Poland. The solici- 
tations of Prussia in Berlin and Warsaw were met with 
polite excuses. Dantzig was assigned at once in 1791 by 
special mention in the privileges accorded by the Great 
Diet to the cities, representation in the Diet, and a ha 
‘‘ which is not to be denied them.”’ 

On its own part Dantzig stood with well-proved loyatty 
behind the Great Diet, and welcomed joyously the famous 
reforming Constitution of the Third of May. Kahlen, the 
long-resident agent of the city in Warsaw, did not wish to 
listen, when Hailes in confidence unwisely tried to win him 
over to supporting the cession of the city to Prussia. A little 
later, and from another side, the same man was solicited 
by Bulhakow, the Russian Minister in Warsaw, in the 
interests of the pro-Russian Confederation of Targowica, 
which was already in preparation, aiming to ruin Poland 
and the Constitution of Third of May. But here, too, 
Kahlen bore himself worthily, and returned a decided 
negative. 

It happened soon, however, that the Great Diet, and 
the May Constitution, and the nation, found themselves 
menaced by the superior might of Russia, by the treachery 


THE PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION 47 


of Prussia, and by the crime of Targowica, and the peril 
of a second Partition became visibly nearer. For a moment 
the idea was entertained of defending the cause of Poland 
behind the faithful walls of Dantzig. This was in the sorry 
autumn of 1792, when victorious Targowica took over the 
administration in Warsaw, under the egis of Russia; and 
from the west the might of Prussia was reaching after the 
chosen booty of Great Poland, as well as for the long-desired 
‘keys of Dantzig. At that fateful hour the modest Polish 
Lieutenant, Stanislaw Fisher, who was partly of German 
blood, and who later became Kosciuszko’s adjutant, and the 
Chief of Staff for Prince Joseph Poniatowski, first thought 
of Dantzig. He decided himself to investigate the chances 
of defending the Republic’s only port. He took leave of 
absence, and went to the seaport city. 

Lieutenant Fisher found the Prussians within the 
city limits, it is true, as they had long made them- 
selves at home in Quadendorf, and even in the Scottish 
suburb itself. From these points of vantage they thought 
any fine day to make their way into the very centre of the 
city. But he found the walls, bastions, and arsenal “in 
the best of order.’’ What was more, he found the same 
sentiments among the citizen-body, the merchants, and 
the guilds, as well as among the body of officers, as had 
aroused the enduring defenders of Stanislaw fifty years 
before. | 

Fisher met the councillors, the youth of the patrician 
and merchant classes, the officers of the city artillery, the 
Schuppelius and Niedermayer families, people whose sym- 
pathies were with their mother city Dantzig, and who 
were also warm for Poland. He examined carefully the 
fortifications and the arsenal. He was amazed at their 
fine condition, at the considerable stores of weapons and 
war-gear of every kind. He drank his wine with the youth 
of the city as a brother. He wept with them in the 
theatre, whither he was invited to see the noble works of 
Schiller, redolent of the very spirit of freedom. 

These youths of the city, with their names ending in 
“us,” were fired by the best of tempers. They aptly 
recalled the benefactions and privileges of the Republic, 
the favour of King Sigmund, the coming of King Stanislaw, 


48 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


and the cannon-balls of Muennich. Above all, they recalled 
the iron, covetous hand of Frederick the Great, which 
strangled their trade and prosperity. They shuddered at 
the sight of the approaching second Partition, and the 
certainty of their being annexed by Prussia. 

On returning to his division, Fisher reported his observa- 
tions in Dantzig to his friend Vice-Brigadier John Henry 
Dombrowski, then one of the staff-officers of the Polish army, 
and later an illustrious general and patriot. The future 
creator of the Polish Legions in Italy, a learned expert in 
military history, knew well the glorious story of the sieges of 
the city. He formed the purpose of defending it once more, 
and of using the loyal temper of its inhabitants in an attempt 
to save Poland from the new peril of division which now 
threatened her. 

Even then, at the beginning of 1793, the Prussians, after 
crossing the boundary, had occupied Great Poland with 
strong army corps, and were getting ready to take Dantzig. 
Dombrowski, in the face of a desperate situation, conceived 
the bold idea of gathering the Polish army together with 
the garrison and artillery of Warsaw, of striking at the 
Prussians, cutting his way through to Dantzig, and there 
entrenching to await help or some diversion through the 
French Revolution. Although this extraordinary scheme 
of Dombrowski did not come into execution, owing to 
unfavourable circumstances, it was all the same a striking 
proof of the position enjoyed by Dantzig, both political and 
military, at the very end of its age-long union with the 
Republic. 

Meanwhile the last hour of Dantzig had struck, both as a 
Polish and as a free city. In keeping with the treaty for 
the Second Partition of Poland, made in St. Petersburg, 
Prussia got the city at last. And she got it in virtue of a 
most singular and scandalous international pact, as a reward 
for attacking revolutionary France. 

‘The King of Prussia,” read the treaty, “ binds himself 
together with the Roman Emperor to take part in the 
war against the French rebels (contre les rebelles frangats), 
and not to conclude a separate treaty with them, nor yeta 
truce. .. . By way of reward for the cost of this war he 
shall take possession of the lands, cities and districts (of 


THE PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION 49 


Great Poland), as well as of Dantzig and its territory” 
(“et pour dédommagement des dépenses qu’entraine et 
entrainera cette guerre (contre la France). ...S. M. 
Prussienne se metira en possession de pays, villes et districts 
de la Grande Pologne) en y ajoutant la ville de Dantzig avec 
son territoive’’).44 

In this unheard-of way, by a robbery of Poland, and as 
a reward for a robbery of France, Dantzig became the booty 
of Prussia. A richly-recompensed Russia assented, and an 
indifferent Europe received the news in silence. On the 
other hand, it was clear that no hindrance could be offered 
from the side of the helpless Republic. The Confederation 
of Targowica, into which Bulhakow had recently wished to 
draw Dantzig, now handed it over to Prussia in obedience 
to orders from the Czarina Catherine. The Diet of Grodno, 
constrained by Russian bayonets, had to confirm the seizure 
by a new pact of Partition with Prussia. 

At the Second Partition, just as at the first, Berlin did 
not wait at all for the forced assent of Poland, whether from 
the Diet or from the Confederation. At once it set itself 
to gather up both the territories of Great Poland and the 
now at last ripened harvest of Dantzig. The whole scheme 
for finally consummating this business of annexation was 
a worthy epilogue to the whole ugly tragedy of violence 
and villainy which had long tortured the unhappy city. 
In feverish haste, at the beginning of 1793, Frederic William, 
in a confidential letter to the Supreme College of War in 
Berlin, gave orders for the taking of Dantzig by a sudden 
assault of arms. The Lieutenant-General selected for the 
task, Bruenneck, delayed, however, the execution of this 
rather risky attack. For his scouting parties reported that 
the men of the city had foreseen a possible surprise. They 
doubled their pickets and their vigilance. They had, too, 
in addition to the regular military garrison, some seven 
thousand civilian guards for an emergency, as well as 
eight thousand men “of every estate,’’ ready to defend 
themselves to the last against the Prussians. 

The best that could happen was thus a massacre, only too 
closely recalling the ‘‘ surprise’ of the Teutons in Dantzig 
five centuries before. In view of this fact the middle way 
of political pressure and armed menace was chosen. 

4 


50 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


A series of most ridiculous demands were set forth, meant 
to justify the necessity of occupying Dantzig by Prussian 
armies. The Point de départ of these fabulous claims—those 
of the Berlin wolf on the Dantzig lamb which troubled 
the waters at the mouth of the Vistula—was the imagined 
Jacobinism of the bloodthirsty people of Dantzig, which 
threatened the safety of poor Prussia. 

That is why the Prussian agent in Dantzig, von Linden- 
owsky, produced in January 1793 a categorical demand 
for the handing over of a certain Garnier, a Frenchman 
said to be a Jacobin envoy of the Paris Convention, who in 
the previous November had come to the city from Berlin. 
The City Council, although its investigations did not discover 
any guilt on Garnier’s part, handed him over to the Prussians 
in fear of charges of provocation. The result was a violent 
protest, both from the merchants and from the Second 
and Third Committees, against such a violation of the right 
of asylum for a French citizen. The upshot was that the. 
Prussian Government made new demands, both because 
of this “‘ Jacobin ”’ protest, and because of suspected secretion 
of papers compromising Garnier on the part of the Dantzig 
authorities. 

Meanwhile the end of the month brought the news of the 
entry into Great Poland of Prussian troops, and of the taking 
of Thorn. The news was an ominous forecast for Dantzig of its 
own ruin. It called forth unbounded indignation. Crowds 
of people walked the streets of the city, hurling threats at 
the Prussians, urging the inhabitants to arms, and singing 
the new hymn of liberty, the Marseillaise. At once the 
Berlin Government began with monstrous charges arising out 
of these annoying meetings and revolutionary songs. It 
used the opportunity, too, for making plausible its suspicious 
deeds in connection with the imminent occupation. 

*‘ The same reasons,’ reads the memorable declararation 
of Frederic William II, issued in Berlin at the end of February, 
1793, in the matter of the city and territory of Dantzig, 
““ which moved His Majesty the King of Prussia to send 
his troops into certain districts of Great Poland, now lay 
upon him the necessity of seizing the city and territory 
of Dantzig. Without mentioning here the scarcely amicable 
attitude of the city for years toward His Majesty, it is certain 


THE PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION 51 


that it has become of late one of the seats of that vicious 
sect, the Jacobins, which goes from crime to crime, striving 
to spread its iniquities on every side with the filthy assistance 
of its messengers and proselytes. One of these thieves, 
after trying in vain to spread the poison of his teaching 
among the happy and deeply loyal Prussian people, was 
openly received by Dantzig ; and even when the facts were 
explained, it was scarcely possible to get his protectors to 
give him up. 

“‘ This fresh example, together with other vices of a falsely 
understood freedom; furthermore, the secret connexions 
maintained by French and Polish co-operators in a conspiracy 
with that party, which by the boldness of its maxims out- 
weighs the number of the infinitely more thoughtful citizens ; 
finally, the ease with which our common foe (the French 
Republic) can procure, with the help of friends in Dantzig, 
every kind of supplies, and especially grain—all these are 
the symptoms which have drawn His Majesty’s attention 
to that city. He had thus to see that it was kept within 
the limits of action proper to its station, above all in order 
to secure safety for the Prussian citizens residing in the 
neighbourhood. 

“With this in view, His Majesty the King of Prussia 
has ordered the Lieutenant-General de Raumer to take 
possession of the city with a sufficient force of troops, in 
order to keep order there, and safeguard the general peace. 
It will be best for the citizens of Dantzig to serve their 
cause by prudent and kindly dependence on the favour 
of His Majesty by voluntarily admitting His Majesty’s 
armies, and by receiving them as friends.’’45 

This capital document is worthy of notice. Apart from 
the above-mentioned secret pact of Partition, concluded in 
St. Petersburg, it is the one public, official formulation, in 
the name of the Prussian King and his Government, of the 
objective, legal and political rights of Prussia to her lordship, 
or rather, if we take the Prussian official definition, to her 
“acquiring ’’ of Dantzig, and her holding it to this day. 

“Falsely understood freedom ’’—this is the dislike of 
Dantzig for Prussian bondage; “scarcely amicable attitude ”’ 
—towards the Prussians who had victimized the city for 
thirty years; connexion “‘ with Polish conspirators ’”’”— 


52 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


i.e. with its rightful lord and mother-state, personified 
in the Great Diet; an inclination for the French Republic— 
which was proclaiming the modern watchwords: there 
you have the villainy of Dantzig, the imputations under 
which she was compelled under the Prussian yoke for over 
a century. 

At the beginning of March General Raumer approached 
the walls of Dantzig at the head of a large army, and armed 
with this royal declaration. He demanded the instant 
surrender of the chief defences of the city and the fortress 
at the mouth of the Vistula, as well as the severance of all 
trade relations with France. The situation was a desperate 
one. There was no prospect of help from any quarter. 
After three days of noisy deliberation, the view of the 
merchants prevailed, that the city should be completely sur- 
rendered to Prussia, seeing that self-defence was impossible 
and every support from without was lacking. 

But having perforce taken this decision to open the 
city gates to the armed Prussians, those enemies of Dantzig 
and of the Republic, the citizens turned with declaration 
of their due allegiance to the Polish Government in Warsaw. 
In a dolorous letter “to our King,” Stanislaw August, 
they sorrowfully explained the situation, making it clear 
that, to save innocent blood and to hinder the complete 
destruction of the place, ‘‘ deprived of all counsel and support, 
cut off from all assistance from Your Royal Majesty,” 
they had found themselves obliged to submit to the 
overwhelming forces of the enemy. On the other hand, 
in surrendering by force into Prussian hands, the City 
Council set express conditions, and won from General 
Raumer certain fundamental guarantees for the future. 
These concerned their internal autonomy, their: rights to 
the harbour, to safety of trade and to exemption from military 
service.4® 

All this amounted to a capitulation on terms, but never- 
theless, as was to be foreseen, the Prussians treated it with 
no kind of respect. In fact, two weeks later, at the end of 
the month, a categorical ‘‘ Occupation Patent” arrived from 
Frankfurt-am-Main, the Grand Headquarters of Frederic 
William, who, while taking the field against the French Revo- 
lution, had heard from Raumer of the readiness of Dantzig 


THE PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION 53 


to capitulate (Besitizergreifungspatent), This ‘‘ Patent,” with 
convenient forgetfulness of promises given, rejected all the 
' city’s conditions and ordered its immediate seizure. This 
happened, by a strange coincidence, on the very day of 
the murder of the Mayor Letczkow and his associates by 
the Teutonic commander, and just a year before the day 
of the Warsaw Insurrection, the memorable Thursday of 
Passion Week, 1793. The Senate, having neither escape nor 
power, at once ordered the inner fortifications to be given 
up. Prussian troops were at last to enter the city. 

It was then that the last effort at defence on the part 
of the loyal citizen was made. For a fortnight, since 
the first agreement with the Prussian General, feeling in 
the town had been in a state of menacing excitement, and 
this broke out now in a violent storm. Indignant throngs 
surrounded the city hall. Amid deafening cheers men 
demanded war to the last with the Prussian intruder. They 
thundered at the cowardice and treachery of the Senate. 
They even began to set the warehouses of wealthy patricians 
on fire, as traitors to the city and the Republic. Their 
numbers included, during these demonstrations against 
the Prussians and for their liberty and Poland, the great 
majority of the inhabitants: all the petty traders and part 
of the larger merchants, the guilds, with the butchers at 
the head, the artisans, and then the labourers, mariners, 
dockers, and the soldiers belonging to the garrison of the 
fortress. 

This all happened without any encouragement from 
agonizing Poland, and in fierce defiance of the Prussians. 
The people's own inborn instinct of self-preservation shrank 
desperately from dealings with Prussia, and kept firm on the 
side of Poland. Men rushed to the storming of the arsenal. 
In a trice they had laid hands on fire-arms. They seized 
the cannon on the ramparts, and taking by force ammunition 
from the artillery stores, began to cannonade with grape- 
shot and rifle-fire the approaching Prussian columns. These, 
taken by surprise and forced to retreat, opened fire with 
big guns and from their own lines, so that a large number 
of the improvised defenders of the city fell as victims. 

This time also, just as it happened nearly five centuries 
before, the ‘“ acquisition” of Dantzig by Prussia was accom- 


54 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


plished by an act of brutal violence, baptized by and at the 
cost of the innocent blood of the inhabitants. It was clear 
that this hopeless effort of the people in defence of their 
city must be abandoned at once, as the Prussians were in 
possession of the fortifications. After some days of rioting, 
there was nothing for it but to submit to the inevitable. At 
a morning hour of early April the first two regiments of 
Prussian infantry entered Dantzig through the four open 
gates of the city. A regiment of dragoons was with them. 
The citizens looked on in sullen silence. The common crowd 
broke out in unrestrained curses. But the soldiers of the 
city and of the Vistula fortress broke their weapons, declaring 
that they would not serve the Prussians against Poland 
and France. The whole garrison, except the officers, were 
led away as captives, and later on forced to enlist in the 
Prussian army. A month later, May, 1793, the act of doing 
homage and swearing fealty to the Prussian King was carried 
through by hisorders. Dignitaries came from Berlin to repre- 
sent him, and receive the subjection of the city.47 

Thus did Dantzig come into Prussian hands. Without 
delay there began a forcible suppression of the ancient 
republican institutions of the city, which had been so prized 
hitherto and fostered by Poland. Then also began an 
enforced modelling of the city in conformity with the 
bureaucratic pattern of the other Prussian municipalities. 
The magistracy was set up on a basis truly and purely official 
and hierarchical. Faint traces only were left of representation 
for the merchants and the guilds. Above all, the “ jacobin ” 
Third Committee was of course utterly abolished. The 
first step of the enlightened Prussian administration went 
in the direction of obliterating this truly democratic 
institution, which had remained in Dantzig, the heirloom ~ 
of the Republic. But the city nobility, composed of the 
better elements of the merchant and educated classes, felt 
keenly too the hard fist of Berlin bureaucracy. Many 
illustrious men of the city laid down their office in the City 
Government, the Courts, and the School Board, by way 
of protest against the Prussian intruder. Some even pre- 
ferred, not minding the material loss involved, to leave 
their native city for ever, now that it had fallen under a 
foreign lord, This, among others, was the course followed 


THE PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION 55 


by the parents Schopenhauer, as we learn from the memoirs 
of Joanna, already mentioned, which are full of bitterness 
at the recollection. 

For a time men deceived themselves with the hope of 
being delivered from the Prussian yoke. But these hopes, 
originally raised by the triumph of the French Revolution, 
soon vanished with the conclusion of the Treaty of Basle 
between France and Prussia. 

In spite of this there was formed a few years later an 
actual conspiracy in Dantzig against the Prussians. This, if 
not actually organized by the Polish Emigration in Paris and 
Dombrowski’s Legions, was at any rate in close sympathy 
with them. A handful of students, with the ardent Bartholdy 
at their head, took up the watchwords of the French 
Revolution, gathered secretly a few mariners, dockers, and 
working-men from the harbour, and resolved to raise the 
standard of armed revolt (1797). Their hope was to restore 
the former republican liberties of the city.# 

Even soberer citizens were incited into the conspiracy, men 
like Father Richter, Deacon of the Church of St. Catherine, 
‘known for his irreconcilable attitude to the Prussian Govern- 
ment. The outbreak was fixed for the same Thursday of 
Passion Week 1797, as it was the anniversary of the recent 
battle in the streets as well as of the Kosciuszko Insurrection 
in Warsaw. The conspirators, provided with arms and 
republican colours, were gathered in the house of Bartholdy. 
They were to hurl themselves on the Prussian pickets, call 
the populace to revolt, and get possession of the city and 
fortress. This childish plot was discovered by the Prussian 
police. The youthful conspirators were condemned to death 
in the courts, but the verdict was commuted to.a long term 
of imprisonment. 

Under auspices none too promising, auspices such as these, 
the Prussian administration of Dantzig began. The new 
monarch, Frederic William II, preferred not to show himself 
in the city he had fought for so long, in view of the openly 
hostile temper of the people. When his successor, the young 
Frederic William III, came to Dantzig in 1798 with his beau- 
tiful Queen Louisa, he met with a cool reception from the 
citizens, in spite of official celebrations and festivals, Nor did 
he do anything useful, as had always happened when the 


56 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


Polish sovereigns had been welcomed in triumph to Dantzig. 
He gave no heed to the bitter complaints as to the complete 
violation of the ancient rights and institutions of the city. 
With one cheap and questionable benefaction he was 
content, when he bestowed on certain of the officials of 
the city, who belonged to the new magistracy, and were most 
inclined to the Prussian regime, the German nobleman’s 
rank, adding the ‘‘ von” to their ancient Dantzig names. 
This titular favour was characteristic of the relations main- 
tained between the authorities in Berlin and Republican 
Dantzig. 

It should be stated, too, that the city did not suffer harm 
in material respects during the short thirteen years of 
Prussian rule. Rather did the improvement of Dantzig’s 
trade, which had already manifested itself under the 
Great Diet, continue under Prussian auspices. Especially 
did the export of grain during this time advance with strides, 
so that in 1802 it reached the long since unknown figures 
of 85,000 measures. 

This reacted naturally upon the prosperity of the city. 
But it was not at all thanks to the Prussian administration, 
because the latter from the very start made itself felt in 
the sphere of commerce through its fiscal and bureaucratic 
tyrannies. It was simply the result of three positive factors. 
First, Prussia did not at the time possess any ports, except 
the infinitely worse situated and mal-administered cities 
of Stettin, Koenigsberg and Memel, which could help in 
crushing Dantzig by competition. Secondly, in view of the 
still raging war of the French Revolution and Napoleon with 
the Coalition in Europe, England, Austria, and Russia, the 
Kingdom of Prussia, which had withdrawn from the conflict 
after the Treaty of Basle, was the chiefest, if not the only, 
source of supply for both parties. Thirdly, and this was 
the most important fact, after the inclusion of the heart 
of Poland with Warsaw in Prussia, in virtue of the Second 
and Third Partitions, the Prussian sources of supply were 
first and foremost the Polish lands. 

If, then, during this period, the last years of the eighteenth 
and the first of the nineteenth century, the exports of Dantzig, 
especially of grain, were kept at a high level, it was just for 
the reason that the city remained, in spite of the Partitions, 


THE PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION 57 


in intimate touch with Prussian Warsaw; and that in 
spite of Prussian bondage it remained, as before, a part of 
the Polish commercial market, which. was so profitable to 
it. Yet, discounting all this, that bondage was a terrible 
burden both to the whole Prussian part of Poland, to the 
capital Warsaw, and to the City of Dantzig. Whether here 
or there, the longing after deliverance was the same. 


V 
A FREE CITY 


THE hour of Dantzig’s deliverance struck at last, when 
Napoleon, after beating the Prussians at Jena, halted his 
army upon Polish soil. Having come to set Warsaw free 
from German hands, the Emperor turned his special atten- 
tion at once upon Dantzig ; and in January he gave the first 
orders as to its investment. Marshal Lefebvre, to waom, 
at the head of the Tenth Corps of the Grand Army, the task” 
was assigned, had the help of the best organized divisions 
of the Polish army, which was then being formed. This 
help included the Third Polish Division, that of General 
Dombrowski, creator of the Legions in Italy; the Polish 
Northern Legion under Prince Michael Radziwill ; and regi- 
ments of regular horse, volunteers from the nobility, and 
the newly formed military units of Posen and Kalish, under 
Colonel Dziewanowski and Generals Kosinski and Sokolnicki. 

The task was an extraordinarily hard one. After the 
previous year’s triumph over Prussia, the present “ first 
Polish campaign ’’ of Napoleon (1806-07) promised to be 
a heavy one. It was carried on against fresh Russian 
armies allied to the Prussian remnants, and was marked 
at the start by the bloody encounter of Eylau, almost a 
disaster to the French army. Meanwhile Dantzig was well 
provisioned. The Governor, Count Kalckreuth, had a garrison 
of 17,000 Prussians, 3,000 Russian foot, and three Cossack 
regiments. He had also access to the sea, from which, as 
it was wholly in the hands of the Allies, reinforcements kept 
arriving. Finally there were available the Russian corps 
of General Kamenskoi, with 6,000 men, and_ several 
thousand Prussians under General Buelow. Thus altogether 
there were over 30,000 troops defending the city. 

58 


A FREE CITY | 59 


On the other hand, Napoleon, after the serious losses of 
Eylau, could not send more than 12,000 men to the Tenth 
Corps before Dantzig ; and there were added later hardly 
as many more, apart from the divisions lent for a time from 
the corps of Marshal Lannes and Mortier. 

More than once during the siege even the energetic 
Lefebvre had his moments of despair and doubt as to the 
issue of the whole matter. Napoleon always roused him, 
however, in lively and even sharp fashion. The Emperor 
displayed in his whole correspondence with Lefebvre unusual 
interest in the undertaking, and full knowledge of the minutest 
details of the situation about the city. At the end of April, 
1807, he rode to Marienburg, the ancient Crusader strong- 
hold, which he had taken, as heir of the Polish Kings. It 
appears that he saw Lefebvre in person there, and gave him 
oral instructions. In any case, as a distinguished Prussian 
historian of this war, who is now a prominent Staff-officer, 
tells us, direct and telling orders of the Emperor in regard to 
the siege exercised a virtually decisive influence on the capture 
of the city. More than that, this competent military expert 
is of opinion that “ the importance of Dantzig for the great 
undertakings ’’ was not appreciated fully either by Frederic 
_ William III nor yet by Lefebvre, but only by Napoleon. 

The Poles took a major part in the operations, and carried 
off the honours in the actual capture of Dantzig. They 
represented a quite presentable fraction of the relatively 
slender army of investment. They numbered in all some 
6,500 men. When Dombrowski, being wounded at Dirschau, 
laid down his command of the Polish Division, it was taken 
over by the valiant if old and hunch-backed Lieutenant- 
General Gielgud. These Polish units, hastily gathered, and 
improvised as they were, left much to be desired in point of 
organization, and even the most necessary things, such as 
arms, uniforms, and food, were lacking. Many had only 
light military overcoats, and beneath them any sort of 
clothing. The poor fellows suffered cruelly from cold, rain, 
often from hunger, being in the trenches before the city 
during the worst season of the year.49 

The siege of the city proper, apart from preliminaries 
in February, began in March, and the cannonade in earnest 
in April, 1807. One must remember that the position of 


60 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


the French army after Eylau was far from favourable and 
its temper rather depressed. 

In spite of all this, the Poles, speedily ridding themselves 
of occasional distempers at the start, not only did their duty 
at Dantzig, “‘ holding the very centre of the line of assault,” 
on the ‘‘ most dangerous and most important station,’ but 
even by their endurance, firmness, and impetus they came 
to be the pick of Lefebvre’s army. The Marshal soon knew 
their value, and loved them. In his daily orders he did 
them justice repeatedly, giving honourable mention to 
their officers and privates. Once indeed, when an enemy’s 
sally from the city was being repulsed, he dismounted 
from his horse, unbuttoned his coat in order to show his 
Marshal’s embroidery and stars, and at the head of 
Downarowicz’s Polish battalion, himself led a _ splendid 
counter-attack, snatching the drum from the drummer’s 
own hands. 

The consciousness that they were fighting for a Polish 
Dantzig and a Polish sea-front served above all to maintain 
the high level of courage among the Polish troops. More 
than one fine expression of this feeling was given. The 
anniversary of the Constitution of the Third of May was 
solemnly celebrated in the lines. In a fiery speech delivered 
on this occasion by Father Przybylski, Chaplain of the 
First Infantry Regiment, Prince Sulkowski’s, the men were 
reminded of “‘ the waving banner of Poland on the shores 
of the Baltic.’”’ Time and again in the appeals and reports 
of Dombrowski, Gielgud, and their subordinates around 
Dantzig, this notion of their efforts and fights being a 
way of emancipation is most clearly emphasized. 

But from the other side, and in Dantzig itself, the great 
majority of the citizens saw for the first time in the siege 
of their city an act of justice and emancipation. Con- 
vinced of this in their souls, these loyal patriots for the first 
time took almost no part in the defence. The Prussian 
Royal Family, fleeing from Berlin after the disaster at 
Jena, thought for a time of seeking shelter behind the 
city’s walls; but in view of the cool attitude of the 
inhabitants they thought it better after a short stay to 
flee still farther to Koenigsberg and Memel. They obviously 
realized that it was not possible at least for Hohenzollerns 


A FREE CITY 61 


to expect such affection and shelter from the people of 
the city as Stanislaw Leszczynski once enjoyed. 

The effort made later by Count Krockow to form in Dantzig 
a corps of volunteers for Prussia met with complete failure. 
The Count himself for that matter soon fell into the hands 
of the besieging Polish troops. Equally unsuccessful were 
the appeals of the Governor Kalckreuth for loyal generosity 
on the city’s part towards Prussia. On the other hand, the 
real temper of the inhabitants is revealed by the fact that 
he had to take special measures of precaution for the Thursday 
of Passion Week, 1807, through fear of riots on that memor- 
able anti-Teutonic and.anti-Prussian anniversary. 

Worse still, the citizens maintained secret communica- 
tions with the Polish outposts, furnishing necessary infor- 
mation and assisting the privates of the garrison to desert. 
This was so common that, according to Gielgud’s figures, 
“over 4,000 Prussian deserters, Poles and Germans, passed 
through the Polish line, of whom 700 Poles enlisted volun- 
tarily in our regiments.” 

“As far as the citizens of Dantzig are concerned,’ wrote 
Colonel Krukowiecki, who was in command of the first rank 
of Polish outposts, “ they are all of good cheer, and await 
impatiently the moment when the beneficent hand of our 
saviour (Napoleon) will set them free from the Prussians 
and Muscovites.”’ 

The last serious effort to relieve Dantzig from the sea 
side was made at the beginning of May, with the landing 
of considerable Russian and Prussian reinforcements at 
the mouth of the Vistula. The valiant and successful repulse 
of this peril by the Polish troops represents their finest and 
most meritorious performance during the whole siege. It 
made the speedy surrender of the city inevitable. The fight 
was of the bloodiest and fiercest, as the Poles and French 
gave no quarter, and victory had to be bought by heavy 
losses. Here in this battle the young and gallant Colonel 
Anthony Parys fell, shot through the breast by a rifle bullef 
as he was leading his regiment to a final charge. He was a 
splendid officer of the Polish Legions in Italy, and the true 
hero of the present struggle for Dantzig. 

On the spot where he fell his companions threw up a mound 
and held a solemn funeral in his honour. The illustrious 


62 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


writer and patriot Prince Alexander Sapieha, who was a 
member of Gielgud’s staff, exclaimed at the funeral, in the 
presence of the city, which still held out: 


Heroic Race oF Porss! 

The weakness of our fathers has not availed to erase the 
glory of their ancestors. Turn your gaze from this hill whither a 
holy ceremony has led us. Look upon Dantzig, for whose restora- 
tion to the motherland you are fighting. Fix your eyes in this 
direction to the endless plains of Pomerania, torn from us by treachery. 
For centuries we cherished this land in safety. . . . Ye see this moving 
element, the stretches of the Baltic which the eye cannot measure. 
That was our possession during the time of the Sigmunds. Polish 
vessels ploughed its surface, and brought abundance into our land 
by flourishing trade. 

All this glory our ancestors handed over to their children, and 
it is now your task to recover what the carelessness of the latter let 
slip. . . . We have piled up this mound with our hands. . . . Perhaps 
some day, when fortune ceases to harass us, Poles will recover their 
former possessions, and surrounded by their children will point to 
this grave as an evidence of our deeds, and as a lesson of how much it 
cost to bring a fallen nation to a new birth.°? 


The names of Parys and of many other Poles who took 
part in these battles, and received in return the generous 
mark of the French Legion of Honour, were mentioned 
with high distinction in the bulletins of the Grand Army 
at the end of the siege and capture of Dantzig. In fact, at 
the end of May, a few days after the unsuccessful attempt 
at relief, the capitulation followed. Scarcely a month 
passed from the proper commencement of the siege before 
all was over. It is a notable fact that of all the investments 
of Dantzig the shortest was this one, in which the city was 
taken from the Prussians. 

Marshal Lefebvre, by way of doing homage to the Poles, 
assigned them the place of honour when the city was occupied, 
both because of their proved valour and because they had 
the real right to the city. At the solemn entry into the city 
through the High Gate on the morning of May 27, 1807, 
the Marshal, surrounded by his suite, led the way in a blaze 
of decorations, and right behind, in full parade, with a band 
playing at its head, the Polish Legion followed. The six 
regiments of French infantry brought up the rear. 

The capture of Dantzig was an event of the first rank, 


A FREE CITY 63 


not only military but also political. It finely restored the 
position of the Grand Army, and made possible the decisive 
victory at Friedland a few weeks later. Napoleon, aware 
beyond all others of the significance of the event, expressed 
his personal satisfaction to Lefebvre in a beautiful letter, 
granting him the dignity of “‘ Duke of Dantzig.”’ 5 

In those very days of triumph the Emperor made his 
entry into Dantzig. Welcomed cordially by the inhabi- 
tants, as were the Polish kings of yore, he took up his 
residence in Langgarten. He inspected with care the chief 
institutions of the city, the fortress of the Vistula, the 
Neufahrwasser harbour. He received in special audience 
representatives of the council and the merchant-class. He 
took from their hands a memorial, which set forth the sore 
crimes suffered at the hands of the Prussian Government 
from the time of the First Partition. He showed special 
satisfaction towards the Polish besieging forces. A review 
was held on the Long Square. He covered them with proofs 
of his favour and appreciation. 

As a matter of fact Dantzig was won largely at the price 
of Polish blood. The aged General Gielgud emphasizes this 
in his report made to the Emperor. ‘“ The Third Polish 
_Division,” so he wrote, ‘‘ which I had the honour to com- 
mand, came to the blockade of Dantzig with 6,500 men 
under arms. Asa result of the labours of the siege and the 
losses sustained in skirmishes and in the trenches, it numbers 
now but 4,650 men.” The Polish losses were thus some 
two thousand. 

“ The inhabitants of the city,’’ he went on,”“‘ are Poles. 
They are imbued with the spirit of loyalty and admiration 
for Your Imperial and Royal Majesty, as well as with feelings 
of love for their former motherland, when Poland was still 
a united nation.”’ 

At that time neither the future of the city was certain, 
nor yet the issue of the war itself. Nevertheless it was 
generally taken for granted that, with the triumph of 
Napoleon and the reconstitution of Poland, Dantzig should 
be returned to her motherland. Such was too the general 
opinion of Warsaw. It was to be expected that the first 
news of the taking of Dantzig by the Franco-Polish army 
should give rise to universal enthusiasm in the capital. 


64 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


“The news was the occasion of such great rejoicing in 
Warsaw that on the very day it came all the houses in the 
city were illumined, though no such order had been given 
by the authorities. ... On all the streets were to be heard 
the glad cheers : ‘‘ Long live the great Napoleon, the deliverer 
of Dantzig!’’ At once the President of the Warsaw Pro- 
visional Regency Commission, the grey-haired Malachowski, 
who had been Marshal of the Great Diet, prepared a letter 
to the Emperor asking for the assignation, or rather the 
restoration, “‘of the city of Dantzig and all the parts of 
Poland round about her ’’—i.e. Royal Prussia and Polish 
Pomerania—to the Polish State in the hour of its 
re-birth.5? 

Nevertheless, things were to turn out quite differently. 
When a little later, after the victory of Friedland, the Peace 
of Tilsit was concluded between Napoleon and Czar Alex- 
ander, the latter’s rooted opposition served above all to make 
the reconstitution of a large and powerful Poland impossible. 
The result was the mangled Duchy of Warsaw as a com- 
promise, without Royal Prussia and Pomerania, and without 
Dantzig. By the Treaty of Tilsit of July, 1807, Dantzig, 
with the territory round about to a radius of sixteen kilo- 
metres, was declared a free and independent city. At the 
same time the free use of the Vistula was guaranteed. In 
December, thanks to the kind mediation of the French 
Marshal Soult, the boundaries were somewhat extended by 
a supplementary agreement made in Elbing between Dantzig 
and Prussia.53 

Though left nominally under the joint care of Prussia 
and Saxony-Warsaw, Dantzig actually was at the immediate 
disposition of Napoleon himself, whose bust in marble took 
the place in the Town Hall formerly occupied by that of 
Frederic William. The city was given a French garrison 
and a French commander, General Rapp. A considerable 
war contribution, with numerous supplementary payments, 
was levied in the interests of the French Treasury. In return 
the town got back its constitution and the machinery of 
self-government : the Three Committees, the Council called 
officially from now on the Senate, its own courts, repre- 
sentations of the four “ quarters,’ etc. At the Emperor's 
command, however, the Code Napoléon was introduced. 


A FREE CITY 65 


The citizens managed to get this greatly delayed and make 
it only an auxiliary institution.54 

Besides the Governor, the resident French agent, Massias, 
held office, and afterwards also the Saxon-Warsaw one, 
Helbig. There were in addition quartered here, rather 
for purposes of espionage, the Prussian Consul Vegesack 
and the Russian Trefurt. The people of Dantzig had their 
official deputation now in Paris, as formerly in Warsaw, 
together with a permanent envoy with power to act, Kahlen, 
who had been the representative to the Republic of Poland 
in Warsaw of old, and was now the same for Napoleon. It 
is worthy of note that recommendations kept being made 
by the Emperor to the Dantzig delegates, just as formerly 
by the Kings Sigmund and Sobieski, to the effect that the 
city should admit Catholics to its offices and its adminis- 
tration. 

_ From the autumn of 1808 the garrison in Dantzig was 
composed of two Polish regiments of foot of the Duchy of 
Warsaw. The commander was General Grabowski, who in 
the next year succeeded Rapp as Governor, the latter being 
placed on the Emperor’s staff for the Austrian campaign 
of 1809. After Grabowski, the duties of commander were 
performed for a time by General Woyczynski. The rela- 
tions of the citizens with the Polish garrison and the Polish 
commanders were always of the best. In 1810 Prince 
Joseph Poniatowski, War Minister and Commander-in-Chief 
of the army of the Duchy of Warsaw, came to Dantzig to 
inspect the garrison and the fortress. He was received by 
the city with great honours, as nephew of the late King 
Stanislaw August and the most popular of Poles, and with 
the respect always shown to the royal Polish line. 

In accordance with Napoleon’s own orders and in agree- 
ment with the military authorities in Warsaw, headlong 
efforts were being made all this time to strengthen the 
fortifications of the city. In the spring of 1811, after the 
first misunderstandings between the Czar and Napoleon, 
Dantzig was placed under a state of siege, as it was especially 
threatened from Russian quarters. On the outbreak of the 
great war with Russia, Napoleon, on his way to Moscow, 
visited Dantzig for the second time in June, 1812, in order 
with his own eyes to verify the state of its defences. It 

5 


66 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


was to be one of the chief bases for all further operations 
against Moscow. This time also he received in a long audience 
representatives of the city authorities and the merchants. 
With the penetration and simplicity peculiar to him, he 
questioned them in detail as to their needs and burdens, 
as well as about the actual industrial position of their free 
city, which he had called back to life and retained under 
his protection.55 

The position of Dantzig during this protectorate left, 
it is true, very much to be desired. The six years of Napo- 
leon’s rule had brought it to the verge of ruin. Its trade 
had wholly ceased. Many of the oldest and richest of its 
financial houses had become beggared, bankruptcies were 
numerous, the artisans had no work, and the working- 
classes were in misery. The people kept themselves alive 
with grants from the army or work at the fortifications. 
It suffices to note that the population of the city with the 
surrounding district was diminished by one-fourth. It had 
been over 80,000, and was now only 64,000.56 

The causes of this disastrous situation were many. The 
contributions and numerous military levies of the French 
were a sore burden to the city. The blockade of the con- 
tinent was infinitely more harmful. Instituted six months 
before the capture of Dantzig, by the famous Berlin Decree 
(1806), which declared the British Isles to be in a state of 
blockade, it cut the city off from its chief customers and 
providers overseas. Both imports and exports were as good 
as finished for Dantzig. Neither the Emperor’s “ licences ”’ 
granted to the citizens, nor exceptional vessels and ladings, 
could help the matter, nor yet the spread of contraband. 
Chiefest of all, the Tilsit solution itself of the question of 
Dantzig and Poland, forced upon Napoleon by Alexander, 
was absolutely mistaken, absurd, both hurtful for Poland 
and ruinous for Dantzig. : | 

The so-called ‘‘ free city,” cut off by West Prussia from 
Poland, found itself in virtually the same position, and with- 
out escape, as after the First Partition. Rather the position 
was even worse than after the Third Partition, when Dantzig 
had at least been reunited with Warsaw, beneath the 
Prussian yoke it is true, but at least under one single 
regime. To return to her natural and historical state- 


A FREE CITY 67 


unity with a free Poland, as one of the most splendid 
of Polish cities, a city animated with a fulness of life, and 
not to vegetate as a fancied free city in an artificial separa- 
tion and isolation from her—this has been and will be 
the highest political injunction imposed on Dantzig both 
by nature and by history. Indeed, the most striking proofs 
of this are furnished by the lamentable experiences of the 
free city during the Napoleonic era. 

Meanwhile the tragic end of this epoch was approaching. 
The disastrous retreat from Moscow followed. Rapp, who 
had been taken again by the Emperor on that luckless 
expedition, returned to Dantzig in December, 1812, half 
alive, with face and hands frozen, but full of energy. He 
at once declared that the city was in a state of war. 

Already the Russian army was following close on the 
heels of the retiring remnants of the Grand Army. True, 
no one in Alexander’s army headquarters had settled the 
matter at this juncture (New Year, 1813) how far the vic- 
torious pursuit was to be pushed. In the most approved 
circles of Russian politics, and just because Napoleon was 
in such desperate straits, it was not thought in the least 
desirable for Alexander to pursue his foe to France itself. 
Such an expedition would have had the appearance of 
advantage for Russia, but would have meant in reality the 
reconstitution of Prussia. 

Kutuzow, the Russian Commander-in-Chief, was decidedly 
of opinion that a stop should be made at the Vistula, that 
an alliance with Prussia was undesirable, as was also further 
fighting pour le roi de Prusse. He wanted, on the other 
hand, to come to terms with Napoleon and make peace on 
the best conditions for Russia. The Chancellor Rumianzeff 
was of the same opinion, as was also almost the whole suite 
and the “ general public sentiment” of Russia. In the 
same way a modern Russian historian and military expert, 
after weighing the whole military and political situation 
of that time, came to the conclusion that precisely this 
and no other solution suited “‘ the real interests ”’ of Russia. 

Thus, then, these best possible conditions of peace, of 
which Kutuzow was thinking, and which were not hard to 
obtain from Napoleon in view of his position, involved not 
only the uniting of the whole Duchy of Warsaw to Russia, 


68 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


but also the gaining of the line of the Vistula from end to 
end. This meant at once the incorporation of the whole 
of East Prussia. The situation seemed once more the same 
as it was in the time of Czarina Elizabeth, when striking 
at Frederic the Great. As a matter of fact, just as in the 
former time, this whole province of Prussia was actually now 
in Russian hands. 

According to a competent eye-witness, Field-Marshal 
Boyen, a Prussian who conferred with Czar Alexander at 
the end of 1812, the Russian military party demanded un- 
conditionally the Vistula as a boundary-line. ‘‘ They were 
ready at this price to leave the rest of Europe to Napoleon, 
or to even the devil himself.” 57 

The whole latter part of the Moscow campaign, the escape 
of Napoleon, the slowing-up in his pursuit, is all virtually 
explained by the above secret calculation of Russia. In 
point of fact it looked seriously as if the calculation were 
to be realized. In January, 1813, the Russian Generals 
Tchernisheff and Rydygier took Koenigsberg. Here a 
highly curious regime was begun, without the least regard 
for Frederic William III, and beneath the most serene 
authority of the Czar Alexander himself, just as of yore under 
Czarina Elizabeth. The Russian military Governor, Marquis 
Paulucci, had taken Memel even earlier, abolished the Prus- 
sian administration, taken over the treasury, and simply 
instituted a Russian government. 

The question of Dantzig was closely connected with 
these important events. There can be no doubt that the 
Russian plans at the end of 1812 and during the greater 
part of 1813 had one aim in view—to get possession of 
Dantzig and either simply retain it or, in the worst case, 
leave it with the status of a free city as the Peace of Tilsit 
had done. There would, of course, be one difference—that 
the protector would be Alexander and not Napoleon. 

In fact, Kutuzow, in a very remarkable ordinance 
addressed to General Wittgenstein, advised him to remove 
the Prussian troops from Dantzig and use for its investment 
only Russian units. The result was that in January, 1813, 
after the city was surrounded, the Cossack Commander 
Platow was in charge, whilst in February Wittgenstein, and 
to the end of April General Lewis, directed the operations. 


A FREE CITY 69 


In May Prince Alexander of Wiirtemberg, Military Governor 
of White Russia, the born uncle of the Czar himself, was sent 
straight from the Russian headquarters. The choice of such 
a distinguished personage, as well as the increase of the 
besieging army to well over 30,000 men, were a clear indi- 
cation of the importance attached in the immediate entourage 
of the Czar to his getting control of Dantzig himself. 

Frederic William, too, easily scented the danger, and 
gave orders already in April ‘‘ to make all thinkable efforts ”’ 
to send to the siege of Dantzig Prussian divisions, whose 
very presence would be a kind of pledge of Prussia’s claims 
to the city. A weak division of Prussian ‘‘ Landwehr,” 
numbering a few thousand men, under the leadership of Count 
Dohna, was brought together, and it was sent in June “to 
the help”’ of Prince Wiirtemberg. 

The Russian Commander naturally received the uninvited 
“help” in the most ungracious manner. He looked down 
on them, issued orders to them in Russian, just as to his 
“crews of reserves,” but set them regularly in the rear, 
etc. Thus there was played out under the walls of Dant- 
zig a strange tragedy-comedy, part political, part military, 
between the Prussian troops, who outdid themselves in their 
importunate eagerness, and the Russian Commander, who 
turned the cold shoulder mercilessly to their proffered 
services. | 

This last siege of Dantzig, in the year 1813, when, as 
in 1734, it was beset and finally taken by victorious Russian — 
armies, was once again nothing less than a tragedy alike for 
Dantzig and France and Poland. Again Polish and French 
troops defended the city in her bitter need. It was infinitely 
important for Napoleon that Dantzig should hold out as 
long as possible—‘ that walled palladium of France on far- 
away reaches ”—as it would be for him a solid point d’appur 
in case of a more fortunate turn of events. 

Yet the garrison gathered now in the city, the Tenth 
Corps of the Grand Army, was nought but a collection of 
frozen, wounded, and exhausted wrecks of men, survivors 
of the fearful catastrophe of Moscow. It was a “ heap 
of invalids,” numbering nominally over 35,000 men, of 
whom, however, the greater part—up to 18,000—at once 
went into hospital, and soon died almost to the last man. 


70 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


There were thus in truth never more than some 13,000 to 
14,000 men fit to bear arms. It was the most complete 
medley of people—French, Bavarians, Dutch, Westphalians, 
Spaniards, Italians, and even Africans. 

1 Next to the French, the stoutest element of defence 
which was to be found in the garrison, was the Poles. The 
Seventh Polish Division was there, under the command of 
Brigadier-General Prince Michael Radziwill. There were three 
regiments of foot, the Fifth, the Ninth, and the Eleventh, 
which had taken a brilliant part in the capture of Dantzig 
six years before, and were now called upon to defend it. 
There was the Ninth Regiment of Polish Lancers, which 
had just shed its blood liberally and distinguished itself 
in the Moscow expedition. Finally, there were two companies 
of foot and one of horse artillery, and a company of sappers. 
This made a total of 6,000 men, virtually half of the whole 
garrison that was able to fight. All were splendid soldiers, 
resolved to defend the ancient Polish city to the last. 

Of course the Russian besiegers on their part under- 
took vigorous steps the moment the city was invested, to 
demoralize and win over precisely this stoutest Polish element 
of the garrison. The Russian Commander himself prepared 
a proclamation urging the Poles to desertion and treachery. 
At the same time a falsified appeal was issued, supposed 
to be that ‘of the citizens of Warsaw to their brethren 
in the field.”” In this proclamation the people of Warsaw 
adjured and challenged all Poles under arms in general, 
and those defending Dantzig in particular, ‘‘ by the sacred- 
ness of their faith and of their fatherland,” to leave the 
standard of the atheistic and crime-committing Napoleon 
and to place themselves at once under the protection of 
“the great Czar, Alexander the Magnificent,” and of “ the 
great Russian nation,” akin to the Poles in blood, in language, 
and in near neighbourhood. 

This singular appeal, written for the rest in curiously bad 
Polish and full of Russianisms, was naturally a wretched 
counterfeit. As a matter of fact, Warsaw, when captured 
at the beginning of February, 1813, by the Russian armies, | 
maintained generally a patriotic and hostile attitude to its 
conquerors. Instead of urging people to desert, she did 
exactly the opposite. Her whole soul was with the Polish 


A FREE CITY 71 


army fighting in the field under Prince Poniatowski and 
holding loyally to France and to Napoleon. All the same, 
the moment the Russian armies approached Dantzig, Cossack 
officers sent by Platow put in an appearance among the 
Polish outposts and began to fraternize. When they were 
hustled out they ride away, scattering among the troops a 
host of the proclamations above mentioned. 

The Governor, Rapp, was equal to the occasion, acting 
like a soldier and to the point. He wrote up the whole 
incident in the Dantzig Gazette, ordered the counterfeit 
appeal ‘“‘ from Warsaw ”’ to be printed word for word, and 
bade it be read everywhere publicly to the assembled Polish 
regiments. The result was that the troops rejected with 
indignation the Russian request, and took a solemn oath 
to hold out unfailingly in the defence of Dantzig, France 
and Napoleon. 

They issued further a written declaration, edited by 
Captain Wladislaw Ostrowski, who was then at the head 
of the Polish Horse Artillery at Dantzig. He defended the 
city gallantly, and became in 1831 the zealous Marshal of 
the famed Revolutionary Diet in Warsaw. The declaration 
recalled the Partitions of Poland, the massacre of Praga, 
the injuries without number suffered from the Powers who 
had divided the land, especially from Russia, and ended 
with a pledge “ of love of country and gratitude to Napoleon.” 

This declaration, which was handed to Rapp by Prince 
Radziwill and the Polish Staff, was signed by “the 
generals and senior officers, the commanders, the officers 
and non-commissioned, as well as the privates of the Fifth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Regiments of Foot, the Ninth 
Regiment of Lancers, the commander, officers, non-commis- 
sioned and privates of the Foot and Horse Artillery. and 
of the Sappers” in Dantzig. This eloquent pledge was 
confirmed by the Poles time after time by their splendid 
deeds. During the first attack made in earnest by Lewis 
on the city early in March, 1813, the Russian columns 
advancing to storm the place were scattered, thanks 
chiefly to the furious charge of the Polish Brigade. The 
grateful Rapp appeared from that time in the red cap of 
a Polish Confederate and often in full Polish uniform. 

The conditions of the still continuing siege grew day by 


72 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


day more desperate. Beneath the enemy’s fire, under the 
influence of hunger, typhus, and insidious tales from without, 
the spirits of the men kept sinking always the more. When 
treachery was creeping into the city and among the Allies, 
only the Poles remained true to their duty, to their leader, 
their nation, and to Europe, loyal to the end here, just ‘as 
on the field of Leipsic under Poniatowski. Nearly half of 
them—some 2,500—died, either falling on the ramparts or 
dying in the city hospitals. 

At length, a month after the Battle of Leipsic, when he 
had exhausted his means of defence and there was now no 
more hope, Rapp signed a deed of surrender on honourable 
terms at the end of November, 1813. He was to leave the 
city with his garrison on New Year’ s Day, 1814, if no relief 
came before that time. 

By the deed of surrender the Poles of the garrison were 
guaranteed the choice either of marching out and making 
their way to Napoleon’s armies or of returning home. Alex- 
ander, however, for reasons which did him no credit, refused 
to ratify the terms. He ordered the French, together with 
their Commander, to be taken prisoners and sent off into 
the depths of Russia. The Poles were allowed to return to 
Warsaw, but without their arms.58 

At ten o'clock in the morning of New Year’s Day, 1814, 
some 3,000 Polish troops, with 230 officers, marched out of 
Dantzig by the Oliva Gate, under the command of Radziwill. 
They had their arms with them, but laid them down a league 
outside the walls. This was the last Polish garrison to take 
leave of the Polish Dantzig for over a century. 

The Prussians, who were keeping a suspicious eye on the 
Prince of Wiirtemberg, were deeply alarmed at the news 
of the surrender of the city, a transaction arranged by the 
French Governor with the Russian Commander, of course 
without any thought for Berlin. At once they informed 
their King that the Russian Staff was resolved to level the 
fortifications of Dantzig, not to restore it to the Prussian 
crown, but to declare it a free city. At the same time they 
denounced “ certain gentlemen of the Senate of Dantzig, 
who certainly desire a return of the city’s former glory and 
exert an influence on some important persons here,’ i.e. 
in the Russian headquarters, Frederic William sent an order 


A FREE CITY 73 


forthwith naming General Massenbach as Governor and 
Colonel Dohna as Commander of the city. 

Now, however, as the Prussian historian of the fortress 
of Dantzig expresses it, a “catastrophe” followed. The 
Prince of Wiirtemberg declared outright that he had no 
intention of obeying the King’s orders, that he awaited 
the orders of the Czar, and that duty bade him consider 
above everything else the interests of his master and Russia. 
For the rest he added quite openly that in his opinion “ the 
question of Dantzig is inseparably bound up with that of 
Poland.” 

The Russians, then, the day. after the Franco-Polish 
garrison left the place, entered Dantzig themselves. The 
keys were sent to the Czar. Lieutenant-General Prince 
Wolkonski became Governor of the city and General Rach- 
manow the Commander. The Prussians were excluded 
wholly both from the military and the civilian administra- 
tion. Permission was given them to man just the inner 
Heugarten Gate, between the Bishop’s Hill and the Hagels- 
berg. 

Sharp differences soon resulted. A violent scene took 
place between the Prince and the Prussian Generals. Count 
Dohna was bold enough to post up printed proclamations 
in the city on his own authority as “Commander.” But 
these were torn down at once, and that possibly by the 
people themselves, who, as the confidential reports of Major 
Hake to the Prussian King inform us, demonstrated in a 
clear manner their hatred of the Prussian authorities. The 
Prince of Wiirtemberg threatened Dohna himself with 
arrest. For a month the Russians were sole lords of 
Dantzig, and made themselves at home in the city. Thus, 
at least for the short period of January, 1814, the old Russian 
longings of Peter and Elizabeth for the city were fulfilled. 

Nevertheless the Prussians did not neglect their business. 
From the moment when, renouncing Napoleon, they joined 
the Coalition again, they undertook with great diligence 
the regaining of Dantzig. In February of 1813, on the first 
negotiations of Frederic William with the Czar as his ally, 
the Prussian demanded that Russia bind herself to restore 
Dantzig to him. Alexander demurred at the time, and in 
the joint agreement of Breslau-Kalish between Prussia 


74 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


and Russia, he made no mention of the city at all. Nor did 
he cease demurring in the matter, for one or another reason, 
during the whole spring and autumn campaign of 1813. 
Even in October, after the Battle of Leipzig, he broached 
the idea through one of his diplomats of leaving Dantzig 
as a free city, or in any case not letting Prussia get it 
back. 

But both the Prussian diplomats and the King himself 
kept assailing the Czar in this delicate matter with ever- 
increasing insistence. Unfortunately, too, they got the 
support of the British representative in the Allied camp, 
Lord Castlereagh, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
who took a most perverted view of the Dantzig question, 
as indeed of that of Poland as a whole. Castlereagh, by 
the suggestions of the Prussian Cabinet, was daily kept in 
dread of the Russian peril, and recalling the mistaken and 
now out-of-date initiative of Pitt of twenty years previously, 
he declared himself favourable to the restoration of Dantzig 
to Prussia. 

In the face of this Alexander could not resist further. 
When, then, on his victorious way to France, he received in 
Basle the news of the surrender of the city to the Prince 
of Wiirtemberg, he gave orders that it be restored again to 
Prussia. These orders reached Dantzig at the beginning 
of February, 1814, and were carried out forthwith. Thus 
the Prussians got possession of Dantzig once more, and that 
for a full century. 59 

Nevertheless, in spite of the Czar’s orders and the act 
of Prussia in again taking over the city, the fundamental 
question of its title to Dantzig remained still an unsettled 
one. It was a matter for the whole of Europe, which, just 
like all the others growing out of the division of the lands 
taken from Napoleon, and of his abdication and the capture 
of Paris, had to be settled finally by the General Congress 
of the Nations in Vienna. It was on this that the unhappy 
people of Dantzig set their last feeble expectations. For 
these experienced and stubborn citizens, just as in the days 
of Frederic William III, or with Frederic the Great, shud- 
dered at the thought of coming again under the rule of 
Prussia. 

They did not at all admit themselves beaten. They did 


A FREE CITY 75 


everything they could to prevent their again falling into 
Prussian hands. As indicated, the resident representative 
in Paris, “‘ deputy of the city of Dantzig at the Emperor’s 
Court,” in Napoleon’s time was first the patron of Dantzig 
Kahlen, and after his death in r811, his friend Dr. Keidel, 
a resourceful and energetic man, born in Bremen. The 
Senate of Dantzig, through its closed Committee of five 
senators, foreseeing the fall of Napoleon and an upheaval 
in Europe, worked out secret instructions for Keidel imme- 
diately after the disastrous retreat from Moscow. 

These instructions, under the date of Januafy, 1813, 
set forth on the eve of a reconstitution of Europe the essential 
demands of Dantzig. The return of the city under the 
Prussian sceptre was entirely excluded, as the greatest of 
evils, a thing quite inadmissible. But in the same way 
the Constitution of the city of 1807 as a free city was declared 
to be unsuccessful and undesirable for the future. For this 
situation led, so the report declared, to similar lamentable 
results for the city as had been experienced from 1772 to 
1793, while it was cut off from Poland. Those grievous 
experiences proved that Dantzig could not maintain itself 
as a free city, even though all its sovereign rights were 
guaranteed. Thus, then, the instructions ended, the best 
solution, and the one we must aim at, would be that Dantzig 
be again united ‘“‘ with Poland, as a powerful and independent 
State.’ 

After waiting through the critical year 1813 and the 
siege of the city, Keidel began with the desired representa- 
tions to the Allied Powers the moment their victorious 
armies entered Paris. He first reached the Czar through 
the latter’s Swiss friend Laharpe, and handed him in May, 
in the name of the Senate of Dantzig, a bold and dexterous 
memorial on the question of the unlucky city. He recalled. 
the oppression and violence it had suffered at the hands of 
Frederic the Great and his successor. He declared the 
seizure of the city by Prussia in virtue of the Second Parti- 
tion to be an act which international law did not warrant. 
He went back to the plans of the Czarinas Anne and Cath- 
erine as guardians of the city. He demonstrated that 
“ Dantzig is the key to the Vistula, and the natural and 
indispensable market-place of the products and output of 


76 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


Poland.” Therefore, he said, “‘these very Polish lands 
are most concerned for the maintenance of an independent 
Dantzig.” 

Keidel demanded, therefore, from Alexander the deliver- 
ance of Dantzig from Prussia, and the reservation for her 
in the future at least of the same guarantees of a free city 
as had been given at Tilsit, this time, of course, under the 
protectorate of the Czar. Properly speaking, he departed 
here from his secret instructions, whose chief recommenda- 
tion was the uniting of the city with Poland. 

But this very reconstitution of Poland was still, during 
the stay of the Allies in Paris, a very doubtful thing. Then, 
again, the Allied statesman, Pozzo di Borgo the Russian 
diplomat and a convinced enemy of the Poles, Metternich 
and Stadion the Austrian statesmen, to whom the Dantzig 
representative turned for counsel, did not in the least 
favour the restoration of Poland by Alexander. In any 
case Keidel, in all his papers laid before the Allies at the 
time in Paris, unconditionally excluded Dantzig’s return 
to the Prussian domination. At the same time he went 
privately to the British Embassy in Paris and put into 
the hands of the Ambassador, Sir Charles Stuart, a separate 
and still more cogent memorial, which was meant for Castle- 
reagh. In this he recalled the former friendly relations 
of Dantzig with England. He stated emphatically that 
‘““ His Majesty the King of Great Britain never ratified the 
delivering up of Dantzig to the Prussian King, done tem- 
porarily in 1793 and then abolished in 1807.” 

Dantzig’s representative in Paris, in his search for salva- 
tion for his city, received, as was natural, the support of a 
most distinguished Pole who was present in the city, 
Prince Adam Czartoryski. This nobleman, who was then 
the friend and confidant of the Czar, took Keidel under 
his protection, and with him the cause of Dantzig he was 


championing. ) 
“The man works very well,’’ wrote Czartoryski about 
Keidel in his Paris Diary of the time. ‘‘... He is an excel- 


lent man ; he is stirring up compassion in commercial cities 
for his own.” The Prince himself for a year and a half 
had worked with the greatest industry at the reconstitution 
of Poland by way of a personal union with Russia, 


A FREE CITY 77 


even if it had to be under the sceptre of the Czar, since 
better conditions could not be realized. 

In the light of this idea of a new-born Poland for 
which Czartoryski was working, against Kutuzow’s plan 
of complete conquest, the cause of Dantzig assumed a 
fresh complexion, and turned into its normal historical 
path. The goal now was no more the taking over of Dantzig 
by the Czar in the spirit of the greed for extension shown 
by Peter and Elizabeth, but the rightful restoration in one 
form or another of the ancient and proper relation of the 
city to Alexander as King of Poland. This would have 
meant, of course, the greatest political and industrial gain 
both for the future Kingdom of Poland and for Dantzig itself. 
And it would be in exact agreement with the essential recom- 
mendations of the secret instructions prepared by the Senate. 

With this idea, prompted by Czartoryski and armed 
with his recommendations, Keidel crossed to London, in 
-erder, as the representative of the Dantzig Senate, to continue 
there his efforts for saving his city from Prussia. He found 
in the City time-worn sympathies for Dantzig, and used them. 
Two distinguished members of the Union of London Mer- 
chants, Isaac Solly and Lewis Paleske, instituted a plan 
of intervention in the Dantzig interests. In the same way 
Keidel got in touch with the Opposition in Parliament and 
the Press. In his difficult task in London there helped 
him an eminent Pole who was staying in England, Count 
Joseph Sierakowski, a friend of Kosciuszko, whom Czar- 
toryski had recommended to him. 

In August and September, 1814, the Opposition Morning 
Chronicle printed several articles inspired by Keidel which 
concluded decidedly against the delivering up of Dantzig 
into Prussian hands. One of these was written by Siera- 
kowski. The view of the paper was that the occupying of 
Dantzig by Prussia after the surrender of Rapp and the 
withdrawal of the Russians was to be considered as only 
a temporary expedient. Void of all legal justification, it 
should be rendered void by the decision of the nations of 
Europe in favour of a return to the former SREEE SHEEN of 
a free city. 

But all of Keidel’s movements were being watched with 
the greatest care by the Prussian Embassy in London, and 


78 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


reported to the Chancellor Hardenberg in Berlin. They 
were also being represented to the British Government, 
which was at the time under Prussian influence, as highly — 
suspicious actions and hostile to the cause of the Allies. 
It was thus in vain that the tireless representative of 
Dantzig knocked at the doors of that Government. He 
turned, it is true, in person to the Prime Minister, Lord 
Liverpool, and to the head of the Foreign Department, 
Lord Castlereagh. He presented again a huge memorial, in 
which he went back to the privileges granted by Casimir 
Jagiellon. He demanded the deliverance of his city 
from Prussian hands, and the guarantee for free traffic on 
the Vistula. He claimed finally—and this in the spirit of 
the suggestions of Prince Czartoryski—that Dantzig should 
be put “‘ under the cover of the special protection ’’ (sous 
Végide d'une protection spéciale) of the future King of Poland. 
Unfortunately the eloquent representations of the Dantzig 
deputy did not convince the British statesmen, whose fear 
of Russia made them the more well-disposed to Prussia. 

It was with difficulty that Keidel, as Sierakowski told 
the Prince, obtained from the British Government permission 
to attend the Vienna Congress. Apart from that he gained 
nothing ; ‘‘ rather Lord Liverpool talked to him profusely 
about the kindliness of the Prussian Government.” To 
crown the whole, Weickhmann, a member of the secret 
Committee of the Dantzig Senate of the former year, who 
was now named Mayor of the city by the Prussian Govern- 
ment, sent to Hardenberg in Berlin the whole secret declara- 
tion, together with Keidel’s confidential correspondence, 
The Prussians could thus, with their exact acquaintance 
with the facts, take successful steps to checkmate all that 
was being done for the city. 

Keidel did indeed get to the Vienna Congress, 1814-15, 
but all his efforts in Dantzig’s cause were easily paralysed 
by Hardenberg. Nor did the mediation of Czartoryski 
avail any more. He held his ground longer, it is true, in 
the matter of the defence of Thorn and its incorporation 
into the Kingdom of Poland. But even this point was 
resigned ; and in the face of the unfriendly attitude of the 
Powers, the efforts made to save Dantzig were the less able 
to command success. By the treaties of Vienna, made in 


A FREE CITY 79 


May and June, 1815, between the Powers that had divided 
Poland, as well as by the Act of the Conclusion of the Con- 
gress, Dantzig was finally assigned to Prussia.® 

It turned out in very truth that the final disposal of 
Dantzig by the nations was achieved under extraordinary 
circumstances. For it was done in the teeth of the city’s 
own wish; and her. remarkable protests before the whole 
of Europe, her efforts to the very last to avoid being 
relegated again to the domination of Prussia, seemed 
worthy of more detailed mention. 

At the same time the decision of the Congress of Vienna, 
which assigned Dantzig to Prussia, was taken not the least 
because of the then prevailing anxieties about a Russian 
hegemony in Europe, if the latter were to swallow up East 
Prussia. Circumstances had now changed wholly. Such 
fears had vanished. Mighty Russia has fallen at the hands 
of Prussian Germany, which has also been striving after 
the hegemony. In viewof the restoration of an independent 
Polish Republic, the verdict of Vienna must be thoroughly 
revised in the matter of Dantzig, and that in the light of 
its age-long, natural, and historical connexion with Poland. 


VI 
IN THE HANDS OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY 


WITH the recovery of Dantzig by the Prussians there began 
in the city a work of centralization and of Germanization. 
In February 1814 a special Organizing Commission, sent 
from Berlin, dissolved the previous municipal administra- 
tion of the free city, which was suspected of Franco-Polish 
sympathies. It set up instead a new City Council, com- 
posed of creatures of the Prussian Government. It further 
transformed on the same principle the character of the city 
courts, dismissed the Code Napoléon, and restored the Prus- 
sian Landrecht. It abolished every trace of the Polish and 
French institutions of the free city, and adapted everywhere 
the general Prussian municipal administration in their place. 

On the new division of West Prussia into the departments 
of Dantzig and Marienburg, Dantzig was made the capital 
of the whole province in 1816, and became, under that 
most capable, clever, and convinced Germanizing bureaucrat, 
Oberpraesident Theodore Schoen, the seat of a provincial 
bureaucracy, whose numbers were legion. This able ad- 
ministrator, and still abler destroyer of all things Polish, 
was at once a Liberal and an ultra-Prussian, and is one 
of the spiritual fathers of the later National-Liberal idea 
and of Hakatism. With the help of an assistant, who was 
worthy of him, Flottwell, who was at the time Regency 
Councillor in the city, and became later the famous Ober- 
praesident of Posen, he accomplished in the eight years 
of his stay in Dantzig an extraordinarily successful piece 
of work for German Kultur. He did much for the improve- 
ment of the administration, the rebuilding of the city, the 
roads, streets,-and schools, everything with the studied, 
easily-running purpose of sh peers 


IN THE HANDS OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY 81 


His work of Oberpraesident was begun with distinction. 
He undertook the restoration of the old Castle of the 
Grand Master in Marienburg, which has been destroyed 
by the people of Dantzig and the Poles together, as a 
visible symbol of the renewal of the Crusaders’ supremacy 
(1817). Simultaneously he secured financial support and 
administrative privileges from the Government for the 
active assistance of the business world of Dantzig, which 
had suffered, and was threatened with complete ruin after 
the recent industrial and military subversions. By these 
methods and by his own personal influence Schoen made 
the first really successful breach in the bitter anti-Prussian 
front the people of Dantzig had maintained, because of 
their traditional inclination to Poland, and pushed forward 
markedly the work of transforming the ancient Polish city 
into a Prussian emporium. 

All the same, these skilful operations of a superfine 
bureaucracy could neither hide nor repair the actual disaster 
the change brought upon the city, thus severing it from the 
natural source of its well-being, its nursing Alma Mater, 
from Poland. As yet, of course, the industrial misfortune 
consequent on this severance was not felt so keenly during 
the first period of Prussian occupation, after the Second and 
Third Partitions, since at that time a considerable part 
of Poland, including Warsaw, had shared Dantzig’s fate 
of remaining under Prussia. But in the epoch which began 
after the Congress of Vienna, and lasted a whole century, 
the position of the city was at least so far changed for the 
worse that Poland’s one port was finally cut off from the 
new Polish State set up by the Congress. | 

The results were very soon apparent. The trade of 
Dantzig lost the normal guarantees of its prosperity and 
improvement. For the time being the Berlin Government 
was able by a dexterous method of using its influence in 
St. Petersburg, and by dint of clever negotiation in trade 
matters with Russia, by the palliative of a_ profitable 
Customs-treaty to stimulate it artificially. But in spite of 
all this, it was condemned to a gradual and inevitable end. 
Misery made its appearance in the formerly wealthy city 
among the patrician merchants and among the common 
people, who had been producers, or who had lived on the 

6 


82 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


traffic in timber, on the warehouses, or on the harbour itself. 
And this was'‘no more merely transitional, as during the war 
in Napoleon’s time. It clearly pointed to the unavoidable, 
if gradual, impoverishment and decay of the city. 

The population became aware of their crumbling for- 
tunes, and their resentment became general. It was not 
long before violent riots occurred in the city, caused by 
the general poverty—a thing unheard of before in Dantzig. 
They happened in September 1819, August 1821, and May 
1822. 

It is true that shortly after the Congress of Vienna the 
Berlin Government was able, thanks to the Czar’s readiness 
to serve it, and to the services of his plenipotentiaries, who 
had been won over by Prussia, to conclude a Trades Conven- 
tion with Russia that was highly favourable to themselves. 
This extraordinary deed, dictated by Prussian interests, 
introduced tariff and Customs regulations, which either 
lowered or abolished all tariff on goods exported from 
Prussia into Poland, killed the Polish industry that was 
raising its head, and gave instead exclusive rights to the 
commerce and industry of Prussia. By doing this it brought 
about indirectly a certain artificial increase of the export 
and import trade of Dantzig, though this success was short- 
lived. Polish statesmen, and especially Prince Lubecki, the 
Treasury Minister of the Polish Kingdom, soon began an 
attack on the fatal arrangement. . After explaining its 
harmfulness to the Czar, the Warsaw Government initiated 
a tariff war of defence with Berlin. Lubecki secured an 
“ukase’”’ for a prohibitive tariff in Poland against Prussia 
(1822). 

The next year there followed new Prussian reprisals, 
which even put difficulties in the way of transit from 
Poland to Dantzig. This was in direct opposition to the 
purpose of the Vienna Congress, which guaranteed the free 
use of the Vistula. Finally the Warsaw Government 
forced the conclusion of a new agreement between Russia 
and Prussia, which made the necessary degree of provision 
for the industrial interests of Poland (1825). At the 
same time Lubecki set about forming direct trade relations 
between Poland and England, in the hope of freeing the 
former from ‘“‘ Prussian tribute,’ from the ‘“‘ Cerberus 


IN THE HANDS OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY 83 


watching at our gates,’”’ the Prussian one in Dantzig. These 
efforts were assisted by the Polish Consuls in Dantzig, 
Makarewicz and Tengoborski, in consonance with the 
Minister. 

All this should have reacted most visibly on the well- 
being of the city. In the event of direct trade between 
Poland and England, the Port of Dantzig, used only for 
transit, would have to be content with the minor gains of 
the shipping trade, instead of the former generous profits 
of permanent storage for buying and selling. Together 
with the trade in grain, that in timber also fell off; the 
more so that England during the blockade of the Continent 
set herself to procure the oaks of India and the pines of 
Canada, in the place of Polish timber for masts and con- 
struction. The increase in the freight was no more than 
the tariff imposed by Prussia. The export of Polish grain, 
which had risen in 1816 to 24,000 lasts, and in 1820, after 
the first agreement between Prussia and Russia, to 38,000, 
fell soon after, with the commencement of the tariff war 
with Warsaw, to 16,000 in 1821, and in 1822 to a bare 
6,500 lasts. 

Simultaneously with this economic ruin of the city, 
under the Prussian crown, a systematic Germanization of 
the place was also accomplished. It was a part of the 
wider Germanizing programme being undertaken at the 
time in the whole district. With a view to eliminating 
West Prussia as a separate unit, remaining from the now 
divided Poland, the recommendation came in that it should 
be united with East Prussia in a single province (1824), 
Schoen became Oberpraesident of both together, and his 
place of residence was moved from Dantzig to Koenigsberg. 
The united Diet of the province of East-West Prussia was 
to meet from now onward, according to the Royal Ordinances 
of 1823-24, alternately in the two cities. From this time 
the designs of the Government in the matter of Prussian- 
izing the Kashubian-Polish population were pushed with even 
greater intensity. In the whole administration, in church, 
and in school, the process of centralization and of levelling - 
went on, and that in the little corner around Dantzig as 
well as in the whole new province.™ 

In addition, and during this period after the Congress, 


84 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


the first incipient signs of an every way notable phe- 
nomenon appeared in Pomerania about Dantzig, viz. the 
re-birth of the Kashubian-Polish national consciousness. 
The Kashubian Poles, from the dawn of history, the proper 
indigenous Slavs in this land, had spread out hither into 
the districts of Dantzig from the western Pomerania (i.e. 
“Seashore ’’) of Stettin long before the dawn of the 
Middle Ages, and had made themselves a home under 
the sovereign protection of Poland and the rule of their 
own Pomeranian Princes. As we have related, they were 
broken by the deceit and violence of the Order in the 
memorable massacre at the beginning of the fourteenth 
century in their own city. From that time their ancient 
nobility was humiliated, their people enslaved, trodden 
down in body and soul, and condemned to Germanization, 
poverty, and extinction. 

With all this they did not permit the Order to stamp 
them out, as it did the native-born Prussians proper; but, 
of a softer yet more enduring temper than the latter, they 
survived ages of trials, true to their popular proverb: “ The 
Kashubian will never perish ! ”’ 

Neither did they forget the ancient and mortal injuries 
done by the Crusaders, that massacre of six centuries ago, 
remembered to-day in the Kashubian cradle-song :— 


In Radun the waters are red, 
For the blood of the sires, alas! 
And that of the children was shed ! 


On the other hand, they preserved their close union with 
Poland, dating from somewhere about Boleslaw the Great’s 
time, and confirmed by their loyalty that did homage to 
Lokietek, delivered from the Order and faithful to the 
sceptre of the Jagiellons and the elective Republic. In the 
good old days over the High Gate of Dantzig the Polish 
White Eagle stood as a brother beside the black Kashubian 
Griffin, which faced to the left. On the walls of the 
presbytery of Oliva’s venerable abbey the portraits of the 
Kings of Poland and of the Pomeranian Princes hung 
peacefully side by side. 

Of course, the Polish Republic, with its exaggerated respect 


IN THE HANDS OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY § 85 


for the autonomy of Dantzig, could not hinder the passive 
Germanization of the Kashubians under the Polish crown. 
But all the while what remained genuinely Kashubian 
bocame mingled through and through with Polish blood 
and the Polish spirit, thanks to influences which leaked 
through from the neighbouring Great Poland, as well as 
through the constant influx by way of the Vistula of rafts- 
men, traders, nobility, from Warsaw, Cracow, or even the 
far-away Carpathians. 

This reacted most on the Kashubian language. It 
retained certain primitive marks of its ancient Slavonic 
individuality, but in the course of time it became influenced 
all the more, until it became at length a variation of the 
Polish—just as the people themselves became a type of 
the Polish nation. The tongue was far more intelligible 
to the Warsaw or Cracow Pole, than Low German is to the 
man of Munich or Berlin, than Provengal to the Parisian, or 
the Venetian dialect to the Tuscan. It became a pleasant 
maritime Polish. Thereby the language constituted an 
intellectual rampart of defence both for the Kashubian 
people and for the Polish element in Dantzig. 

In subsequent days the Kashubians, when the restored 
Prussian administration set itself to stamp out the last 
traces of things Polish, and because they saw the Kingdom - 
of Poland re-born across the way, under the powerful shelter 
of Russia, entered on an investigation of their Polish and 
Kashubian languages. The learned priest of the church 
of St. Anne in Dantzig, Father Mronga-Mrongovius, 
lecturer of Polish in the City Gymnasium, and a member of 
the Scientific Societies of Warsaw and Cracow, undertook 
studies lasting for years of Polish and Kashubian vocabu- 
laries, not only from the point of view of philology, but also 
from the deeper national standpoint. 

This did not happen without certain aberrations of a 
political sort, brought about by the prevailing relations 
between Poland and Russia. The former covetous glances 
of Russia towards Dantzig were repeated again in a curious 
way on the field of philology. The works of Mrongovius 
provoked the interest of the Governor-General of Poland, 
the Grand Duke Constantin Pavlovitch, the former Chan- 
cellor Rumianzeff, and the former Nationalist Russian 


86 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


Minister of Education, Chichkoff, and these began in 
Dantzig to seek amid the old monuments of the Kashubian 
tongue new evidence of its closer relationship ‘* with its 
mother-tongue, the Russian,” than with Poland. In spite 
of this sort of temptation, the excellent old patriot Mronga 
kept to the end his life-long loyalty as a Kashubian to the 
cause of Poland, both as regards its language and its politics. 

“We are praying for you,’ he wrote from Dantzig 
at the time of the Warsaw November Revolution (1830), 
in his own name and that of his Kashubian brethren. 
*“ Eternal Helper, do Thou deliver weakness out of the hands 
of the furious ones!’’ On the collapse of the insurrection 
he wept “ tears of blood’ over Warsaw’s fate. This learned 
Kashubian son of Dantzig was therefore deserving of the 
praise of the great patriot, Prince Adam Czartoryski, and the 
hearty greetings of the great Polish poet, Adam Mickiewicz, 
sent later on from the colony in Paris to far-away Dantzig.% 

The outbreak of the November Revolution and the 
hopeless course of the war between Poland and Russia, 
permitted Prussia to influence the traditional relations of 
Dantzig to Poland in a hostile fashion, and one quite 
opposed to the fairest tradition of the city’s history. 
Dantzig, which was famed for its loyalty, which had always 
stood by Poland without hesitation against every kind of 
foreign invader, and which had of yore defended at such 
sacrifice Jan Casimir against the Swedes and Stanislaw 
Leszczynski against Russia, was now used and abused as 
the chief basis of operations for the furnishing of secret help - 
by Prussia to the troops of the Czar Nicholas, which were — 
despatched to stamp out the Polish revolt. 

The truth appears to be that according to the contem- 
porary witness of the Field Marshal Paskiewitch, and the 
Polish General-Quartermaster Prondzynski, ‘enormous sup- 
plies of food and ammunition were brought by sea for the 
Russian army, and then towed up the Vistula. Accord- 
ing to the Russian’s new plan, Dantzig and Thorn became 
their most serviceable basis of operations. . . . Through 
the Russian Consul in Dantzig, and with the help of the 
Prussian Government, huge stores of provisions were. bought 
up and conveyed over the boundary, just as too great sup- 
plies of munitions of various kinds came by sea to Dantzig 


IN THE HANDS OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY § 87 


in Russian ships and were brought up the Vistula to 
Thorn ”’ (1831). 

The consequence was that revolutionary Poland, cut 
off from her natural allies, France and England, and defend- 
ing herself with her last strength against the Russians, was 
handed over under pretence of a treacherous neutrality 
by Prussia, which was content to sacrifice the once Polish 
Dantzig to the behests of the Czar. 

When the November Revolution was crushed and the 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland was abrogated, 
there was no one left to defend successfully the interests 
of Dantzig. Prussia took for her friendship a rich reward 
in the form of new, most advantageous trade agreements 
with Russia. Over against the ban thus put for a long 
time on a genuine development of Polish industry, however, 
a certain advance in the export of land produce from the 
Kingdom again vouchsafed to Dantzig for a time a certain 
modest increase of earnings. 

It was just after this that the aged Frederic William III, 
father-in-law of Czar Nicholas I, furnished renewed proofs 
of his servility to his redoubtable son-in-law. Meeting him 
for a joint review of Prussian and Russian troops at Kalish 
in the down-trodden Kingdom of Poland, he permitted a 
part of the Russian army to be brought to\the place by 
sea, and that through the harbour of Dantzig (1835). Thus 
on the very centenary day of the taking of the city by 
Muennich, which event Nicholas was only too pleased to 
commemorate in such a fashion, Dantzig had solemnly to 
receive in her midst Russian troops landing at her docks. 

At the same time a new and important step was taken 
in the direction of the Germanization of the Kashubians 
of the whole seacoast. In 1837 the provincial Diet of 
Koenigsberg passed a resolution abolishing entirely the 
Polish language among the Kashubians, both in church 
and school. Fortunately, the new King, the liberalizing 
young Frederick William IV, who, on taking over the throne, 
visited Dantzig on his way to his coronation (1840), did 
rescind this burdensome edict (1843). 

In these troublous times of conspiracy in Poland, an 
original genius, Dr. Florian Ceynowa, the first worker for 
educational ends among the Kashubians since Mronga, 


88 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


bore witness to the indestructible community of Kashubians 
and Poles. Joining himself to the union of Polish patriots 
in 1846, he was arrested by the Prussian authorities, 
condemned to death, and only set free from prison by the 
Berlin revolution of 1848. During these revolutionary 
risings in West Prussia there was formed in the Dantzig 
region the Polish-Kashubian National Revolutionary Com- 
mittee, which, however, fell to pieces shortly when the 
revolution in Berlin was put down. All these facts are 
notable, if they are not prominent, indications of the undying, 
because deeply-rooted, inward inclination of the people of 
Dantzig for Poland, and that in a period of Polish history 
that might be characterized as most difficult, if not alto- 
gether hopeless. 

Fifteen years later there came another unfortunate and 
critical time for Poland, that of the great revolutionary effort 
in Warsaw, cleverly used up by the Berlin Government. 
The same game, including the same well-paid services to 
Russia as had marked the years of 1830-31, was again 
played by Prussia at the time of the Polish January 
Revolution of 1863. For this reason, after the detection 
of the notorious secret pact between Prussia and Russia 
of February of that year, sanctioning common action to 
stamp out the revolt in Poland, sharp reproofs were levelled 
at Berlin. Not only did Polish and Anglo-French protests 
appear, but even the progressive Prussian Opposition of the 
time made its voice heard. 

Then it was that Herr von Bismarck, President of the 
Prussian Ministry, in defence of his anti-Polish policy, used 
from the tribune of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies this 
particular argument : that the success of the Polish Revolu- 
tion would certainly mean the raising of the quéstion of 
Dantzig by the new independent Poland. 

A few days later Bismarck told the British Ambassador 
in Berlin, Sir Andrew Buchanan, who in an interview was 
questioning him about the secret pact, that on the proclama- 
tion of an independent Polish Kingdom in Warsaw “the 
first efforts of the new State would be to recover Dantzig.” 
This would be a terrible blow to the power of Prussia. All 
the same, in spite of Bismarck’s threats, it was the Assembly 
of the Senate of the Merchants’ Corporation in Dantzig 


IN THE HANDS OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY 89 


which came out with a remarkable declaration, condemning 
that secret Russo-Prussian pact as a blow aimed at the 
Polish Revolution, as well as against the whole policy of 
the Berlin Government directed against Poland. Nor did 
they take account in the least of the coming of the new 
monarch, William I, with his Queen, Augusta, to Dantzig in 
that very year. 

It was clear that the old sympathy for the Polish 
Republic had not yet died out in the city, in spite of all 
the workings of the Prussian Government. What is more, 
the Kashubian people of the seacoast showed their sympathy 
for the Warsaw Revolution in military action. According 
to the witness of one of the revolutionary leaders, there still 
existed at the beginning of 1864 a rebels’ unit, composed 
“of nothing but Kashubian peasants, who had joined the 
division, but refused either pay or assistance. They 
marched from the Baltic to the boundary of the Government 
of Plock at their own expense, in the middle of winter, 
nor would they take wagons from any one for the journey. 
They crossed the line, and when forced back, they would 
not disperse, but demanded to be led against the enemy 
again. When they were told that all was lost, they dragged 
themselves home with tears in their eyes and at their own 
cost. Nor did they cease to reckon up the numbers whom 
they had left on Polish soil.” % 

The crushing of the January Revolution by Russia with 
the political support of Berlin was afterwards, as is well 
known, utilized to the full by Prussia in its victorious wars 
with Austria and France. The Germans counted on Russia’s 
gratitude. For Dantzig itself, however, the fate of the Polish 
revolutionaries could mean nothing but misfortune. More- 
over, the speedy development of the industry of the King- 
dom of Poland, which now began, and could not longer 
be hindered, together with the building of a network of rail- 
ways, and still more the laying down of the railway on the 
Vistula, coupled with the complete neglect of the regulation 
of the river itselfi—all this sorely undermined the trade 
of Dantzig in grain and timber with the Kingdom, as with 
the whole Russian part of Poland. A similar influence upon 
Dantzig’s decline was wrought by the sudden growth of 
the rival ports Libau and Riga, which were pushed forward 


90 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


by the Russians, and also by influential circles among the 
Baltic Barons in St. Petersburg. 

It is very noteworthy that all this time Dantzig, under 
the specious pretence of official goodwill and protection, 
was actually being treated by the Prussian Government 
itself with studied purpose in step-motherly fashion. The 
city was allowed simply to languish away, and was forced 
from her one-time greatness to the very level of a second- 
rate provincial town. As a matter of fact the possession of 
Dantzig always had for Prussia a purely negative significance. 
The Prussians were concerned that Poland should not have 
her natural outlet to the sea, along the Vistula, the mother 
of her streams; that she should not have a normal way 
of export for the rich fruits of her soil; and that the main- 
tenance of a healthy credit balance for the State Treasury 
should not be possible. Prussia was concerned noé¢ to permit 
a direct means of communication between Poland and the 
Western World, which was its regular customer, both as 
buyer and seller, as well as in case of need her powerful 
political ally. She was concerned that the Polish Dantzig 
should not become the rival of her own German seaports, 
Koenigsberg, Stettin, and afterwards Kiel and Hamburg. 
For all these purely negative reasons the Prussians were 
in fact concerned in the period before the Partitions that 
Dantzig should mot enjoy the fulness of life as a part of 
Poland, and, again, after the Partitions that the city should 
not grow, but vegetate as a part of Prussia. 

In the second half of the nineteenth century, when the 
development of Prussia went on with ever-increasing speed 
as regards organization and industry, the singularly negative 
attitude of the Berlin Government to the systematically 
persecuted city is thrown into bolder relief. This was seen, 
for example, when the Eastern Railway was built from 
Berlin to Koenigsberg. In a scandalous manner Dantzig 
was ignored, and the line built on purpose to avoid her 
(1853). This involved naturally sore losses to her trade, 
and these are apparent to this day. 

In lieu of any tangible assistance for her trade, the 
Prussian Government offered the city trumped-up benefac- 
tions of a bureaucratic and militarist sort, which were of no 
value to a commercial town; In 1878 Dantzig was again 


IN THE HANDS OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY 91 


made the administrating capital city of the province of West 
Prussia. The Oberpraesident’s authority was transferred to 
it, and the Regency, the provincial Customs office, the School 
- collegium, and the Postal and Police administrations. The 
city was stuffed full of German State officials. | 

It was crowded up likewise with military offices. Dantzig 
became a “‘ war-harbour ’’ and the “seat of the High Com- 
mand of the Seventeenth Army Corps of West Prussia.”’ 
Artillery workshops were established, ship-building docks, 
especially for torpedo-boats, and small-arms factories were 
built. The attempt was even made to found different 
metallurgic, chemical, and machinery plants, factories for 
match-making, etc., all under special patronage, subsidized 
by the Government, and yielding lamentable financial 
results. This, however, was only artificial, and it could 
not take the place of the one thing Dantzig needed, her 
essential, natural, and only help, the one thing Prussian 
militarism and bureaucracy would not, and could not, give 
her, viz. free trade with a free Poland, and the restoration 
of her industrial and political union with that of Poland. 

Meantime the Polish trade of the Prussian Dantzig 
kept falling off more and more. The fact struck even 
foreign observers, who more than once drew attention to 
it. Sir William White, who had for many years (1865-75) 
been British Consul-General in the city, drew the attention 
of his Government to the approaching ruin of the trade 
between England and Dantzig, which was for various reasons 
important for the former. As the grandson of Sir W. Neville 
Gardiner, the last representative of Great Britain in the 
Republic in Poland in 1794, he had been first himself English 
Consul in Warsaw at the time of the January Revolution, and 
had been removed, for being too great a friend of Poland, at 
the request of the Russian Government. He became later 
famous as Ambassador in Constantinople. This distinguished 
statesman, who was connected closely with Poland by family 
ties and remained her true friend until death, already during 
his residence in Dantzig was clearly aware of the importance 
of the city for Poland, and so for Europe. 

He was a witness when, at the beginning of the Franco- 
Prussian War, Dantzig for the third time since 1734 (the 
second being in 1812) saw once more the war banner of 


92 DANTZIG AND POLAND. 


France. In August of 1871 three armoured cruisers and 
a patrol of the French fleet, under Vice-Admiral Bouet- 
Villaumez, dropped anchor in the gulf, but after a short 
cannonade steamed off again to the West. There could be 
no talk, then, of France delivering Dantzig, and the city, 
after the French defeat, sank deeper and deeper. White 
emphasized in his Dantzig despatches the characteristic 
fact that, when the intensive industrial expansion of the 
German Empire began after the victorious campaign in 
France, Dantzig was undergoing a contemporary process 
of decay. As a matter of fact the exports and imports of 
the city in the next five years (1871-75) dropped again by 
more than ro per cent.% 

The decisive blow for Dantzig came, however, when a 
little later a fundamental change was effected in the German 
tariff policy in the direction of protective dues, and espe- 
cially in the interests of the caste of agrarian Junkers, 
chiefly East Prussian, who were the real lords in the new 
empire. The prime step was taken in this direction when, in 
1879, the new tariff law was introduced by Bismarck, which 
raised the Customs enormously on grain and timber trans- 
ported from the Kingdom of Poland and from Russia. 
This very project evoked unrest in Dantzig, and the city 
found means of expressing its opinion during the discussion 
of the motion in the Prussian Diet. 

In the course of this discussion, among others who 
opposed the plan, was that famous'member of the Progressive 
Party in the German Parliament and the Prussian Diet, 
who had represented Dantzig for many a year, Henry 
Rickert. With the greatest emphasis he set forth in detail 
the disastrous consequences of the new tariff Bill for the 
Polish-Russian export trade in its bearing on the trade of 
Prussia as a whole, and its Dantzig trade in particular. 

Bismarck returned an answer full of deductions that 
were insincere, inexact, and even illogical. In the course 
of a long speech he asserted that the grain from the 
Polish lands must in any case come into Prussia, whatever 
was the duty; that the Polish producer would have to 
pay the increase in the same, and not the German con- 
sumer; that Riga would never be able to rival Dantzig, 
etc. He gave the game away, however, and revealed 


IN THE HANDS OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY 93 


his real mind, when, speaking scornfully of the decay of 
the Vistula’s traffic, he made the notable remark that of 
course ‘‘ all the raftsmen are foreigners,”’ i.e. Poles. 

The almighty Chancellor easily got his burdensome 
duty accepted by the submissive Parliament. Six years 
later the German agrarians, having partaken of the Govern- 
ment’s tariff benefactions, were influential in introducing 
a tariff reform which again put serious Customs restric- 
tions in the way of Polish and Russian export of grain 
and timber (1885). Once more during the consequent 
bitter debates, lasting through several sessions of the 
Reichstag in Berlin, the opposition emphasized strongly 
the actual lamentable results for Dantzig of the previous 
tariff regulation. The member for Dantzig, Rickert, called 
the new and additional restrictions now projected “a 
murderous blow ”’ to the trade and well-being of his city. 

Bismarck had the nerve to answer with the categorical 
and plainly untrue assertion, that “the trade of Dantzig 
had advanced since 1879, and had profited by the bene- 
factions of the new legislation.’”’ The agitation against 
the new scheme he branded with disdain, declaring that 
its aim was “to give the labourers and dockmen of the 
port a chance to make a noise now that a grain-duty is 
being introduced in Dantzig.’’ This time, too, as was 
natural, the Chancellor put through his restrictions, gratified 
his agrarians, and finally crushed the trade prospects of » 
Dantzig. 

His real thought about Dantzig, which the “Iron 
Chancellor’ kept diplomatically to himself as long as he 
was at the helm, he commenced more expressly to reveal 
after his fall, in indiscreet utterances over his resignation. 
At a reception in Varzin in 1894, when a German Nationalist 
deputation from the Duchy of Posen gathered to do him 
homage, Bismarck recommended strongly in a fiery speech of 
thanks that they should keep an even “ securer watch on the 
Warta and Vistula than on the Rhine, since not an inch of 
soil could be yielded. . . . If a Polish State were formed, it 
would be the ally of our enemies; it would be an active, 
aggressive power, until it got West Prussia and Dantzig 
under its control.” 

Once more, too, and that shortly afterwards, when 


94 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


receiving in audience a kindred deputation em masse from 
West Prussia, the eighty-year-old Prince expressed the 
quintessence of his views and premonitions in the matter 
of Poland in the following words :— 


It is my political conviction, that to have Russia as neighbour 
is indeed at times unpleasant and troublesome; but a Poland would 
be worse. If I had to choose, I should always prefer to have to do 
with the Czar in St. Petersburg than with the nobles of Warsaw. 
. . . If the dream of the Poles were to become a reality, the danger 
for Dantzig would be the proximate one. The Poles would have 
to annex it. Dantzig would be the first desideratum of a State with 
Warsaw as capital. It would be the conditio sine qua non of a Polish 
Republic.§7 


But now the Prussian anti-Polish policy, which was 
already in Bismarck’s time out to exterminate with its 
campaign of colonization (1886), became more severe than 
ever under the third Chancellor, von Buelow, with its studied 
persecution of the Polish schools and its confiscation scheme 
(rg01, 1906-7). This all gave rise toa salutary Polish reaction 
for self-preservation in the whole of Prussian Poland, and of 
course, too, in the region of Dantzig. A powerful defence 
movement, both material and moral, starting in Poznan 
and supported by Warsaw, spread itself out right to the 
ancient Baltic confines of the Republic. At once the purely 
defensive action, which could not help being also aggressive 
in temper, was recognized by the Prussians, who were 
looking anxiously on, as a “‘ Polish drive to the Baltic.” 

In this peaceable undertaking for self-protection, among 
the 750,000 Poles of West Prussia, 150,000 Kashubians 
took a very active part. It is true they had been for half 
a century greatly embarrassed by the sight of the growing 
prosperity of the Powers which divided Poland, and the 
misery of that people after the January Revolution. They 
were to be enticed by the growing power of Germany, or 
even by the sheer immensity of Russia, to desert Poland’s 
thoroughly stricken cause. This went so far that the worthy 
Ceynowa, of yore the Polish revolutionary patriot, appeared 
at the Slav Congress in Moscow in 1867, three years after 
the Warsaw Revolution, to witness the sympathy of the 
Kashubians with the Russian Slavophile movement. 


IN THE HANDS OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY 95 


But all this meant only the semblance of clouds cast 
over the Polish-Kashubians’ self-consciousness. During the 
years between the re-constituting of the German Empire 
(1871) and the last elections held before the war (1912), 
the only Polish mandates from West Prussia to the Berlin 
Reichstag and the Prussian Diet that were permanent 
were guaranteed by the loyal votes of the three Kashubian 
constituencies, Konitz, Starggard, and Putzig. 

And just in proportion as the oppression of Poland on 
the part of Germany and Russia grew crueller, the old 
Polish-Kashubian unity began to strengthen its hold. The 
Kashubian poet of Dantzig, Derdowski, called on Warsaw, 
the Polish capital in 1885, with a dolorous ditty :— 


We of Kashubia are guarding for Poland her sea-front: 
You there in Warsaw have scarcely a thought for your kinsmen ! 


And at the same time he launched the striking call :— 


‘There’s no Kashubia without Poland: 
And no Poland without us! 


From this time (1890) the Kashubian cause found in 
the Polish Dantzig Gazelte a constant champion. Simulta- 
neously the Co-operative Movement in economic matters 
spread from Poznan out to the Dantzig coasts and formed 
here, slowly at first, and then from 1895 daily faster, more 
than thirty co-operative Polish banks, among them the 
biggest in the region of Pomerania, that in Dantzig (1901). 
Further acts of Germanization only gave new spurs to this 
work. A healthy and energetic Young Kashubian move- 
ment sprang up, completely consecrated to the Polish 
cause, which even outstripped in its high idealism the sober 
politicians of Great Poland. It demanded, and with justice, 
the respect on Poland’s part of the individualities peculiar . 
to Kashubia, and worthy of preservation for the sake of 
their spirit and their past. This organization gathered in 
1g08-9, on the six-hundredth anniversary of the conquest 
of Dantzig by the Crusaders, around the symbolical 
Griffin, the first Polish-Kashubian periodical, which was 
soon (Igiz) transferred to Dantzig, as being ‘“‘ the chief 
city of Kashubia.’’ & 


96 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


Meanwhile the life of the city went along on the blind 
and confined course the Prusso-German authorities had 
mapped out for it, without any way of escape towards real 
growth. The chief Polish grain-warehouse was turned 
into a Prussian armoury. The instructions of the Prussian 
Staff were officially confirmed, that in the expected event 
of a war on two fronts “ Dantzig, in a defensive conflict 
with Russia, must be a pivotal basis of operations.” The 
garrison was increased. In Langfuhr a brigade of Letb- 
husaren was placed, a “‘ Brigade of Death,’’ with the warrior 
Kronprinz as their commander. Each year the population 
was treated to the manceuvres of the German fleet in the 
gulf. The city was gladdened by an equestrian statue of 
William I in his spiked helmet, a hideous abortion that 
ruined the High Gate. It was unveiled by William II 
in person, with the assistance of Prince Buelow, and amid 
the mouthing of lying orations, to glorify in Dantzig “the 
heritage of the German Knighthood ”’ (1903). 7 

Certainly more than one good deed was done for the 
city. With the help of English engineers a model water 
and sewerage system was installed in the years 1869-71. 
The regulating of the mouth of the Vistula was undertaken 
in 1888. After ten years of work the beautiful Free Port 
was opened, too shallow it is true, and soon seen to be too 
narrow. This was in the Neufahrwasser in 1899. Follow- 
ing on, the new Kaiser Port was opened in 1904. Lastly, 
there was founded the Dantzig School of Engineering, etc. 

This Government solicitude did not, however, make up 
for the real, but dissimulated, persecution in the field of 
economic matters. Its separation from Poland became for 
Dantzig an incurable wound. It avenged itself steadily, 
both in the matter of the whole economic well-being of 
the city, and still more in that of communications. The 
partial improvement of the river mouth and the city harbour 
did not help much as long as the whole middle course of 
the Vistula was neglected, and so long as not even the 
minimum of two metres was reached by dredging to allow 
the modest type of 600-ton barges. 

The ancient traffic on rafts and that with sailing-galleys 
on the river also declined. The newer traffic with steam, 
begun by the French Guiberts in 1829, and subsidized by 


IN THE HANDS OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY 97 


Count Andrew Zamoyski in 1848, could not develop as it 
should have. It numbered at the end of Ig1I, on the whole 
Vistula, little more than a hundred vessels, several times 
less than on the shorter Elbe, the Oder, etc. The city of 
Dantzig itself, sometime proud of her maritime position, 
had scarcely twenty little steamers, with a tonnage of some 
18,000 tons in all, for sea-trade.®9 

As for communications on land, it had already been 
noted how the tariff preference granted by the Berlin 
Government to other seaports, especially to the two ancient 
rivals of Dantzig, Koenigsberg, and Stettin, which had been 
subsidized even by Frederic the Great, and competed with 
Dantzig from both sides, had never ceased sorely to injure 
the city. Only after a long conflict, lasting fifteen years 
from 1862, and conducted by the Council of the City Mer- 
chants, the indispensable but simple railway connexion 
with Warsaw was at length established, by way of Mlawa 
and Marienburg (1877). 

In return, however, Dantzig was again hard hit by a 

one-sided political tariff scheme, which prescribed lower 
rates on the railways to Lodz from Stettin than from 
Dantzig. “Our connexion with the south of Poland,” 
complained in 1907 the report of the Council of the Dantzig 
Merchants, “‘ gives way before the advancing Stettin, which 
enjoys lower railway-rates, although it is much farther 
away. This fact, too, has had a disastrous effect on our 
transport trade.” 
: Amid such conditions Dantzig’s trade in grain and 
timber, which had flourished while Poland existed, was 
consigned to a subordinate position. The imports to the 
city of Polish-Russian grain, already hard hit by the factors 
mentioned, especially by Bismarck’s raising of the duty, 
fell in the twenty years from 18go to 1910 from 145,000 tons 
to 103,000 tons, or about one-third. Because of insufficient 
deliveries, the prices of wheat and rye in Dantzig, the one-time 
granary of Europe, during the years from 1909 for which 
reports are available, have been higher than in Hamburg, 
Stettin, or Koenigsberg. 

A similar and steady shrinkage occurred in the imports 
to Dantzig of Polish-Russian timber. In the twenty years 
from 1891 to 1911 these sank from 500,000 to 379,000 cubic 

| 7 


98 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


metres, or one-fourth. Of the new articles of import, that 
of cotton was checked by the protective Russian tariff in 
favour of Turkestan cotton in 1887, and finally passed into 
the hands of Hamburg and Stettin. In the same way the 
import of coal from England was hindered. It is true that 
the latest trades agreement between Germany and Russia 
in 1904, exceptionally favourable to Germany, could not 
help affecting in some way Dantzig also for the better. 
But the degree of improvement was much smaller than in 
the case of the other rival German seaports. 

In the course of the ten following years, up to I913, 
the maritime imports into Dantzig rose, like the exports, 
from some 600,000 tons lading to not quite 800,000 regis- 
tered tons. This slow advance is like stagnation in com- 
parison with the swift advance in the corresponding figures 
for other cities during the same time. Hamburg’s figures 
increased to over 13,000,000 tons, Bremen’s to nearly 
2,000,000, Stettin’s to 1,900,000, and even the much smaller 
cities, Luebeck and Rostock, saw their trade rise by one 
and one and a half millions respectively. All this time the. 
industry of the city remained an insignificant compensation, 
artificially fostered, and chiefly composed of official military 
establishments. The whole business, so the last official 
report tells us (1913), “‘ was still very feebly developed,” 
and “‘ was more dependent on political considerations than 
on economic growth.”’ 7° 

All this could not but react negatively on the position 
and growth of the population of Dantzig up to our own 
time. Even in the matter of numbers the results are 
evident. Atthe middle of the seventeenth century it was the 
most populous city of the Polish Republic, with its 80,000 
inhabitants, considerably higher than the capital Warsaw. 
Thinned out later, especially owing to Prussian violence 
in the eighteenth century, the city scarcely numbered at 
the middle of the nineteenth as many people under Prussian 
rule as it had had two hundred -years before. The appear- 
ance of growth was brought about, in the teeth of the 
Municipality, in 1877 by an ordinance of the Government, 
which incorporated fourteen suburban communities into the 
city, thus bringing the population up to 100,000. Thirty 
years later the population of Dantzig, according to the 


IN THE HANDS OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY 99 


Census of 1910, had risen to 170,000, or hardly double what 
it had been two and a half centuries before. 

It was thus far and away outstripped by the contempo- 
rary figures of other German seaports: by Hamburg with a 
million, by Bremen with 300,000, and even by the cities 
that had formerly been much smaller, Stettin and Koenigs- 
berg, which now number each a quarter of a million 
inhabitants. 

What is more, during the last half-century (1860-1910) 
the population of all the larger Polish cities, which were 
not under Prussian domination, Warsaw, Wilno, Lwow, 
Cracow, has grown threefold, fivefold, or, as in the case of 
Lodz, more than tenfold—which are all rates incomparably 
faster than those of Dantzig. This city, which was once, 
as I have said, the most populous of the prominent cities 
of Poland, to-day, after a hundred years of Prussian occu- 
pation, has lagged behind, and is the least populous of all. 
The first has now been made last. 

The number of Kashubian-Poles registered as such 
in the present city lists is now estimated at the relatively 
unimportant sum of 6,000. In reality it could to-day 
be at least doubled, or even trebled, if it were not for the 
threats attending the registration. Dantzig is a city where 
the officials are not too well paid, since, not being “ threat- 
ened with Polonization,”’ it does not benefit from the supple- 
mentary pay for the East Marches (Ostmarkenzulage). 
Here, then, a host of Polish officials eke out a kind of 
existence, but they do not confess their nationality for fear 
of losing their modest posts. 

In the business world of the city the number of born 
Poles is equally large. They live from the custom of the 
Government institutions of the city, haunted, too, by the 
fear of losing their means of subsistence. Very many of » 
them would reject their Germanism in a moment if the 
age-old union of the city with Poland were renewed, and 
would return to their former Kashubian-Polish allegiance. 
Apart from these, Dantzig retains to-day some 60,000 
Catholics, which means about a third of the whole popula- 
tion. On them the German party of the Centre has been 
concentrating its influence. This was done when, after 
Prince Buelow dissolved the Reichstag (1907), the famous 


100 . DANTZIG AND POLAND 


“ Ride of the Centre to the East’’ for election purposes 
took place in the direction of West Prussia and Dantzig. 

These influences looked at the start favourable to the 
Poles, but soon commenced, especially after the last elec- 
tions (1912), to tend in an anti-Polish direction, as can be 
seen from the West Prussian Popular Newspaper, the influ- 
ential organ of the Centre in Dantzig. The German Catholic 
people of Dantzig were once, as noted, away back in the 
Middle Ages assigned to a Polish diocese, and were afterwards 
sheltered for centuries beneath the egis of the Polish 
Kings. There can, however, certainly be no doubt that, 
if they were once delivered from the influence of Prussian 
administration and the Centre, and restored to the former 
care of the Polish State and Church instead, this German- 
Catholic population, which formerly belonged to a Polish 
diocese, and were true for centuries to the Polish crown, 
would speedily recover their former affection for the 
Republic. | 

The same comment is likewise true of the German Pro- 
testant part of the population, whether the ancient burger 
circles which read the serious and moderate German Danizig 
Gazette of years standing, and the circles roused up 
nationally against all that is Polish by the MHakatist 
Dantzig News, or finally the socialist masses, who feel 
most sorely the economic stagnation of their city, when 
cut off from Poland, under the Prussian authorities. Thus 
unquestionably the great majority of born Dantzig people, 
with the exception of just the Pan-German, official, military, 
and other purely migratory elements, would easily, without 
- regard to estate or profession or creed, shake themselves 
loose from these hateful anti-Polish instigations, the moment 
the city succeeded in being once more joined to the Polish 
Republic. They would return gladly to the time-worn 
traditions of prosperity and progress, to enjoy the tested 
brotherly relations which once existed, and to cherish the 
loyalty of worthy subjects to “the Most Serene Republic 
of Poland.”’ 

Very notable signs of this are not lacking. They are 
to be seen from the day when with the ending of the world- 
war a tremendous crisis began to shape itself to the destruc- 
tion of German imperialism, and the actual new-birth of 


IN THE HANDS OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY 101° 


Poland and the restoration of Dantzig under her sway 
began to appear on the arena of practical possibilities. 

Already in October 1918 the Imperial Government in 
Berlin received a confidential telegram from the German 
ambassador in Berne, that “‘ the merchants of Dantzig are 
said to be turning to the Polish Government in Warsaw, 
and expressing the wish that Dantzig might be restored to 
Poland, and that they expected great good therefrom for the 
future of the city.”” The Chancellor’s office in the Wilhelm- 
strasse was so disturbed by the report, that by way of the 
Imperial Office for Foreign Affairs it sent confidential word 
of the same to the Governor-General of Warsaw, through the 
central agency of the Secret Military Police.7* At the same 
time the German authorities in Dantzig itself spared no 
effort to initiate an anti-Polish and pro-German movement. 
Indeed, we can see from the correspondence addressed to 
the German officials in Warsaw from the city in November 
1918, which fell into Polish hands on the evacuation of 
the city by the former, ‘“‘ personal letters were sent around 
in the royal workshops in Dantzig with the question whether 
the receiver was German or Polish. Whoever gave himself 
out to be a Pole was to be discharged at once.” 72 

Such haste in applying coercive measures clearly proves 
that the Prussian authorities had good grounds for fearing 
the actual tone of public opinion in the city. As a matter 
of fact, the local Nationalist-Prussian elements, in spite of 
boisterous agitation, revealed their whole weakness during 
the last elections to the revolutionary Parliament of the 
Empire, at which they secured barely one-sixth of the 
votes cast. But the most remarkable thing is this, that 
the unheard-of catastrophe of the war with the revolution, 
and then the economic crisis for Germany, which brought 
with it a marked depression in the price of land in other 
German seaports, caused on the other hand in Dantzig an 
extraordinary rise in the value of real estate and town- 
sites. This rise has been a plain intimation of the optimism 
roused in the people of the city at the splendid prospect 
for their mother-city, in the event of its separation from 
Prussia, and an eventual restoration to Poland.73 

The last effort at hindering this possibility from the 
Prusso-German side has /been the ventilation of the idea 


22. oi. 2: DANTZIG AND POLAND 
to create of Dantzig a free city. Being now without 
prospects of keeping it for themselves, the Pan-Germans 
would like to hinder its being restored to Poland. Such a 
move, though very clever, cannot however succeed for any 
long period. The abstract and only superficially German 
nationality of the people of Dantzig could never serve as a 
pretext for doing violence to the city’s connexion with 
Poland, a connexion at once real in itself and confirmed both 
by its geographical position and its past. The Germans, who 
have first-class ports of their own, cannot justly claim the 
one port which serves Poland. Dantzig wasted away under 
their domination, and it is essential to the life of a resurrected 
Poland. It is Poland’s rightful, time-worn heritage. It 
was only torn from her by force ; it had flourished under 
her sceptre, and it again will flourish under the same fostering 
care. There can be no thought of letting this one Polish 
port be cut off from the future State under the guise of a 
free city, so that outside the bounds of her sovereignty it 
might become at her expense a powerful German emporium, 
set right in her side, planted at her very gates, and the 
guardian of her one exit to the sea and the wide world. 
The destiny of Dantzig will be seen to be wholly different. 
Only a single right and successful solution of the problem 
is possible: that which serves the interests alike of the 
city, of Poland, and of Europe, and is from the start sus- 
tained by natural and historical justice. Dantzig must 
revert to Poland, Poland to Dantzig. In that event, with- 
out any injury done to the present German population, 
and without any pressure upon it, on the lines of voluntary 
and natural choice of what is one’s own good, and under 
the influence of factors more enticing still than they were 
in the times before the Partitions—-a more intensive business 
connexion with Poland, nearer communications with her 
centres, Posen, Warsaw, and Cracow, and union with the 
more effective influence of Polish national culture--under 
such conditions as these the ancient city of Dantzig, born 
anew in the present, will become the great, powerful, and 
prosperous seaport of the resurrected Poland. 


NOTES 


1. The Dantzig literature in the fine Bibliography of Polish His- 
tory of Finkel (1906), NN. 17299 sqq., 23965 sqq., need completing. 
The best general works on Dantzig are: R. Curicke, Die Stadt Danzig, 
historische Beschreibung (posthumous edition by his son, Amsterdam- 
Danzig, 1688); Lengnich, Jus publ. civit. gedan. (ed. of Guenther, 
tg910) ; Gralath, Versuch einer Geschichte Danzigs (Koenigsb., 1789- 
91}; Loeschin, Geschichte Danzigs von d. aeltest. bis zur neuest. 
Zeit (1828) ; Simson, Geschichte der Stadt Danzig (unfinished, 1913-18). 

2. On Dantzig from, the topographical point of view :— 

Balinski-Lipinski, Ancient Poland I (1843), 675 sqq.; Dictionary 
of Geography II (1881), 513 sqq. (errors in dates and figures) ; Sonntag, 
Danz. Strandverschiebungen ; Freytag, D. Danz. Werder (Zeitschrift 
fuer Westpr. Gesch. I (1908); Duda, The Development of Polish 
Pomerania, from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries (1909); A. 
Hirsch, Die geogr. Lage u. Entwicklung Danzigs (1912).. Bare German 
accounts of earlier date of the fancied German-Gothic origins of Dantzig 
rested exclusively on an arbitrary interpretation of mentions made 
by Pliny (Hist. Nat.), by Tacitus (Germania), Ptolemy (Geography), 
Pomponius Mela (De situ orbis), etc., where the Vistula is said to 
be a boundary between Germans and Slavs, and the Goths and Wendts 
are said to be neighbours. These references are quite indefinite, 
and have no worth as evidence whatsoever. On the other hand, 
the first certain proof from the sources, that Dantzig had a Slavonic 
character from the beginning, is the old Saxon report of Wulfstan 
the Seafarer in the ninth century, interpolated by Alfred the Great 
into his translation of the Chronicles of Orosius. This declares that 
sailing along the very coast of the Baltic to the mouth of the Vistula, 
he had Slavonic peoples on his right. hand all the time, Script. rer. 
pruss. I (1861), 732. A second and final proof, establishing the old- 
slavonic sound of the name of the city of Dantzig, we have in the 
earliest biography of St. Adalbert, Joannis Canaparius; Vita S. Adal- 
berti: “ ipse vero adiit primo urbem Gyddanyz,”’ Script. rer. pruss. I, 
228. In view of this the latest German historian of Dantzig, Simson, 
I (1913), 12 sqq., has been forced to renounce the former Gothic- 
German accounts, and to affirm that “tribes of western Slavs must 
also have been the founders of Dantzig. It is a certain fact that 


Dantzig is not a German but a Slav name.” 
108 


104 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


3. The assigning of Dantzig to the diocese of Cujavia-Wloclawek : 
the bull of Eugene III, Rheims, April 4, 1148 :-— 

. . . Warnero Ulotizlauensi episcopo eiusque successoribus . . . 
castrum Kdanze i in Pomerania cum decima tam, annone quam omnium 
eorum que de navibus solvuntur,” Cod. dipl. Pol., II, 1; Perlbach, 
Pomerell. Urkundenbuch (1881), N. 2. 

4. Wladislaw Lokietek in Dantzig: he stayed there in January 
and June, 1298, in April and May, 1299, and in December, 1306. His 
verdicts and grants in the matters of the monasteries of Oliva, Pelplin, 
of the Bishop of Cujavia, etc., ‘“‘ actum in Dansk,” “‘ data it»Gdanzk,” 
January 13, 1298, April 29, 30, 1298, May 21, 1299, December 17, 
1306, Perlbach, NN. 552-3, 572-5, 650. Cf. Dlugosz, Hist. Pol., 
III (1873), 28: ‘‘ Descendebat autem Wladislaus Loktek personaliter 
in Gdansk (1306), maximo honore tam militum, quam civium, de suo. 
principatu exultantium, receptus, ubi.. . fidelitatis et homagii 
accepit juramenta.”’ . 

5. On the origins of Dantzig’s trade with Poland, on the Polish 
raft-traffic in thirteenth century, vid. Th. Hirsch, Handels-u. Gewerbe- 
geschichte Danzigs unter der Herrsch. des Deutschen Ordens (1858), 
172 sqq.: “(im Polen der Piastenzeit) eine schnelle, das Interesse 
der Fremden sorglich beriicksichtigende Justiz.” 

6. On the Teutonic massacre in Dantzig, November 14, 1308, 
Script. rer. pruss. I, III, passim, the admissions of eye-witnesses :— 

“furtim intraverunt civitatem et occiderunt milites et uxores 
eorum et pueros, et sic occupaverunt civitatem,”’ “in expugnacione 
et capcione castri Gdansk multos milites et. bonos alios homines et 
eciam, pueros in cunabulis (occiderunt),’”’ Lites ac res gestae inter 
Polonos ordinemque crucifer., I (1890), 26, 265 sq.; the Bull of 
Clement V, Avin. 19 jun. 1310: “in civitate.Gdansco ultro decem 
milia hominum gladio peremerunt, infantibus vagientibus in cunis 
mortis exitium inferentes, quibus etiam hostis fidei pepercisset,”’ 
Theiner Monum, pol. I (1861), No. 204, Lites I, 420. The explanation 
of the procurator of the Order, 1310, in answer to the above Bull: 
“item quod predicti cives (Danzike) destruxerunt propria voluntate 
domos dicti opidi et iverunt ad habitandum in aliis partibus,’’ Perl- 
bach, N. 696, Dlugosz III, 44 sq.: ‘nec ulli polonicae gentis parcunt 
conditioni, sexui, aut aetati, sed tam puberes, quam impuberes et 
aetatem, infantilem et lactantem absque ulla miserationis respectu 


extinguunt . . . ut fama crudelitatis tantae diffusa, corda eaeterorum 
perculsa, ad faciendam in aliis civitatibus et munitionibus resistentiam 
pavescerent .. . et securior illis occupatio dictae terrae proveniret. 


Raro unquam, polonici sanguinis in alicuius loci conquisitione plus 
effusum, raro caedes inhumanior.”’ 

7. Caro (who enjoys undeserved authority, since with all his 
erudition he is often superficial, oftener biased, and always at 
bottom an enemy of Poland), Gesch. Polens, II (1863), 43, mitigates 
the massacre of Dantzig, averring Polish ‘ exaggerations,’ and 
“ wrong-doing and bloody violence on both sides.’’ Major-General 
Koehler, Gesch. der Festung Danzigs u. Weichselmuende, ‘‘ most 
respectfully dedicated to His Majesty the Emperor and King William I,” 


NOTES 105 


I (1893), 20 sqq.: ‘‘ In view of the purposes it formed in regard to 
Pomerania, the Order could not leave the rich city behind it, which 
had shown itself so spiteful. The Landmaster (Henry von Plotzke) 
demanded therefore the levelling of the ramparts and the evacuation 
of the city by the inhabitants. They had to submit. There can 
thus be no talk of a destruction of the city as the Polish reports had 
it (!). The houses probably were broken up in order to be used as 
building material (!). . . . We get a taste of Mongolian war methods 
in the treatment meted out to Dantzig and Dirschau. Dzengis Khan 
did much the same thing on a larger scale when he conquered the 
empire of the Chovaresmi, as he was not supplied with sufficient 
troops to permit him to garrison the larger cities. In view of the 
few troops at the disposition of the Order it had no choice but to act 
in the same way. Dzengis Khan destroyed the cities and divided up 
the younger inhabitants among his troops as slaves. The older ones 
he had put to death. The Order was content (!) to force the people 
of Dantzig to leave the city.” 

Influenced by such an explanation as this, even Simson, I, 44 sq., 
tries hard to excuse the massacre. On the other hand, the older 
historians of the city of Dantzig, Chytraeus, Curicke, Lengnich, 
condemned the crime of the Order in strongest terms, while the 
excellent Loeschin, even though writing under Prussian censure, 
branded in 1828 in his Gesch. Danzigs, I, 38: ‘‘ The entry of the 
Brothers of the Order into the city, stained with the blood of 10,000 
dead.’’ Of the latest Polish works, cf. Kujot, The 14 November 
in Dantzig and the Region, in the Annual of the Scientific Soc. of 
Thorn, 1908, 87 sqq., and The Hist. of East Prussia, I, in the 
Same journal, 1916, 1242, sqq. Cf. the small contribution of Pro- 
chaska, Memoirs of the Order, in the Archives of the Hist. Com. 
of Cracow Academy, I, 243. On the transfer of the Residence of the 
Order to Marienburg after the event in Dantzig, between September 
13 and 21, 1309, cf. Lohmeyer, Gesch. von Ost und Westpreussen, I 
(1908), 160, 164 sqq. 

8. The Order’s Trade Competition: all the early historians of 
Dantzig complain about it. Even the newest, Simson I, 106 sqq., 
I10, admits it as “‘ the cause of the later estrangement, even hostility 
of the city to the Order . .. Dantzig’s trade could not reach its 
height before the fall of the Order’s rule, when now no more barriers 
separated Dantzig from the Polish hinterland.” In the best years 
of the rule of the Order, Dantzig had 10,000 inhabitants, cf. Foltz, 
Gesch. der dantz. Stadthaushalts (1912), 8. Of the solicitude of the 
Polish episcopate for Dantzig, the best witness is the curious Indul- 
gence declaration of the Primate Archbishop of Gnesno and of the 
nine Polish Bishops in favour of the building of the church of Notre 
Dame in Dantzig, made in Kalish, in synodo provinciali, May 20, 
1406, vid. Simson IV (1913), 119. 

9g. The anti-Teutonic riots in Dantzig after Tannenberg: the 
report of an eye-witness (1410) in Scr. rer. pruss. III (1866), 485: 
“So there came in a great many honourable guests . . . to Dantzig 
from the conflict, of whom the most were sore wounded and opined 


106 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


there rest to find and healing for their wounds. While then the folk 
of the city were considering whether they had cast in their lot with 
the Polish King, or should yet do so, the guests had to leave the place. 
. . . The people gathered a force, the town-hall was sounded, the 
folk became furious . . . and smote the wounded as well as any 
hale ones who were with them from one street into the other... . 
They then gave the city over to the Polish King out and out, 
and received a Polish lord into the place as sheriff.” Cf. also 
Kujot, Der Krieg von 1410, Annals of the Scientific Soc. of Thorn, 
XVII, 193 sqq. © 

10. The charter of Ladislaus Jagiello for Dantzig, from his camp 
by Marienburg, August 5, 1410 :— 

“habito diligenti respectu ad constantis fidelitatis indicia, quae 
Nobis consules, communitas, cives et incolae civitatis nostrae gdan- 
ensis exhibuerunt et... poterunt exhibere in futurum, horum 
intuitu cupientes ipsos gratiarum nostrarum prosequi favoribus et 
fidelitatis constantiam Nobis et coronae nostri regni Poloniae per 
ipsos exhibendam continuo reddere promptiores, praedictaeque civi- 
tatis nostrae gdanensis conditionem facere meliorem. ...” Dogiel, 
Cod. dipl. Regni Pol et M. Ducatus Lith., IV (ViILNaE, 1764), 
fol. 83. The authenticity of this charter, wrongly called in question 
by Caro, III (1869), 341, has been admitted by Hirsch, 41, and has 
now been attested in full. Cf. in Toeppen, Acten der Staendetage 
Preussens, I (1878), 106, and Simson, IV, 121, the authentic copies 
of this charter from the Dantzig MSS. The second supplementary 
royal charter for Dantzig, as well as for Thorn and Elbing, was on 
August 1oth. The triumphal entry of the Royal envoy into the city 
and the doing homage to the King by Dantzig, August 7th. The 
retreat of the King from Marienburg, September; the surrender of 
Dantzig to the Order, October 1410. 

11. The murder of Letzkow and his associates: Invited by the 
Commander Henry Reuss von Plauen, they came to the Castle of 
Dantzig on April 6th, their corpses were given back to the city by 
Plauen on April 13, 1411. The bodies were placed in the church of 
Notre Dame, in the chapel of St. Hedviga, with a stone inscription 
half-effaced but remaining to this day, which gives only the names of 
the victims and the date of the murder. A description of the murder as 
‘* sullicher schentlicher, boshafftiger tat,” in the Dantzig Chronicles 
of the Order, Scr. rer. pruss., IV (1870), 376 sqq., as also the account 
of how “ Frau Anna went before the Commander and spoke.” Prus- 
sians have essayed purposely to call in question this plain Dantzig 
evidence, accepted by Schutzius and other earlier historians of the 
city, Voigt, Gesch. Preussens, VII, 143 sqq. (1835), later Caro, III, 
340, turning the thing upside down, clearing the Teutonic murderers, 
and making traitors of the victims. Then even Simson, I, 140, 
justifies the slaying in a way which bears sad witness to the disruptive 
influence wielded even on such a conscientious investigator by the 
unmoral special pleading of the newer Prussian historical school: 
‘‘ The Order had to act to keep the stubborn city from getting to be 
too much for them.” MReversely the honest Loeschin, Beitraege 


NOTES 107 


zur Gesch. Danzigs, III (1837), 77 sqq., proved in his study of 
K. Letzkau that the conclusions of Voigt were false. So, too, Hirsch, 
Ser. rer. pruss., IV, 385 sqq., in analysing the Dantzig reports about 
Letzkau, rejected the unfair conclusions of Caro and finally settled the 
authenticity of the Dantzig report as to the murder and the Order’s 
guilt. Cf. Graske, Der Hochmeister von Plauen im Konflikte mit 
den Staedten des Ordenslandes Preussen, in The Journal of West- 
Prussian History, XX XV (1896), 7 sqq. 

12. The first Charter of Casimir Jagiellon for Dantzig, Elbing, 
June 16, 1454: ‘‘das wir fleysig angesehen haben die namhaftige 
manner burgemeyster, rothmanne, scheppen und ganczer gemeyne 
unser rechten statt Danczke, ire getrawe und stete beystendikeit, 
do sie in gedechtnisz wider brochten die mennygung der freyheit 
un der goben der vordrigen geczeiten des reichs von Polan Konigen 
und herezugen, unseren vorfarn . .. noch dirlaufung so vil joren, 
in welchen sie die krewczigern mit dem yoch der dinste verbunden 
woren, zcu uns als zcu iren rechten und eynigen hern und erblinge 
widdergekart haben, und zcu uns zugeflogen sein, und sich uns und 
unsern nochkomlingen, des reichs von Polan Konigen, ewiglichin 
undir gegebin haben, von naturlicher begerlichkeit dorczu gereiczet. 
...  Toeppen, Act. der Staendetage Ost und Westpreussens, IV 
(1884), 282; reprinted by Simson, IV, N. 137, with slight changes 
from, the original Charter in the Dantzig Archives. Cf. Karnkowski, 
De iure province. majorumque civit. Prussiae (Crac., 1574), s.p. The 
Supplementary Charter about the Taxes of Dantzig, Piotrkow, July 9, 
1455: 

The arrival of the King in Dantzig, May ist, the doing of homage 
by the city, May 9, 1455. The Great Charter.of Casimir Jagiellon, 


Dantzig, May 15, 1457: ‘“... die burgermeister, radmannen, 
scheppen und ganczen gemeynen unnsir stat Danczik, unnsir liben 
getrewen, die stete getrewenheit, . . . vormittelst welchen szie uns 


in wedirwerbunge unnsir lande Prewszen, die doruch unrechte und 
unbilliche bekommerunge von unnsirm reiche entfremdet woren, mit 
steten getrewheit und vestem gemute haben beygestanden .. . geben 
wir und vorleyen unnsir stat Danczk . . . das sie zcu ewigen geczeiten 
nymands vor eynen herrn halden noch gehorsam zcu weszen seyn 
sullen in weltlichin sachen, wenne alleyne uns und unnsirn noch- 
kommlingen, konigin zu Polan.”’ 

The supplementary charter, May 25th; the departure from 
Dantzig, June 7, 1457; the later court charter for Dantzig, Cracow, 
January 28, 1472; vid. Curicke, Beschreibung der Stadt Dantzig, 
153 sqq.; Dogiel, IV, 157, 160 sqq. (juramentum Gedanensium) ; 
Toeppen, 314, 367, 369; Simson, 138, 141-2, 144. Casp. Schutzius, 
contin. Chytraeus, Wahrhaffte und eigentliche Beschreibung des 
Landes Preussen . . . darinne auch die Ankunfft und Erbawung der 
koeniglichen Stadt Danzig (1599), 203. Cf., on the other hand, the 
miserable bare wrath of Caro, V (1886), 105. 

The taking of Marienburg by the Poles and the men of Dantzig, 
August 6, 1460; the inscription in the Artushof: “‘ Danzker machts 
ein End dem Streit!’’ The Peace of Thorn, October 19, 1466. Cf. 


108 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


Simson, Dantzig im 13 jaehrigen Krieg, 1454-66, Journal for 
West Pr. Hist., XXIX (1891); ib., XLVII (1904), 116 sqq., the im- 
proving of the city’s Coat of Arms by Casimir Jagiellon, Insign. urbis 
ged. auctio, May 24, 1457: ‘‘ zcu czeychen grosser .. . getruwheit 
unnsir stat Danczke czu unnsirer koniglicher maiestat . . . haben wir 
vorgenommen, czu unnsir und unnsirs reiches zcu Polan und derselben 
unnsir stat Danczke ere und czirheith, usz sunderlicher koniglicher 
gnad und gunst, derselben stat Dantczke wopfen zcu vornewen und 
zcu vorbessern, so das die stat Danczke hirnachmals eyne guldene 
crone im obirsteyle ires schildes habe .. .,’”’ cf. Warschauer, Die 
Wappen und Banner von Danzig, ib., LVI (1916), 160 sqq. On the 
hearty relation between the city and King Casimir, cf. Kromer, 
Hist. of Poland in the year 1468, in the Collection of historical writers, 
III (1767), 690. Cf. Matricularum Regni Poloniae Summaria, I, 
Casimiri regis, ed. Wierzbowski (1905), passim. 

13. Swiencki, Historical Facts about the City of Dantzig, as well 
as the Sea-traffic and lordship of the Poles in the Baltic (Warsaw, 
1811), 4, 7 sqq., and Description of Ancient Poland, I (1828), 338 sqq. 
Cf. L. Golembiowski, On the Polish Fleet, The Scientific Review, 
II (1843), 12, 92 sqq. 

14. Boucicaut, Livre des faicts, Nouv. coll. de mémoires de France, 
II (1836): ‘‘en Prusse ... tous passerent au royaume de Lecto, 
ot ils firent grande destruction de Sarrasins ’’ (1390). The Prussian 
expeditions of the Earl of Derby (afterwards Henry IV) with a thousand 
men in his suite (1390—92) : he came to Dantzig via Puck on August Io, 
1390, set out for the Lithuanian forest on August 21st, was before 
Wilno from September 11th to October 7th, returned to Dantzig on 
February 15, 1391, Scr. rer. pruss., II (1863), 785 sqq. On the trade 
of Dantzig with England in the fourteenth century, vid. Hirsch, 
98 sqq. On the trade with Portugal, Spain, Italy, vid. Journal of 
West-Prussian Hist., V—-VI (1881-2). 

15. Nimmert, Danzigs Verhaeltnis zu Polen, 1466-92, ibid. LIII 
(1911), 111 sqq.; as to the salutary results of the deliverance by 
Poland from the Order’s economic exploitation, ib., 179 sqq. Cf. 
Lauffer, Danzigs Schiffs- und Wasserwesen am Ende des XV Jhrts, 
Journal of West Pruss. Hist., XXXIII (1894). King Alexander 
reached Dantzig May 25, 1504, received the homage of the city June 2nd, 
and confirmed the Charters of Casimir June 3rd. 

16. The report of the Dantzig envoys on Sigmund’s election, in 
Piotrkow, December 1506, in Finkel, The Election of Sigmund, I 
(1910), 263 sqq.; cf. Balzer, Corp. jur. pol., 1506-22 (1906), sub voce, 
Gdansk. On the quarrel of Sigmund with Dantzig in 1525, vid. 
Lorkiewicz, The Revolt of Dantzigs (1880), and cf. Finkel Bibliography, 
NN. 25787 sqq., also Acta Tomiciana, vols. VII, VIII, Matricul. 
R. Pol. summaria IV", Sigismundi I regis (1910-12) ; Hanserecesse, 
vol. XXIII-IV (1910-13); also Zivier, A New History of Poland, 
I (1915), 305 sqq.; Simson, II (1916), 79 sqq. 

17. The stay of Sigmund in Dantzig, April roth to July 23, 1525: 
the Statutes of Sigmund I, Gedani, July 20, 1525: “... visum 
fuit clementia nostra dignum, ut potius salutarem medicum, quam 


NOTES 109 


severum vindicem tantorum malorum ageremus.. . statuimus et 
ordinamus quod deinceps . . . centum cives ad consulendum et ad 
ferenda suffragia ex quolibet quattuor capitalium opificum ordine 
vocari et adhiberi debeant . . .” Dogiel, fol. 240 sqq., Volum. leg., 


I, fol. 454 sqq., Simson, IV?, N. 153. 

18. Sigmund August confirmed the charters for Dantzig, Decem- 
ber 10, 1548. For the visit of the King in Dantzig from July 8th to 
September 1, 1552, vid. Card. Hosii Epp. in Acta hist., ed. by the 
Cracow Academy (1886-88), NN. 783, 831, 51; Guenther, Vom Koenigs- 
besuch in Danzig, 1552, in Mitteilungen des West-Preussischen 
Geschichtsvereins, XV (1916), 23 sqq. The religious charters of Sig- 
mund August for Dantzig, Vilnae 5 Juli, 1557 (date corrected by 
Simson, II? (1917), 204): ‘‘ nos qui ex officio nostro regio infirmitati 
hominum mederi et conscientiis illorum consulere tenemur.. . 
permittimus et admittimus senatui populoque civitatis nostrae gedan- 
ensis liberam administrationem et liberum usum coenae dominicae 
sub utraque specie ...’’ Lengnich, Preuss. Gesch. (Danz., 1722), 
I], 155 sqq., and Jus. publ. civit. ged. (1900), 494 ; Simson, IV (1918), 
N. 164. The strivings towards union: vid. Constitutiones Karnko- 
vianae, I4 mart., confirmed by the King at the Diet of Warsaw, 1570: 
noteworthy are the democratic rulings “‘de oneribus aequis,” and 
“locus et jus suffragii inter ordines civitatis artificibus opificum 
restitutus,’’ etc., cf. Volumina legum, II, fol. 108 sqq. Cf. Karn- 
kowski, De jure, ut supra; Simson, Westpreussens und Danzigs Kampf 
gegen die polnischen Unionsbestrebungen in den letzten Jahren des 
Koenigs Sigmund August, Journal for West Prussian Hist., XXIII 
(1897), 145 sqq., and Gesch. Danzigs, II (1918), N. 169, who twice 
reprints the statutes of Karnkowski without knowing the text of Volu- 
mina legum. 

-I9. The dispute of Dantzig with King Stephen Batory: Pawinski, 
Stephen Batory before Dantzig, 1576-7, in Sources of Pol. Hist., 
Ill (1877). See ibid., NN. 181-90, Conditiones gedanenses, the 
pardoning of the City by Batory, Marienburg, December 12, 1577, 
reprinted as inedita by Simson, II, NN. 170-71. Ibid., NN. 173-4, 
the edict of Batory tolerating the Augsburg Confession in Dantzig, 
together with the confirmation of the city’s charters, December 16, 
1577. On the splendid relations that followed between the city and 
King Stephen, and the granting of the “ tractatus portorii,” in 
Warsaw, February 26, 1585, which rescinded the Constitution of 
Karnkowski at the requests of the citizens, etc., cf. Curicke, 164 sqq., 
Lengnich, Loeschin, passim.; Goldmann, Danz. Verfassungskaempfe 
unter polnischer Herrschaft (1901); Simson, II?, 321, I13, N. 176, 

20. Dantiscus, Jonas propheta: ‘‘ Urbs nova, dives opum, Dantis- 
cum sive Gedanum, Accipe divina quae tibi mente loquor. Est 
breve tempus adhuc: si non peccata relinques, hoc quibus exundas 
tempore, fracta rues. Crevisti cito: sic etiam Superis mala grata 
Decresces, instant jam tua fata tibi. . . . Comprimet annonae Vistula 
clausus iter. . . . Externis tunc praesidiis frustrata manebis Divi- 
tiisque tuis despoliata gemes .. .” J. de Curiis Dantisci Opera, ep. 
olim varmiensis poem. et hymna (Vratisl., 1764), 138 sqq. Klonowicz, 


110 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


in his celebrated poem, “ Flis” (The Raftsman, 1595), warns the 
Polish squire of the exploitation practised by the merchants of Dantzig, 


advises to sell grain only for cash, etc.: ‘‘ Already here in Dantzig 
there are store-houses and factories, . . . and there are traders and 
farmers from far and near. Ask first whether he has cash, .. . for 


if you take a note for your produce, the useless scrap of paper will 
only be a nuisance to you. Be careful. And when you have de- 
livered your goods, duly paid for, into the red store-houses, see that 
you get back at once to your dear Poland.” Kochanowski, in his 
poem The Satyre (1585), criticizes the nobility for thinking that 
it is “the greatest thing in life in their eyes to know the way to 
Dantzig. with rye and potash.’ Christopher Opalinski, Satires 
(1650), ‘On the Luxury in Poland’: ‘‘ We enrich the foreigners 
in buying from them at high prices goods, silks, and made-up cloth, 
what they call ‘roba per la Polonia.’ They know how to get away 
with our grain, which we sell them cheap.” In similar vein (Soli- 
kowski), in his political pamphlet, The Talk in Kruszwitz between 
Piast and his Guest, February 19, 1573 :— 

‘‘ The Guest : Now that the Crown has let the Port of Danzig, the 
eye with which it looks into the world outside, fall in ruins, ... 
everything goes out of Poland each year to Germany, Italy, Hungary, 
and Turkey, for cloth, linen, silk, satin, wine, nectar, and spices. This 
huge export passes all moderation. . .. Piast: Every ruler and 
every people have more interest in sea-power than in land-power, 
for . . . who has the latter and does not use it or even lets it be 
taken away, lets every advantage slip and brings on himself mis- 
fortunes: he who has been free becomes a slave, and the rich man 
becomes poor.’’——Czubek. The political pamphlets of the first Polish 
Interregnum (1906), 51, 479. 

21. Itis striking that this view of the Polish authors of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, as to the exploitation of Poland on the 
part of the merchants of Dantzig, agrees fully with the conclusions 
of a modern German investigator, Naudé, Die Getreidehandelspolitik 
der europ. Staaten vom 13 bis 18 Jhdt., Acta boruss. (1896), 345, 
373, 384 sqq.: “‘ the men of Dantzig were able by the use of clever 
means to bring it about, that the Poles remained in ignorance of the 
situation on the market, that they let the Danzig traders get their 
grain cheap, but on the other hand had to pay dearly for the salt, 
wine, silk, spices, herrings, which they got from Dantzig alone. The | 
essence of the whole matter was this: that Poland became steadily 
poorer, so that it was quite apparent, and Dantzig rose in splendid 
prosperity.” 

At the same time one finds the conviction that the coast and the 
sea-port is a necessity for Poland, as well as pride in the Polish 
Dantzig, on the pages of many early Polish writers. Already Dlugosz, 
I, 3, 55: ‘‘ Gdansk, a Polonis populata . . . nedum apud Polonos, 
verum apud ceteras gentes et nationes vicinas memorabile, haud 
magnum quidem oppidum, sed frequenti emporio celebre, quod mul- 
tarum, verum merces in illud flumine Wysla, qua illic . . . miscitur 
Oceano Sarmatico.” Cf. the characteristic report, mentioned by 


NOTES W1 


Bielski, Chronica, of the last campaign of Wladislaw Jagiello against 
the Order (1433), ‘‘ how the Poles marched to Dantzig, and camped 
before the city, where in the course of four days they conquered 
the surrounding districts. And the Polish knights on reaching the 
sea, embarked and sailed upon it, rejoiced that they had reached it 
and had conquered its shores,” Collected Polish Hist. Writings, II 
(1764), 302. (Stryjkowski) Gwagnin, Chronicles of European Sar- 
matia (1575): ‘‘ The glory of the city of Dantzig. . . . The tradesmen 
here are famous and wealthy. In regard to its buildings and their 
position, to the beauty of the collections and the variety at the 
markets, to the easy approach to the river and the sea, to the in- 
describable numbers of the burghers living here, as well as the number 
of merchants who come here from afar, lastly in regard to its wealth 
and war-materials, the city can be listed among the very first of 
Europe. In-a word, it is a mighty, thrifty, and famous place, and 
one could not easily find one where tradesmen are better off,’’ Ibid., 
IV (1768), 368 sq. Stan. Sarnicki, Descr. vet. et nov. Poloniae: 
“ quicquid habet Polonia, Lituania, Mazovia, tanquam, in oesophagum, 
Gedanum intrat et in transmarinas regiones avehitur; et rursus, 
quicquid affertur ex Germania, Anglia, Gallia, Hispania, Dania, 
Suecia, per universam Sarmatiam digitibus gedanensium civium 
dispensatur . . .,” ed. Mizleri-Koloff, Collectio, I (1761), 250. 

22. The grain exports from Dantzig, in round figures: 1608, 
87,000 lastes (measures); 1618, 116,000 (corrected 129,000); 1649, 
100,000 ; 1655 (a war-year), 11,000; 1659, 542; 1662, 36,000; 1669, 
47,000; vid. Loeschin, I, 397. These figures do not quite agree 
with the tables of the grain exported from Dantzig 1649-1799 as given 
by Czacki in The Laws of Lithuania and Poland, II (1861) 267 sqq. 
Cf. the table of the exports from Dantzig given by Forten, Documents 
to the history of the Baltic Question, I (1889), 165 sqq., N. 75: and 
The Baltic Question in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century, 
1544-1648, I (1893), 409 sqq., 530, 590, 628 sqq., II (1894), 458 sqq., 
and again Studies in the Archives of Luebeck and Dantzig, in the 
Monthly. Review of the Russ. Ministry for Education, CCLXX 
(Petersburg, 1890), 310 sqq. Cf. also the report of the /legate Bo- 
lognetto, May 11, 1583, on the economic conditions in Poland and 
the trade of Dantzig, published by Korzeniowski, Informatio de 
rebus oeconomicis Poloniae, Scr. rer. pol. of the Cracow Academy, 
XV (1894), 217 sqq. Cf. the remarks of Behring, Mitteilungen des 
Westprussissen Geschichtsvereins, I (1902), 66 sqq. On Dantzig’s 
trade with Turkey in 1613, ibid., III (1904), 58 sqq. Czermak, On 
the Corn-trade of Dantzig in the Seventeenth Century, uses a MS. 
of Loyko, but without giving precise details, Reports of the Cracow 
Academy (1898), N. 5, 8 sqq. The data of Szelongowski, From, the 
History of the Rivality of England, Germany, Russia and Poland 
(1910), 4 sqq., about the figures of Dantzig’s trade, are unsystematic 
and inaccurate. Kutrzeba, The Vistula in the History of the Polish 
Econ. Evolution, in the Review Econ. News (1918), NN. 33-9, gives 
several, sometimes very incomplete tables as to the export trade of 
Dantzig 1490-92 and 1608-74, (Cf, Simson, II? (1917), 269, II5 (1918), 


a0) DANTZIG AND POLAND 


516.sqq. In comparing the earlier and later export figures one must 
remember that a Dantzig ‘‘laste,’”” holding 60 Prussian bushels, was 
the same as 28 Warsaw “ korsee.’’ The laste of wheat weighs 2,550 
kilograms, that of rye 2,455 kilograms, that of oats 2,160 kilograms. 
On the average, then, a laste of grain makes about two or two and 
one-half present-day English tons. 

23. Sigmund III was in Dantzig in 1587, 1593, 1594, 1598, and 
in July, 1623, when at the news of his presence, Gustavus Adolphus 
appeared in the gulf, threatening the city with the Swedish fleet. 
Cf. Damus, Danzig und der nord. Krieg, in The Journal of West 
Pruss. Hist., XII. The Diet’s decisions in favour of Dantzig in 1565 
are in Vol. leg., II, fol. 686; in 1626 and 1628 (a special charter for 
English cloths), 1629, 1631, 1632: ‘‘ Having regard to the firm loyalty 
of our city of Dantzig toward Ourself and the Republic, ... we 
decree that all grain carried on the Vistula is to be brought only to 
Dantzig and nowhere else,” 1633, 1641 (about the right to stamp 
goods), 1647, Vol. leg., III, fol. 524, 580, 616, 656, 680, 737, 811, IV, 
fols. II, 74, 194. 

24. On the visit of Wladislaw IV and his consort, Maria Gonzaga, 
in Dantzig (1646), cf. Laboureur, Hist. et relation du voyage de la 
Royne de Pologne (Paris, 1647), 140-72. Cf. Niemcewicz, Collected 
Historical Memoirs, IV (1839), 134 sqq.; further Roepell, Koenigin 
Louise-Marie von Polen in Dantzig, in the Journal of West Pruss. 
Hist., XXII (1887). A view of the triumphal arches on the occasion 
of the Queen’s coming, in Kruszynski, Dantzig Antiquities, 16. 

25. Dantzig, Carolus Gustavus and Jan Casimir: Rudawski, 
Polish Hist. of the time of Jan Casimir, 1648-60, ITI (ed. 1855), 137 sqq. ; 
Litt. regis Suec. ac com. Steinbock ad Gedanenses (1656) ; Lengnich, 
Gesch. der preuss. Lande, VII (Danz., 1734), 146, 158, 173, giving 
the words of the chancellor of state, Korycinski, “ that in this same 
Dantzig alone the whole state has been maintained against the 
violence, tyranny, and cunning, of a terrible foe,’’ 221 sq., 262. The 
resolution of the Diet in Dantzig’s favour, 1658, under the caption, 
“The Insuring of Dantzig’: ‘the rare virtue, faith and stability 
of our city of Dantzig, even more than before have been attested now 
especially during the Swedish War: they are worthy to serve as an 
example to all, and deserve our high respect ’—1698, Vol. leg., IV, 
fols. 559, 618. , 

26. The Treaty of Oliva, May 3, 1660 (a day ever since of solemn 
holiday in Dantzig), in § 153 conditioned the freedom of Dantzig’s 
trade, on pre-war footing, vid. Dumont, Corp. dipl. VI (1739), 303, 
and Chwalkowski, Jus publ. reg. Pol. (Regiom., 1676), 281. 

27. Dantzig and Sobieski: Decretum Joannis, III, Gedani, 1678, 
Zaluski, Epistolae Familiares, I (Brunsbergae, 1710), fols. 721-37; 
Polish Geog. Dict. II, 520; Sierakowski, The Visit of John III Sobieski 
in East Prussia, 1677~78,.in the Annual of the Scientific Society of 
Thorn, XIX (1912), 209 sqq., with a special description of the stay 
there in the light of Sobieski’s secret plans to take East Prussia from 
the Grand Elector. Cf. Finkel, Bibl., N. 4116. 

28. Peter the Great in Dantzig: Lengnich, Gesch. der preuss. 


- 


NOTES 113 


Lande, IX (1755), 294 sqq.; Loeschin, II, 127, 131, and Beitraege, 
III, 92; also Foltz in the Reports on West Pruss. Hist., VI (1907), 
68 sqq. 

29. Dantzig and Stanislaw Leszczynski: Boyé, Stan. Leszczynski 
(1898), Askenazy, The last Royal Election but One, in Two Cen- 
turies, I (1901). An interesting relation of the Dantzig deputation 
to St. Petersburg asking for pardon, 1734, is in Loeschin, Beitraege, I 
(1837), 38 sqq. 

30. Lengnich, Jus publicum civitatis ged. (together with his 
biography); Jus publ. Prussiae Polonae (1758); Jus. publ. Regni 
Pol. On Dantiscus, cf. Siemienski, Literary Portraits, I (1865). On 
Hevelius, cf. Warsaw Memorial (1809), the monthly Warsaw Library 
(1843), also Skimborowicz, Life and Works of Hevelius (1860). On 
the Chodowiecki family vid. Mitteilungen des Westpreussischen Ge- 


_ schichtsvereins, III, 74 sqq., IV (1905), 17 sqq. Cf. Rastawiecki, A 


‘Dictionary of Polish Painters, and Oettingen, Chodowiecki von Berlin 


nach Danzig, 1773 (1895). 
31. Polish printing-presses in Dantzig: J. S. Bandtkie, History 


of the Printing-offices in the Kingdom of Poland, I (1826), 82 sqq., 


104 sqq.; also Loeschin, History of the Dantzig Printing-presses 
(1840) ; Mankowski, History of the Polish Prints and Literature in 
West Prussia, in the Annual of the Scientific Soc. of Thorn, XVIII 
(1911), 79 Ssqq., gives an exact Polish-Dantzig Bibliography, from the 
first printing, the Polish ABC—1528 (?), until the end of the eighteenth 
century. In all 219 items are given, among them some, chiefly of 
the eighteenth century, of special interest. 

32. The Polish language in Dantzig: Loeschin I, 305, 385; Sim- 
son II, 371; cf. Hirsch, Gesch. der akad. Gymnasiums in Dantzig 
(1837). Decisive, however, on this point is the witness of Cellarius, 
overlooked until now but unbiased: Andr. Cellarius, Descr. regni 
Poloniae (Amstel., 1659): ‘‘incolarum urbem (Gdanzk) habitantium 
magna est multitudo, ex Germanis, Polonis, aliisque nationibus con- 
flata; Germani tamen ceteris numero superiores sunt, et hos Poloni 
sequuntur; ac utrius nationis idioma, germanicum et polonicum, 
in urbe usitatum est, adeo ut plures incolae reperiuntur qui utramque 
linguam, callent,’’ ed. Mizleri-Koloff, Collectio magna, I, 626 (Vars., 
1761). 

33. The export of grain from Dantzig 1700-52, and 1752-92, 
Loeschin II, 207, 311; cf. the Tables of Czacki, 215, also Naudé, 
Getreidehandel der Europ. Staaten, 387 sqq., and Schmoller-Naudé, 
Die Getreidehandelspolitik Brandenburg-Preussens bis 1740, Acta 
boruss. (1901), 258, which gives the exact details of the exports of 
Dantzig from 1715-35. Cf. Schmoller-Naudé-Skalweit, id. 1740-56 


(1910), 137, 166, 468 sq., 563, with curious data of the already bitter 


_ competition waged by Stettin and Koenigsberg with Dantzig. 


34. The jubilee of the Deliverance of Dantzig from the Teutonic 
Knights: Of the first one, 1554, no news remain, of the second one, 
1654, a medal with the inscription ‘‘ Gedani annos ante ducentos.. . 
ab infanda crucigerorum, tyrannide liberatae tertium libertatis suae 


saeculum, regnante Io. Casimero, feliciter inchoanti memoria,” cf. 


8 


114 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


Kruszynski, 27. The tercentenary, 1754, had a medal struck with 
this inscription on its circumference: ‘‘ prussiaco-lechici Casimirus 
foederis autor . . .”” and on the face: “‘ Deo auspice Augusto) II] 
Poloniarum rege . . . jubilaeum gedanense unionis prutenopolonae 
memoriae sacrum ...’’ Gottl. Wernsdorff, Oratio saec .. . in audi 
torio Athenaei ged. magn. senatus jussa (Gedani, February 27, 1754) 
“‘ Libertatem, jura, immunitates vestras, moenia, tecta, possessiones 
bona omnia, vestra sacra, securitatem, otium, vestram vestrorumqué 
omnium vitam, conjuges, liberos, indigenae, nobilitatis salutem . . 
augustissimorum regum Poloniae praesidio . . . conservatam atque 
restitutam videtis. Nihil horum omnium vobis integrum, nihil salvum 
esset, si isti adhuc domini capitibus nostris insultarent, quorum moles 
tissimum jugum majores vestri diu pertulerunt, et qui rapinis, con 
tumeliis, injuriis, cruciatibus, caedibus, provinciam vestram exinanire 
evertere, extinguere allaborabant, et extinxissent tandem, nisi. . 
anno abhuc trecentesimo, profligata equitum teutonicorum tyrannide 
mitius imperium clementissimorum Poloniae Regum explendisset . . .’ 
(a detailed account of the Crusaders’ crimes, of Letczkow’s murde 
of the brutalities done to the people, “‘ erga rusticanos homines ¢ 
miseram plebeculam, ” and especially the violence inflicted on the 
trade of the city, “in mercaturam quae altrix et quasi anima rei 
publicae est”). Cf. J. B. Chr. Freislich, Cantate bey dem Jubelfes 
der Stadt Danzig (Danz., February 27, 1754) :— 
“So hub auch Danzig sein gebeugtes Haupt empor 

Und sahe sehnsuchtsvoll Dir, Casimir, entgegen. 

Du kamst, Dir folgte Freiheit, Ruh und Segen. . . 

Gott, lass uns dies mit Thraenen und mit Blut 

Sehr theur erkauftes Gut 

Nie wiederum verlieren ... 

Es wird, bey Polens Schutz, auch Dantzigs Wohlergehn 

Spaet unerschuettert stehn.”’ 

Cf. Fr. Klein, Das befreyte Preussen an dem dritten Jubelfeste de 
Stadt Danzig (Danz., February 27, 1754) :— 

** Wie ein entfuehrtes Kind, das seine Mutter siehet, 

In ihren offnen Arm, verfolgt von Raeuber, fliehet, 

Sie nimmt es in den Schooss, . . . es kuesst die milden Haend 

So liebreich machtest Du der Preussen Noth ein Ende, 

O Polen! als es sich, vom Orden neu bedrueckt, 

In Deine Arme warf . . . O Danzig, dieses Glueck, 

Das Polen Dir gebar ... 

Wie viel vollkommner muss es nun Dein Buerger schmecken, — 

Da schon dreyhundert Jahr Dich Polens Fluegel decken.” 
Cf. J. P. Titius, Oratio saec. (Ged., March 6, 1754) :-— 

‘‘ (Gedanum) crudeli ac barbara tyrannide convulsa . ... incom 
parabili Jagellonici sanguinis benignitate et clementia recreari 
pit...’ (In a long tale, praise of the Polish Kings and of 
tolerant and practical kindness Poland had shown for Dantzig 
trade) ; Titius, Carmina saec. quae in panegyri dantiscana canebantt 
(Ged., 1745): ‘‘ des weissen Adlers Kraft (hat) Schutz und Freyhei 
Dir geschafft.’’ 




















NOTES 115 


35. The occupation of East Prussia with Koenigsberg by Russia 
was provided for in the Austro-Russian pacts of Maria Theresa 
with Elizabeth, February 2, 1757, April 1, 1760, vid. Martens, Recueil 
I, 269. On the Russian occupation of Koenigsberg, vid. Russ. Anti- 
quities, LXXXIX. On Tichon Jakubowski and the Orthodox Church 
in Koenigsberg, 1758-62, cf. Reports of the Jaroslav Eparchial News 
(1893), N. 29, also the Woronzoff Archives, IV (1873), 315 sqq., and 
The Russian Rule in East Prussia, in Reports of West Pruss. Hist. 
(1915), XIV, 54 sqq. On the intended seizure of Dantzig by Russia, 
vid. the Russian Note of December 4th, letter of Bruehl, December 18, 
1760, Eelking, Letters of Count Bruehl (1854), 167 sqq. Cf. Lengnich, 
458, and on the negotiations of the Vice-Chancellor Woronzoff with 
the Court of Versailles in this matter, Ségur, Politique de tous les 
cabinets, I (Paris, 1802), 161. 

36. The first brutalities of Frederic the Great, the control-station 
of Marienwerder, the cause of the Dissidents, etc., vid. Schmitt, Hist. 
of the Rule of Stanislaw August (1868), also Damus, Die Stadt Danzig 
gegenueber der Politik Friedrichs des Grossen und Friedrich-Wil- 
helms II (1887). Cf. The Polit. Corresp. of Frederic the Great, and the 
Collection (Sbornik) of the Russian Hist. Soc. (which Damus has not 
consulted), passim. The Dantzig Diploma of Catherine II, April 5, 
1767, confirming the earlier one of Anna of May to, 1736, declared 
virtually the sovereignty of Russia over the city, even against Poland, 
in guaranteeing in a one-sided way the sanctity of the Assurance 
of August III, and prescribing for Dantzig ‘‘ that it seek refuge with 
confidence and humility under our protection and that of our suc- 
cessors, hereafter as heretofore,’’ Sbornik, XXXVII, NN. 318-19, 
521, 541, 550-0, 563-4, 572-3, 580, LXVII, 357, 367, LXXII; also 
Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des Grossen, XXIV-XXXI1V 
(r911). Frédéric le Gr., Mém., 1763-75, Oeuvres, VI, 12: ‘“‘ comme 
il était évident que le possesseur de la Vistule et du port de Danzig 
assujettirait cette ville avec le temps, on jugea qu’il ne fallait pas 
arréter une négociation aussi importante (le partage) pour un avantage, 
qui proprement n’était que différé.”’ | 

37. Dantzig and England: On earlier relations and in part their 
differences, vid. Loeschin, Simson, Journal of West Pruss. Hist., 

passim. The Privilege Patent of Charles II for Dantzig, Whitehall, 
_ July 18, 1668. The Anglo-Dantzig Treaty, Dantz., October 22, 1706. 

The English Residents in Dantzig: Fr. Gordon, 1632-42, John 

Robinson, 1706, and his curious opinion “‘ that there is not in any 

place ‘of Europe so great a number of British natives and their pos- 

terity, whose industry God has blessed with such plenty and affluence 

as here in Dantzig’’; Jac. Jeffries, 1721 ; Arch. Gibsone, 1724-50; 

_ Trevor Correy, 1754-80; Alex. Gibsone, 1780-93. Cf. Michael, 

Englands Stellung zur ersten Theilung Polens (1890), Litwinski, 

Polish and British Interests in Dantzig, December 4, 1918. 

. 38. Frederic to Maltzan (in London), Potsd., April 18, 29, 1771: 

_ ‘je ne vois, pourquoi on s’embarrasse tant dans votre ile des affaires 
de la Pologne. . . . L’Angleterre n’a aucun sujet de s’embarrasser 

_ des affaires de la Pologne; elles lui sont effectivement tout-a-fait 


Ke 
s 
’ 


116 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


étrangéres ...la cour britannique ... peut se mettre l’esprit 
entiérement en repos a leur compte,’’ etc., Pol. Corr., NN. 19846, 
76sq. The Memorial of Bukaty to the Earl of Suffolk, July 11, 1772. 
Vid. also J. Williams, The rise, progress and present state of the 
northern governments, II (Lond., 1777), 555: ‘‘ the intelligent part 
of mankind will undoubtedly be amazed, that a prince (Frederic IT), 
whose family has received their all, except the lakes and sand-banks 
of Brandenbourg, from the crown of Poland, should on every occasion 
endeavour to destroy that power, to which he and his ancestors have 
been so much obliged. But by recurring to history, it will be clearly 
seen that this now illustrious family, from the time that they were 
first distinguished among the common robbers, who hid their plunder 
in the marshes of Brandenbourg, down to this day, have adhered so 
closely to the serpents’ politics, that they have always stung the bosom 
which warmed and supported them.” 

39. The treaty of the First Partition, between Prussia and Austria, 
St. Petersb., July 25, 1772, §1: ‘‘S.M. le roi de Prusse . . . se dé- 
sistant en méme temps de toute prétention sur la ville de Dantzig, 
prendra, en guise d’équivalent, le reste de la Prusse polonaise.’”’ The 
Pact of Partition between Prussia and Poland, Warsaw, September 18, 
1773, §2: ‘excluding the city of Dantzig and its territory, ... 
the Prussian King renouncing every claim to the city of Dantzic and 
ts territory.’”” The Prussian-Polish Acte séparé conten. tout ce 
qui a rapport au commerce, Warsaw, March 18, 1775, §6: “la ville 
de Dantzig étant totalement étrangére au roi de Prusse, sera assujettie 
aux mémes lois et conditions que l’étranger .. .”’ Vol. leg. VIII, 
fols. 42, 80. 

40. The occupation of Dantzig’s harbour by Frederic’s forces, 
September 16, 1772. Cf. Jantzen, Réflex. sur la propriété du port 
de Dantzig (Dantz., 1773) ; also Johanna Schopenhauer, Jugend- und 
Wanderbilder (ed. 1884), XI. Cf. Aus Gralaths Berichten ueber 
die erste Theilung Polens, in Reports of West Pruss. Hist. Society, I 
(1902), 27 sq. On the taking of the peninsula Hela, vid. Stephan, 
Die Ansprueche Preussens auf Hela, 1772, in Reports of West Pruss. 
Hist. Soc., VIII (1909), 60 sqq. Cf. Journal of West Pruss. History, 
XLIX. 

41. The opposition of the Third Committee, June 1, 1774, and 
the couplet nailed up on the Artushof at the time :— 


“Der erste Junius 1774: Siegt, oder wenn der Preuss sich wider 
uns empoert, 
Sterbt, eine Sklavenwelt ist unser nicht mehr werth.” 


The report of Geret, June 11, 1774, Schmitt, Materials, II (1857), 
249 sq.; cf, Damus, 59 sq. On the cutting of the drinking water 
of the Radun, vid. the Cabinet Order of Frederic, October 13, 
1773, published first by Preuss, Friedrich der Grosse, Urkunden- 
buch, IV (1834); rescinded by Royal order of October 27, 1773: 
“‘ wegen Wassers fallen lassen,’’ cf. Pol. Corr. Friedrichs des Grossen, 
XXXIV, also Klopp, Friedrich II (1860), 306 sq. Cf. the vain apology 


NOTES 117 


of Baer, Hat Friedrich der Stadt Danzig das Trinkwasser entzogen ? 
in Reports of West Pruss. Hist. Society, V (1906), 50 sqq. 

42. Dantzig and the Great Diet: Kalinka, The Four Year Diet, 
(1884-8) ; Korzon, The Internal History of Poland in the reign of 
King Stanislaw August, II (1897), 44 sq. Askenazy, The Polish- 
Prussian Alliance (1919). The growth of the export trade and the 
price of grain in Dantzig, 1789-92, Czacki, op. cit., cf. Loeschin II, 
311. The short-sightedness of England in the matter of Dantzig, 
Pitt’s advice to give it to the Prussians, in Prince Oginski’s Mémoires 
I (1826), 92 sq. Oginski at that time personally negotiated with 
Pitt in London on account of the Dantzig question. Hailes’ pro- 
paganda papers, Mémoire sur les affaires de la Pologne, Réplique 
a& Vexamen du mémoire (Vars., 1791). A Conversation between 
a Pole, a Russian, and an Englishman in the matter of Dantzig, “‘ in 
a Club” (Warsaw, 1791). Cf. Lord, The Second Partition of Poland 
(1915), 170 sq.: “ Hailes displayed... .an amazing though often 
a misguided and tactless activity.”” Staszic, Warnings for Poland 
(Wars., January 4, 1790), foreword, 18 sqq. 

43. The Letter of the Third Committee to Stanislaw August, 
Dantz., September 13, 1790: ‘“‘ Das kleine Voelkchen der Danziger 
. . . war lange nicht mehr gluecklich und seufzete nur, wartete... 
auf Huelfe und Trost und erlag nicht. ... Eine Brotkruste und 
Freiheit !—das die Losung der Einwohner ... Sire, unser Terri- 
torium ist zerstueckelt, der Hafen ist noch immer im Besitz einer 
maechtigen fremden Macht . . . Sire, wir stehen verzweifelt auf 
einem schroffen Felsen, von der schrecklichen Brandung umgeben. 
.. . Geruhen EW. Kgl. Maj. uns auf unsren gebahnten Weg, den 
wir seit achtzehn Jahren umsonst suchen, durch einen Richtsteig zu 
fuehren, oder wir muessen in die Brandung herab!”’ Cf. Zablocki 
Writings (1903), 225 sqq. ‘‘On the Jibe pasted on the corners of 
the Streets, to the effect that Dantzig and Thorn were for sale.’’ 
The Constitutional Privileges for the cities, April 18, 1791, § 12, Vol. 
leg. IX.—Fisher, My Journey to Dantzig, October 29th to 31st, till 
November 4, 1792, cf. Askenazy, Hist. Studies, II (1904), 479 sqq. 

44. The Seizure of Dantzig: The treaty between Prussia and 
Russia for the Second Partition, Pétersb., January 23, 1793, §4: 
*“S.M. le Roi de Prusse s’engage de son cété a continuer de faire 
cause commune avec S.M. l’Empereur des Romains dans la guerre... 
contre les rebelles francaise et a ne faire ni paix ni tréve séparée . . .”’ 
(This condition was finally broken by Prussia at the Treaty of Basle 
with France, 1795, which, however, did not hinder Prussia from 
gaining in virtue of this pact indirect confirmation by France herself 
of her seizure of Dantzig.) §5: ‘‘Et pour dédommagement des 
dépenses qu’entraine et entrainera cette guerre (contre la France), 
. . . S.M. Prussienne se mettra en possession de pays, villes et dis- 
tricts (de la Grande Pologne) . . . en y ajoutant la ville de Dantzig 
avec son territoire,’’ Martens, Recueil des Traités conclus par la Russie. 
II, N. 44. 

45. The declaration of His Majesty the Prussian King in the 
matter of the taking of the city and territory of Dantzig, Berlin, 


118 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


February 24, 1793; reprinted in the Suppl. to the Warsaw Gazette 
of March 27, 1793, N. 35; id., in French in the Hamburg Corr. (1793), 
N. 48; cf. Angeberg, Recueil des actes traités, etc., concernant la 
Pologne (1862), 304 sq.: ‘‘sans parler des dispositions hostiles que 
cette ville (de Dantzig) entretient contre la Prusse depuis une suite 
d’années, elle est devenue actuellement un des points de réunion de 
cette secte rebelle (des jacobins), qui marche de crime en crime. . . 
Un de ces malfaiteurs (Garnier) ...a été publiquement requ 4 
Dantzig méme, et ce n’est qu’a force de remonstrances qu’on a pu 
l’arracher des mains de ses défenseurs. Ce récent exemple, d’autres 
abus fréquents d’une liberté mal comprise, les relations intimes que 
les populations entretiennent en France et en Pologne avec un parti 
qui, a l’aide de l’audace de ses principes, domine la majorité des — 
citoyens bien intentionnés, et enfin la facilité que trouve l’ennemi 
commun (la République francaise) & se procurer, grace au secours de 
ses adhérents & Dantzig, des provisions de toute sorte, et particuliére- 
ment du blé: telles sont les différentes circonstances qui ont appelé 
l’attention du roi de Prusse sur cette ville et l’ont decidé & lui imposer ~ 
un frein nécessaire. . . . Aces fins, S.M. . . . a chargé son lieutenant- 
général de Raumer, d’occuper, avec un corps de troupes suffisant, 
la ville et le territoire de Dantzig. .. .” 

46. The appearance of General Raumer with his army before 
Dantzig, March 6, 1793. On the movements for defence of the city, 
vid. Official Recess on the Events of the Occupation (1793), and 
cf. the coloured account by Damus Die Stadt Danzig gegen die Politik, 
162 sq., also Festschr. zur hundertjaehrigen Gedenkfeier der Vereini- 
gung Danzigs mit dem Kgr. Preussen, 1793 (1893). Cf. also Pruemers, 
Das Jahr, 1793 (1893), 42 sq., 746, 749; and Baer, Ein Beitrag zur 
Gesch. der Erwerbung Danzigs durch Preussen, 1793, in Reports of 
West Pruss. Hist., X (1911), 58 sqq. Protest of Henning, the Polish 
Legation counsellor, in the name of the Republic and the Polish King, 
against the taking of Dantzig by Prussia (Dahz., March 11, 1793). 
The letter of the men of Dantzig to Stan. August, ad regem nostrum, 
Ged., March 12, 1793: “ .. . (on the oppression of Raumer and the 
Russian agent in Dantzig, Sokolowski) ad Seren. Reg. Majestatem 
Vestram, Domine nost. clem. confugere constituimus illico, verum 
id non licere amplius edocti, ...ab omni consilio quid juvaret 
destituti, quocunque Sacr. Reg. Majestatis Vestrae auxilio inter- 
Re ae 

47. The Prussian Occupation Patent, March 25th; the taking of 
the outer fortifications, March 26th ; the taking of the town, April 4th ; 
the annulling of the terms of surrender by the ministerial proclamations, 
April 18th, 19th. The act of doing homage to Prussia, May 7, 1793. 
The incomparable address delivered on this occasion by the Regency 
President of West Prussia, von Schleinitz, Dantzig, May 7, 1793: 
“|. . Bei der Besitznahme Westpreussens (1772) befand sich Dantzig 
in einem bluehenden Zustande. . .. Ein ununterbrochenes Glueck 
haette vielleicht Uebermuth, Ueppigkeit und Hartherzigkeit erzeugen 
koennen. Um euer jetziges Glueck in seinem ganzen Umfange zu 
fuehlen, war es daher noethig, euch erst durch eine zwanzigjaehrige 


NOTES 119 


Erfahrung zu ueberzeugen, dass . . . getrennt von der Provinz, eine 
glueckliche Existenz fuer euch unmoeglich war. Es war noethig, 
euch erst davon zu wueberzeugen, dass ... (nicht) euer bisheriger 
Schutz- und Oberherr (Polen) ...sondern dass nur Friedrich 
Wilhelm der Mann war, bei Dem ihr Trost, Hilfe und Rettung finden 
konntet. Ohne diese Ueberzeugung waeret ihr vielleicht mit weniger 
Inbrunst in seine Vaterarme geflogen (!). Euer Sinken musste also 
dazu dienen, euer Aufbluehen, euer Steigen desto mehr zu verherrlichen. 
Der in Polen herrschende Partei- und Empoerungsgeist . . . drohte, 
nach dem Beispiel Frankreichs, auch in diesem Lande alle buergerlichen, 
politischen und religioesen Bande aufzuloesen .. .” 

The Organization Patents for Dantzig, March 25, June 2, 1793; 
the Administrative Reglaments, April 3, June 3, September 30, 
1794; the Sea Customs Tariff, November 14, 1796, Novum Corpus 
Constitutionum prussico-brandeburgensium, IX (Berolini, 1796), fols. 
1472, 1609, 2107, 2201, 2289, 2317, 2623 sq., X (1801), 739 sq. Cf. 
Simson, Gesch. der Danz. Willkuer (1904), 166 sq., Baer, Behoer- 
denverf. in Westpreuss. (1912) 125 sqq. 

48. Johanna Schopenhauer, Jugend- und Wanderb., Arth. Schopen- 
hauer, Inaugural-Dissertation (1812). After the taking of Dantzig, 
the Fren¢h consul there, Pons, was arrested by the Prussians (1793). 
During Kosciuszko’s Revolution Parandier, the French agent with 
the Polish Emigration, presented the Committee of Public Safety 
a sharp memorial protesting against the leaving of Dantzig in Prussian 
hands: Parandier, to the Comité de sal. publ., Paris, August 25, 
1794. So too during the Directoire there exists in the Paris Archives 
of Foreign Affairs a series of official pronouncements, 1795-6, against 
the seizing of Dantzig by Prussia. On Bartholdy and his conspiracy, 
cf. Loeschin, II, 320 sqq. 

49. The flight of the Prussian Royal Family through Dantzig, 
1806: vid. Hohenzollernjahrbuch, IX (1906); Bailleu in the Reports 
of West Pruss. Hist., V (1906); Schippel, ibid., VII (1908). The 
conquest of Dantzig by Franco-Polish troops, 1807: Napoleon to 
Berthier, Vars., January 23, 1807, and the whole correspondence 
with Lefebvre, bearing witness to the unusual interest of the Emperor 
in Dantzig, espec. NN. 11680-1, 12593, 600, 4, 57, 707-12, Corr. de 
Napoléon, XIV-V. The original state of the Polish forces besieging 
Dantzig: the Northern Legion, 2148; the III Division, parts of the 
2nd and 3rd regiments, 1320; in Gardanne’s Division, parts of the 
2nd and 3rd regiments, 1921; in Polenz’ Division, Dziewanowski’s 
horse, 423; in all not quite 6,000. Situation générale de la Grande 
Armée, April 1, 1807, Mémorial du département de la guerre, VIII 
(1843), 294; at the end the number was 6,500; cf. Gembarzewski, 
The Army of the Duchy of Warsaw (1905), 60, 96, 144 sqq. 

Dombrowski to Zajontchek, in Gniewo, April 3, 1807: ‘‘ We 
here keep working our way ever nearer to Dantzig. My Poles have 
the most dangerous position, and the most important. They are 
fighting daily.”” Napoleon was in Marienburg, April 25th, cf. Corr. 
of April 24, 26, 1807, NN. 12470, 4; it seems that he approached 
Dantzig and saw Lefebvre; cf. Heinel-Berg, Aufzeichn ungen aus 


120 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


der Vergangenheit Marienburgs, in Reports of West Prussian Hist. 
Society, XVI (1917), 5. 

50. The battle of the Mouth of the Vistula (Weicselmiinde) and 
the death of Parys on May 15th ; the funeral at Wonneberg, May 17th ; 
the reports of General Gielgud and General Hauke from before the 
city, vid. Rembowski, Coll. Writings of General Hauke (1905), 56 sqq. 
The report of Gielgud to Prince Poniatowski on May 2oth, cf. Poznan 
Gazette (1807), supplem. to N. 44. (The articles in this paper on 
the Polish activities before Dantzig were mostly edited in Dombrow- 
ski’s Headquarters, as we see from the minutes of his Staff Corre- 
spondence.) Gielgud to Napoleon, Wonneberg, May 26, 1807: “La 
troisiéme division polonaise que j’ai l’honneur de commander, est 
arrivée au blocus de Dantzig avec 6,500 hommes présents sous les 
armes .. . elle se trouve réduite aujourdhui 4 4,650 hommes présents 
sous les armes. . . . Les habitants de la ville de Dantzig sont Polonais. 
Ils sont animés de sentiments d’admiration et de fidélite pour V.M.1I. 
et R. et d’amour pour leur ancienne patrie. Comme tout le reste de 
la Pologne, ils ne se plaindront point de recevoir l’ordre de V.M. 
d’habiller complétement toute la troisiéme division polonaise, qui a 
aidé avec tant de zéle 4 les délivrer du joug prussien, 4 les réunir a 
leur ancienne patrie... .” 

51. The Surrender of Dantzig, May 26, 1807; Description of 
Lefebvre’s and the Polish Army’s entry, Wolski, A Portrait of Mis- 
fortunes of War, 1806-7, in Annual of the Scient. Soc. of Thorn, XVI 
1909), XVIII (1911), 13 sq., 21, 34. On the rejoicing in Warsaw 
at the news of Dantzig’s surrender, vid. Correspondence from Warsaw 
in the Poznan Gazette, N. 45, June 1, 1807. The fine address of 
Napoleon to the French Senate on May 28th, with the granting of 
the title Duc de Dantzig to Lefebvre, Correspondance de Napoléon, 
N. 12667. Cf. General Chlapowski, Memoirs (1899), General Weyssenhoff, 
Memoirs in the Monthly Warsaw Library for 1902. One sees from these 
memoirs how hard the task of the young and inadequately equipped 
Polish armies was before Dantzig. The Letters of General Kosinski 
from before Dantzig, in Poznan Gaz. (1807), NN. 43 sq., cf. also Sokol- 
nicki, General Sokolnicki (1912), 146 sqq., setting in fair colours the 
latter’s not very remarkable part in thewhole. Cf. Bennigsen, Memoirs 
II, 85 sqq., 100 sqq., with the curious Dantzig reports of the Russian 
Commander-in-Chief, General Kamenskoj; also Briefe ueber die 
Belag. von Danzig von einem Augenzeugen (Hamb., 1807), and Duis- 
burg, Gesch. der Belag. und Blok. Danz. (Danz., 1808); further Die 
Belag. von Danz., 1807 (from Kalckreuth’s original papers, Posen- 
Leipsic, 1809); Danz. waehrend und nach der Belag., in Briefen 
(Amst.-Hamb., 1809); Plotho, Tageb. 1806-7 (Berlin, 1811) ; Saint- 
Aubin, Siége de Dantz. en 1807 (Paris, 1818), 72, 97, 103, 117, 123, 
126, on the Polish activities, the death of Parys, etc. Cf. Hoepfner, 
Krieg von, 1806—7, III (1851), 336-529; Koehler Geschichteder Festung 
Danzig, II; Lettow-Vorbeck, Krieg 1806-7, IV (1896), 194-272, 
with interesting observations on the ‘‘ Bedeutung Danzigs fuer die 
grossen Operationen.”’ 

52. Napoleon in Dantzig, June 1, 1807: the parade of the first 


NOTES 121 


Polish Legion on that day, the reception of the city authorities on 
June 2nd, his departure the same afternoon; Mém. de la ville de 
Dantz. for Napoleon, June 1, 1807. Malachowski to Napoleon, Vars., 
June 3, 1807, asking for “‘ la ville de Dantzig et toute la partie de la 
Pologne qui |’avoisine.”’ 

53. Dantzig as Free City: the Franco-Russian Treaty, Tilsit, 
July 7, 1807, §6: “la ville de Dantzig, avec un territoire de deux 
lieues de rayon autour de son enceinte, sera rétablie dans son indé- 
pendance, sous la protection de S.M. le roi de Prusse et de S.M. le 
roi de Saxe, et gouvernée par les lois qui la régissaient 4 1’époque, 
ou elle cessa de se gouverner elle-méme ” ; §8: ‘‘S.M. le roi de Prusse, 
S.M. le roi de Saxe, ni la ville de Dantzig, ne pourront empécher par 
aucune prohibition, ni entraver par l’établissement d’aucun péage, 
droit ou impdt, de quelque nature qu’il puisse étre, la navigation 
de la Vistule,’’ Martens Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie, XIII 
(1902), N. 493. The Franco-Prussian Treaty, July 9th, §14: “S.M. 
le roi de Prusse renonce . . . a la possession de la ville de Dantzig,” 
§§ 19, 20, ut supra, 21: “la ville, port et territoire de Dantzig seront 
fermés, pendant la durée de la présente guerre maritime, au commerce 
et a la navigation des Anglais,” cf. the proclamation of Frederic 
Wilhelm III, Memel, July 24, 1807, renouncing Dantzig. The Dantzig- 
Prussian Treaty as to Boundaries, Elbing, December 6th, signed by 
Dohna for Prussia and Senator Labes with his colleagues for Dantzig, 
§$ 2, 4 

54. The solemn restoration of the previous form of administration 
in Dantzig, July 21, 1807. The Dantzig Deputation to Paris, vid. 
Granier, Berichte aus der Berliner Franzosenzeit, 1807-9, Publi- 
cationen aus den Preussischen Staatsarchinven, LXXXVIII (1913), 
41. Its reception by Napoleon at St. Cloud, September 6, 1807, 
and its return in May, 1808. The Celebration of the introduction 
of the Code Napoléon in Dantzig, in the Cathedral of Notre Dame, 
July 21, 1808. The city’s Memorial to Napoleon in the matter of 
the War Contribution, July 15, 1808, handed in in Erfurt by a Dantzig 
Deputation. A Memorial for Napoleon on July 24, 1811, set forth 
the sinking of the population during four years from 64 thousand 
down to 44, and the complete ruin of the trade. Many interesting 
documents for the story of Dantzig in the Napoleonic period are 
convened at the Parish Archives des affaires étrangéres und Archives 
de la guerre, in the relations of the French Consuls to Danzig : Chopin 
and Massias, and in the correspondence of General Rapp with the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Champagny and Maret, and Marshal 
Berthier. 

55. Napoleon in Dantzig again, June 7, 1812, reception of the 
city authorities and the merchants on June 8th, according to eye- 
witness: “‘der Kaiser im bekannten einfachen gruenen Kleide, mit 
dem Hute unter dem Arme, eine Tabaksdose in der Hand, ging in 
bestaendiger Begleitung Rapps, der sein Dolmetscher war, vor der 
Reihe auf und nieder, blieb in einem Sprechen, Fragen, Erwidern und 
Antworten, und floesste mit jeder Minute mehr eine solche Dreistigkeit 
ein, dass es beinahe eine Conversation wurde, und ein jeder auch unge- 


122 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


fordert, sprach, was er fuer zweckmaessig hielt. . . . Er wandte sich 
(immer) wieder zu den Kaufleuten und begann ein foermliches Handels- 
conseil . . .”’ (a long and curious dialogue of the Emperor with the 
merchants) ... (finally) ‘‘erklaerte er nach der Regierung (i.e. 
turning to the Senate’s representatives), Je garderai votre ville; 
je connais trop son importance. Elle est l’embouchure de la Vistule 
et le débouche de la Pologne. .. .”’ Napoleon left Dantzig for the 
Army, June 11, 1812. 

56. As to the military state of Dantzig at the time, cf. interesting 
details given by Richemont, colonel du génie, directeur des fortifica- 
tions, in his Memoir sur Dantzig, 1812 (MSS. from General Hauke’s 
Papers). The prophecy in the celebrated poem of Mickiewicz, “ Pan 
Thaddeus,’ refers to the time of the Moscow Campaign :—- 


“Long live Dantzig city !—Once our port, 
‘Twill be our port again!” 


Cf. the later letter of Mickiewicz to Mronga, ut supra. Cf. also for 
the Napoleonic period, Danziger Zeitung, 1807-13, passim; Blech, 
Gesch. der Siebenjaehrigen Leiden Danzigs, 1807—14, I (Danz., 1815) ; 
and on the results of the blockade, Tarle, The Blockade of the 
Continent (Petersburg, 1913). 3 

57. The purposes of Russia as to the Vistula line, 1812-14: 
Bernhardi, Toll, II, 366 sqq., and Gesch. Russlands, II, 735; General 
Schilder, Alexander I, III, 137, 142; Pertz, Stein, III, 300; Lehmann, 
Stein, III. Cf. Boyen, Erinner., II, 250, 526 sq.; Meinecke, Boyen, 
I, 247; Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte, I, 423; Oncken, Befreiung- 
skriege, I, 217, 257 sqq.; Osten-Sacken, Milit. Gesch. der Befreiungskr. 
1813, I, 84, 163 sq. 

58. The Siege of Dantzig, 1813: Blech II (1815); Tort, Le Typhus 
contag. de Dantz. en 1813 (1817); Artois, Rel. de la déf. de Dantz. 
(1820) ; Mém du gén. Rapp (1823—a falsification, but it includes the 
siege documents of 1814); Loeschin, II (1828); Campredon, Déf. 
de Dantzig en 1813, journ., notes, lettr. (1888); Auriol, Déf. de 
Dantzig en 1813, Rev. hist. XL (1889) ; Koehler, II (1893); Reboul, 
Camp. de 1813, I (1910), 368 sq. As to Russian espionage in Dantzig, 
vid. The War for the Fatherland (Russian), V (1904), 6, 240; Langeron, 
Mém. 1812-14 (1902), 170 sq., on the mission to Dantzig in January, 
1813, in disguise of a Russian colonel, the famous Figner, who so 
deceived Rapp, that the latter gave him letters to Napoleon—which 
Figner of course handed over to the Russian Headquarters, Vid. 
Wojenski, Acta, docum. and materials for War of 1882-13, I (1909), 
425; cf. The Centenary of the Taking of Dantzig, in Russian War 
Historical Series, II (1912), 425 (valueless). The interest of the Russian 
General Staff in Dantzig is attested by the multiplicity of data and 
studies about the city in the Archives of the General Staff in Petersburg, 
NN. 1764, 1804-6, 2054, 2087, 2130-43, 2286-93, 4773. Anthony 
Ostrowski, Biography of Thomas Ostrowski, II (1873), 402 sq. (based 
on the notes made by his brother Ladislaus in Dantzig, 1813). Cf. 
General Kolaczkowski, Memoirs (1899), 15. On the incident with the 


NOTES 123 


Russian officers in the outposts and the false proclamation, vid. 
Danziger Zeitung (1813), N. 33; cf. Angeberg, Recueil (1862), 600 sqq. 
The Surrender of Dantzig, November 28, 1813, signed in Langfuhr, § 6: 


“les troupes polonaises ... appartenantes a la garnison, auront 
une pleine et entiére liberté de suivre le sort de l’armée frangaise. . . . 
Mess. les officiers polonais . : . donneront chacun leur parole d’honneur 


par écrit, de ne pas servir contre les puissances alli¢es, jusqu’a leur 
parfait échange.”’ 

59. The Russo-Prussian dispute about Dantzig: Schultze, Um 
Danzig, 1813-14 (1903): Schoen, Papiere III (1881), 349, 278; 
Delbrueck, Gneisenau, IV (1879), 175; Krollmann, Landwehrbriefe, 
1813 (1913), 75 sq., the letters of Dohna from before Dantzig. 
The instructions of Czar Alexander to D. Alopeus, his Ambassador 
at the Court of Berlin, Kalish, March, 1813: ‘“‘ rétablir les anciennes 
villes hanséatiques, mais d’en augmenter le nombre, en comprenant, 
dans cette catégorie ... Dantzig ... (pour) servir d’étape aux 
produits russes.” Vid. the Franco-Russo-Prussian truce at Pleswitz, 
June 4, 1813, §§ 5-8, on communications with Dantzig. The Coalition 
Convention (Russo-Prusso-Austrian) at Reichenbach on June 26, 
1813, §2: ‘‘l’aggrandissement de la Prusse .. . par la cession de 
la ville et du territoire de Dantzig,’’ Martens Recueil, III (1876), 
N. 68, VII (1885), N. 259, XIV (1905), N. 500. 

60. The action of the city and of Keidel against Dantzig’s restora- 
tion to Prussia: The instructions of the Senatorial Committee of 
the city (Weickhmann, Wernsdorff, Doering, Trendelenburg, Soermans), 
for Keidel, Dantz., January 8, 1813. The Memorials of Keidel 
for the Czar (via Laharpe), Paris, May 31st, for Castlereagh, June 1, 
1814: “...S.M. Britannique n’a jamais reconnu la soumission 
passagére de Dantzig au sceptre prussien, effectuée en 1793 et terminée 
en 1807, de méme qu’une pareille reconnaissance n’a jamais eu lieu 
dela part dela France . . ."”. Memorial for Pozzo di Borgo, July 27th, 
for the English Govt., Lond., September 19, 1814; Hardenberg to 
Weickhmann, Berlin, September 5th. Articles in the Morning 
Chronicle about Dantzig, August 25th, 31st, September 7, 1814. 
Cf. the appeal of the City of London “ for the purpose of affording 
relief to the suffering inhabitants of the city of Dantzig,’’ February rst. 
Panten, Danzigs Rueckkehr unter Preuss. Herrschaft, in Zeitschrift 
fuer Westpruess. Gesch., XIII (1884), 98 sq.; cf. Jaucourt, Corresp. 
(1905), 17 sq.; Askenazy, Europe and Poland, in Wars. Libr. (1909), 
III, 51; Weil, Les dessous du Congrés de Vienne, II (1917), N. 1496; 
Wawrzkowicz, England and Poland at the Congress of Vienna (1919), 
3380, 383 sqq., adds to that question some new details from the 
London Record Office, the Archives of Berlin and Vienna, and those 
of Czartoryski. 

61. The restoration of Dantzig to Prussia: Acte final du Congrés 
de Vienne, June 9, 1815, §23: “‘...S.M. le roi de Prusse, ... 
ses héritiers et successeurs, posséderont de nouveau, comme aupara- 
vant, en toute souveraineté et propriété . . . la ville de Dantzig 
et son territoire, tel qu’il a été fixé par le traité de Tilsit.’” The Prusso- 
Russian Treaty of May 3, 1815, §§ 22-6, 39, 30, as to the free shipping 


124 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


in the boundaries of Dantzig as set in 1772, Martens, Recueil, III, 
NN. 79, 81. 

62. The Prussian reorganization of Dantzig: Schoen, Papiere, 
passim; Askenazy, Russia—Poland (1907), 159 sq.; Schottmueller, 
Die Einrichtung der Kgl. Regierung in Danzig vor 100 Jahren, Journal 
of West Pruss. Hist., LVII (1917), told in a deceitful and apologetic 
exposition. The misery and riots in Dantzig, Loeschin, II, 500 sq. 
The trade disputes of Prussia with the Kingdom of Poland: vid. 
the Prusso-Russian Trade Conventions, St. Petersburg, December 19, 
1818, with the supplements, § 2, séparé et secret and table des droits 
d’import. ; March 11, 1825, cf. Martens Recueil, VII, NN. 297, 308. 
The Prussian Customs List of October 25, 1821, modified April 10, 
1823; cf. Askenazy, Two Centuries, I, 400 sqq. In the Archives 
of the Warsaw Treasury interesting fragments are preserved of the 
consular correspondence of Heydeken, Makarewicz, Borakowski, 
Tengoborski, from Dantzig, with the Warsaw Government, 1818—30, 
including a series of projects and treatments as to the trade between 
Dantzig and Poland. 

63. The Kashubians: Kujot, History of Polish Prussia, I (1913), 
196 sq. Kentrzynski, in the Monthly The Land (r1o9rr1), N. 22; cf. the 
protest of the Kashubians against his too smooth account, which 
cannot be scientifically justified, in their Review, The Griffin, IV 
(1912), 76; the remarks of Romer, The Poles in the Sea-coast and Lake 
Regions (1019), 8, 15 sq., are superficial and uncritical; on the 
language question, cf. Baudouin-Courtenay, The Kashubian Language 
and Problem, in the Journal of the Russian Ministry of Education, 
V (1897), also Karlowicz, The Kashubian Dialect, in The Vistula 
Journal, XII (1898), and Ramult, Dictionary of the Pomeranian or 
Kashubian Language (1893). Chichkoff to Mronga, Petersb., July 16th; 
Rumianzeff to Mronga, Homel, August 4, 1826, published in the Pre- 
face to Mrongovius’ Complete Polish-German Dictionary (Koenigsb., 
1835), VII, XI sqq. One should, however, moderate the overdone con- 
demnation of Mrongovius because of this correspondence, e.g. Matusiak, 
Panslavism among the Kashubians, in the General Review (1894), 
Poblocki in The Griffin, I (1908), Koscinski, The Slavonic Idea among 
the Kashubians (1908). On the other hand, cf. Slaski, In Defence 
of Mrongovius, The Griffin, IV, 185 sqq.; Frantzew, Polish Slavonic 
Science (1906), 125. Cf.. Mrongovius to Prince Adam Czartoryski, 
Dantzig, November 30, 1822; to The Warsaw Scient. Society, April 
18th ; to the learned Polish historian, Maciejowski, Dantzig, Novem- 
ber 1, 1831; The Griffin, IV, 314 sqq. Mickiewicz (as deputy of 
Prince Czartoryski) to Mrongovius, Paris, February 28, 1852, Collected 
Works, XII, 237 sqq. 

64. Dantzig at the time of the November Revolution : Chtcherbatoff, 
Prince Field Marshal Paskiewitch ; General Prondzynski, Memoirs, 
III (1909), 29, 46 sqq. As to Dantzig after 1831, cf. Brandstaetter, 
Land un Leute des Landkreises Danzig (1879), 325 sqq. The figures 
as to exports, very incomplete, from 1835-38, in Radziszewski, The 
Polish Bank (1910), 397, and in 1849, Makowski, The Turn-over of 
the Grain Export in Dantzig, in the Warsaw Library, XXXVIII 


NOTES 125 


(1850), 374 sqq. The exact figures are to be had in the collection 
of the Jahresberichte der Aeltesten der Kaufmannschaft der Stadt 
Danzig (1847-70). 

65. Dantzig at the time of the January Revolution: the speech 
of Bismarck in the Prussian Chamber, February 18, 1863: ‘‘ Danzig 
in preussischen Haenden zu bewahren,’”’ Reden, II, 75. Buchanan 
to Russell, Berlin, February 22nd, the words of Wilhelm I, of course 
inspired by Bismarck: ‘the first efforts of the new Polish State 
would be to recover Dantzig, and if that attempt succeeded, the fatal 
consequences to Prussia were too evident.” February 28th, March 
Ist: “‘ ... the representations of the elders of the Mercantile Cor- 
poration of Dantzig . . . in which special attention is called to the 
injury that has accrued or might accrue to their interests in conse- 
quence of the agreement with the Russian Government (i.e. the Warsaw 
Convention of February 8th).’’ Confid. Corr. of the Brit. Govt. 
respecting the insurr. in Poland, ed. Filipowicz (1914), NN. 70, 118, 
138, On the Kashubian revolts, vid. Stella-Sawicki, The Year 1863 
(1902), 103 sqq. Cf. The Griffin, III, 56. 

66. Sutherland Edwards, Sir W. White, his life and corresp. (1902), 
calls in question his relationship to an illustrious Polish statesman. 
Cf. the Polish Review, CL (Cracow, 1903). The French Squadron 
in the Gulf of Dantzig, August 21, 1870: vid. Der deutsch-franz. 
Krieg, 1870-71, red. von der Kriegsgesch. Abth. des Gr. Generalst., 
I (1874), 117 sqq., II, 1317 sqq. The figures of the export of grain 
from Dantzig: vid. Wasilewski, Dantzig from the point of) view of 
Trade and Industry, in the Journal of Agriculture (Niwa), X (1876), 
485 sq., 569sq. Exact data given in the collection Jahresberichte des 
Vorsteheramts der Kaufmannschaft zu Danzig (1871-1913). 

67. The speeches of Rickert and Bismarck in the German Parliament, ° 
May 21, 24, 1879, February 10, 16, 1885, given in Bismarck’s Reden, VII, 
236, 262 sqq., X, 166, 233 sqq. Bismarck’s speeches in Varzin, Sep- 
tember 16, 1894, “ ein Polenreich . . . (mit) Westpreussen, Danzig 
u.s.w. (waere) stets der Bundesgenosse unsrer Feinde,” September 23, 
“ , . . ich will immer lieber mit dem Zaren in Petersburg als mit der 
Schlachta in Warschau zu tun haben. ... Wenn das polnische 
Phantasiegemaelde verwirklicht wuerde, so waere zunaechst Danzig 
in Gefahr. Die Polen muessten Dantzig annektieren,’’ Bismarck’s 
Reden, XIII, 104 sqq. 

68. The Kashubian Renaissance: On Floryan Ceynowa, vid. 
Koscinski, The Slavonic Idea among the Kashubians (1908); The 
Griffin, I (1908) ; Frantzew, The Slavonic Idea among the Kashubians, 
in Russian Philological News (Warsaw, 1908), N. 4. On the con- 
temporaneous Young Kashubian Movement, vid. the Polish Dantzig 
Gazette and The Griffin. Curious light is thrown on the suspicious 
attitude of the Prussian Government to this movement, and especially 
on the Union for Kashubian Folk-origins, by the pamphlet of Cardinal 
von Widdern, Polnische Eroberungszuege in Westpreussen, Ostpr. 
und Pommern (1913), 33 sqq. On the number of the Kashubians, 
cf. the earlier calculation of Ramult, Statistics of the Kashubian People 
(1899), further the newer and reliable data in The Griffin, I, 8 (1909), 


126 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


229, and in the Reports of the Union for Kashubian Folk-origins, 
I, 8 (1910), 226. Bernhard, Die Polenfrage (1910), gives a coloured 
account of the economic movement ; Spandowski, The Polish Banks 
in Pomerania, The Griffin, III (1911), an accurate one. 

69. General Koehler, Gesch, der Festung Danzigs, II, 504 : ‘‘ Danzig 
muss in einem Defensivkriege mit Russland den Pivotpunkt abgeben.” 
On the problems of the Vistula and the port of Dantzig : Keller, Memel- - 
Pregel und Weichselstrom, I (1899-1900), 348 sq., IV. 289, 453 sqq.; 
Piechowski, The Vistula as a Highway of Communication and Trade 
(1905), in Warsaw Economist (1905), IV; Reyman, Die Weichsel 
als Wasserstrasse (1913), 49 sqq.; Ingarden, Waterways (1916), 
29 sqq.; Matakiewicz, Polish Waterways (1917), 12 sqq. ; Sadkowski, 
Unsere zukiinftigen Wasserstrassen (1918), 27 sq.; Czernecki, The 
Organization of Internal Polish Trade (1918), 64 sqq. (without value). 

70. The economic situation and the present-day turnovers of 
Dantzig : Rueckgang des Dantziger Handels, in Danz. Ztg. (October, 
1903); Beyer, Der Danziger Warenhandel (1904); Uhlmann, Der 
Deutsch-Russische Holzhandel (1905), 70 sqq.; Muensterberg, Der 
Handel Danzigs (1906), 27 sqq., showing the persecution of Prussia 
from the railway side. Cf. Spandowski, The Condition of the Artizan 
in West Prussia, 1897-1907, in the Annual of the Scient. Soc. in 
Thorn, XV (1908), 130 sqq.; Fehrmann, Danzigs Handel und In- 
dustrie (1912), 8, 14, 18 sqq.; Statist. Jahrb. deutscher Staedte, 
XVIII (1912), 144; Stam, Dantzig as Poland’s Chief Port (1918). 
Vid. the report of the office of the chairman of the Merchants of 
Dantzig for 1908 for the preference given to Stettin to the disadvantage 
of Dantzig’s trade with Poland. Ibid. for 1912, p. 7: “die Schiffbau- 
und Maschinenindustrie in ebenso unbefriedigender Lage, wie schon 
seit einer Reihe von Jahren.” Kroeker, Zur industr. Entwickl, 
Danzigs (1916), 31, 35 sq., confirms the weak growth of the chief 
branches of Dantzig’s industry, “‘ because the largest manufacturing 
plants of the city are state factories, whose amount of production 
depends not on economic development, but on political considerations.” 
On the City’s Population, vid. Preussisches Gemeindelexicon, II (1912) ; 
Stat. Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich, XXXVI (1915). 

71. Copy, Foreign Office (Herr Solf): The following telegram, 
received from the Imperial Ambassador in Berne (Baron Romberg), 
on October 20th, is herewith brought to the attention of the IngPerial 
Ministry of the Interior: ‘‘ Mir wird aus zuverlaessiger Quelle mitge- 
teilt, dass sich die Danziger Kaufleute nach Warschau an Polnische 
Regierung gewandt und Wunsch ausgesprochen haetten, Danzig 
moechte zu Polen kommen, da man sich fuer Danzigs Zukunft Gutes 
vom Koenigreich Polen als Hinterland verspraeche.” ‘‘ See to it 
that inquiries are made as to the correctness of the report, Berlin, 
October 21, 1918.”” ‘‘ The Secretary of State for the Interior, Berlin, 
W. 8, October 27, 1918, Wilhelmstr., 74. Sent Copy to the Chief of 
the Administration in the General Government of Warsaw (Herr 
Steinmeister), with request for a statement in the matter.” ‘‘ The 
Chief of the Administration of the Gen. Govt. in Warsaw, October 30, 
1918, sends this (i) to the Government Commissioner (Prince Oettingen), 


NOTES : 127 


and (ii) to the Central Police Station (Herr von Born-Fallois), with 
_ the request for news, as to whether anything is known of such a step 
' on the part of Dantzig merchants toward the Polish Government.”’ 

| 72. Administrative oppression in Dantzig: Clara D., to Max D., 


_ Dantz., November 8, 1918: “*. . . Hier tut sich was. Das Volk 
-. wird verrueckt mit ihren Polen und Deutschen. . . . In den koeni- 


glichen Betreiben sind Listen umhergegangen, wer sich zu Polen 


; * oder Deutschland bekennt: wer Pole werden will, wird sofort entlas- 





sen.”’ On the elections to the German Parliament, January 19, 19109, 
' out of over 90,000 votes cast in Dantzig, the Deutschnationale got 
_. about 14,000. 

if 73. The troubles of the present Prussian Govt. in the matter of 
Dantzig have been increased by the formal abolition by the Russian 
Soviets-Govt. of all the Treaties of the Partitions of Poland, and 
among them the second one in 1793, which gave Dantzig to Prussia : 
“The empowered Representation of the Russian Socialist Federative 
Soviets-Republic has the honour to draw the attention of the Imperial 
German Govt. to the fact, that the said Russian Administration has 
decided in the Council of the People’s Commissioners (in view of and 
' in keeping with art. 4 of the Russian-German supplementary treaty 
. tothe Peace of Brest, March 3, 1918), to report to the Imperial German 
Govt. as follows : that the treaties, agreements and settlements herein 
noted, are in the opinion of the Govt. of the Soviets-Republic con- 
trary to the changes which the war has brought with it... (then 
comes a list of various Russian treaties with different States of the 
German Empire).... At the same time the said Govt. of the Soviets- 
Republic’ has decided in its Council of People’s Commissioners, on 
the basis of the same art. 4, to abolish all the treaties and acta, agreed 
upon between the Govt. of the one-time Russian Empire and that 
of the Kingdom of Prussia in regard to the Partition of Poland, since 
they stand contrary to the principle of self-determination of nations 
and the revolutionary consciousness of right of the Russian people, 
which has recognized the irrevocable right of the Polish people to 
independence and unity. This involves the following treaties and 
acta: 1. The secret Treaty for the Partition of Poland, January 4, 
1772. 2. The St. Petersburg Treaty for the First Partition of Poland, 
July 25, 1772. 3. The Declaration of Prussia as to her rights and 
claizzs on Poland, September 1, 1772, reported to the Representatives 
of Foreign Govts. in Warsaw by the Note of the Polish Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, September 22, 1772. 4. The Treaty between Russia 
and Prussia, January 23, 1793, for the Second Partition of Poland. 
5. The Agreement for the Third Partition of Poland made in St. 
Petersburg, October 13-24, 1795. 6. The Boundary Settlement of 
Poland, made in Grodno June 21-July 2, 1796, together with a 
secret description of the boundaries. 7. The Agreement of October 
10-21, 1796, as to the interpretation of art. 3 of the Treaty of October 
13-24, 1795, as regards the boundaries of Cracow. 8. The Treaty 
about Polish matter of January 15-26, 1797. 9. The Vienna Treaty 
of April 21-May 3, 1815, about the Duchy of Warsaw. 10. The 
Treaty of Berlin of October 30-November 11, 1817, about the 


128 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


boundaries of the Kingdom of Poland, with additional agreements. 
11. The Minutes belonging to the same of November 7-19, 1817. 
12. The Final Boundary Settlement between the Kingdom of Poland 
and the Prussian States, April 12-24, 1823. 13. The Treaty of 
October 4-16, 1833, on the common dealing with Polish questions. 
The Govt. of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviets-Republic has 
further decided on the basis of the said art. 4, not to let any of the 
secret treaties, agreements, or settlements made by the Govt. of the 
one-time Russian Empire with the Govt. of the German Empire or 
its allied States come again into force, since they stand contrary to 
the Decree of the Commissioners of the People of October 28, 1917, 
“On Peace.” 

The German Imperial Chancellor’s Office to Gen. Govr. von Beseler, 
Berlin, September 30, 1918: 

‘“‘ E, Exz. beehre ich mich, Abschrift einer Verbalnote der hiesigen 
russischen Vertretung zu uebersenden, in der diejenigen Vertraege 
aufgefuehrt sind, die nach Ansicht der Sowiets-Republik nicht wieder 
in Kraft treten sollten. Die auf Seite 5-7 aufgefuehrten Vertraege 
betreffen die Teilung Polens. Diese Dokumente sind nie veroeffent- 
licht worden (this strange statement proves an astonishing ignorance 
of the Berlin Chancellor’s Office, as all the acta mentioned above 
which have to do with the Partitions of Poland are known to have 
been published long since) und koennen daher nur im Geheimen- 
Staatsarchiv eingesehen werden. Praktische Bedeutung haben diese 
Vetraege fuer die Gegenwart kaum mehr. Es wuerden daher dies- 
seits keine Bedenken bestehen, dem Wunsche dem russischen Regierung 
zu entsprechen. E, Exz. waere ich fuer baldfaellige Mitteilung 
dankbar, ob etwa von seiten des kaiserlichen General-Gouvernements 
oder der polnischen Regierung auf eine wieder-in-Kraftsetzung 
einzelner Bestimmungen der Vertraege Wert gelegt wird.”’ 

“Copy respectfully sent to the Imperial Legation Secretary in 
Warsaw, Prince Oettingen, for his perusal. Berlin, September 30, 
1918.”” In the margin: ‘“‘ At this moment the abolishing of the 
Treaties of Partition, a fact which would soon get to be known, 
would only serve to kindle the agitation as to Posen.—Graf. 
Lerchenfeld.”’ 


INDEX 


Adalbert, St., 103 

Alexander I of Russia, 23, 64, 65-68, 
7°, 73-74, 75-76, 82-83, 122 

Alexander Jagiellon, 28, 108 

Alfred the Great, 103 

Alopeus, 123 

Anderson, 39 

Anna of Russia, 25, 26, 38, 75, 115 

Anne, Queen, 37 

Artois, 122 

August II, 23, 28 

August III, 24, 26-31 #. 

Augusta of Prussia, 89 


Bandtkie, 113 
Barth, 44 
Bartholdy, 55 
Benningsen, 120 
Benoit, 41 

Berthier, 119 
Beseler, 128 

Bielski, 111 
Bismarck, 88, 92-94 
Blech, 122 

Boleslaw the Great, 7 
Bolognetto, 111 
Borakowski, 124 
Born-Fallois, 127 
Boucicaut, 14, 108 
Bouet-Willaumez, 92 
Boyen, 68 

Brihl, 115 

Briineck, 49 
‘Buchanan, 88, 125 
Bukaty, 38, 116 
Biilow, General, 58 
Bilow, Bernard, Chancellor, 94, 99 
Bulhakow, 46 
Burke, 38 

Buturlin, 31 


Canaparius, 103 

Caro, 9, 104-107 

Carolus Gustavus, 19, 20, II2 

Carrew, 37 

Casimir Jagiellon, 12, 14, 18, 28, 
107, 114 

Castlereagh, 74, 76, 78, 123 





Catherine II, 33-45, 49, 75 
Cellarius, 113 

Ceynowa, 87-94, 125 

Charles II, 37 

Charles V, 15 

Charles XII, 22 

Chlapowski, 120 
Chodowiecki, 28, 113 
Chwalkowski, 112 
Chytraeus, 105 

Clement V, Pope, 104 
Constantine, Grand Duke, 85 
Correy, 115 

Croy-Arsehot, 21 

Curicke, J. R., 103 

Curicke, R., 103, 105, 109 
Czacki, 111, 113, 117 
Czartoryski, A., 76-78, 86 
Czartoryski, the Princes, 123 


Damus, 115, 116, 118 

Dantiscus (see Hoeffen) 

Derby (see Henry IV), 14, 108 

Derdowski, 95 

Dlugosz, 8, 104 

Dogiel, 106, 107 

Dombrowski, H., General, 48, 55-59, 
119 

Dohna, 69, 73, 120 

Doéring, 123 

Downarowicz, 60 

Duisburg, 119 

Dumont, 112 

Dzenghis Khan, 9 

Dziewanowski, 58, 119 


Eleonore, Queen, 28 
Elizabeth, Queen, 37 
Elizabeth of Russia, 23, 30, 38, 68, 


73, 79; 114 
Eugene III, Pope, 7 


Fabricius, 21 
Fahrenheit, 28 
Figner, 122 
Fiszer, 47-48 
Flotwell, 80 
Francis I, 15 


Y 129 


130 


Frederic I, 32 

Frederic II, 29-38, 75, 97 

Frederic August, 119 

Frederic William, the Great Elector, 


32 

Frederic William I, 32 

Frederic William II, 40-45, 49, 50, 
55, III, 117, 119 

Frederic William III, 55, 59, 68, 87, 
I2I, 123 

Frederic William IV, 87 

Frederic William, the Crown Prince, 


96 
Freislich, 113 


Gardanne, 119 
Gardiner, 91 

Garnier, 50 

George III, 76 

Geret, 116 

Gibson, Alexander, 115 
Gibson, Arch., 115 
Gielgud, 59-63, I19 
Gneisenau, 123 

Golizyn, 39 

Gordon, 115 

Grabowski, 65 

Gralath, 41, 42, 104, 117 
Gross, Anne, II 

Gross, B., 11 

Guiberts, the, 96 
Gunning, 39 

Gustavus Adolphus, 19, 112 
Gvagninus, III 


Hailes, 45, 46, 116 

Hake, 73 

Hardenberg, 78, 122 

Hauke, 119 

Hecht, 11 

Helbig, 65 

Henning, 118 

Henry III, Valois, 28 

Henry IV, 14, 108 
Hertzberg, 41, 43, 45 
Hevelius, 28, 112 

Heydeken, 124 

Hirsch, 8, 15, 104 

Hoeffen, Dantiscus, 7, 28, 104, 112 
Hohenzollerns, the, 32, 43, 60 
Hosius, 109 


Jakubowski, 114 

James I, 37 
an Casimir, 19-21, 28, 88, 112 
an Albert, 28 

Jan III, Sobieski, 22, 28, 65, 112 

Jantzen, 116 

Jaucourt, 122 

Jeffries, 115 

Jonas, 109 





DANTZIG AND POLAND 


Junck, 35 


Kahlen, 46, 65, 75 
Kalckreuth, 58, 61, 119 
Kamenskoj, 58 
Karnkowski, 106, 107 
Keidel, 75-77, 123 
Klonowicz, 17, 109 
Kochanowski, IIo 
Kohler, 9, 104 
Kolaczkowski, 122 
Korycinski, 22, 112 
Kosciuszko, 47, 119 
Kosinski, 58, 120 
Krockow, 61 

Kromer, 108 
Krukowiecki, 61 
Kruszynski, 114 
Kutuzow, 67, 77 


Labes, 121 

Laboureur, 113 

Laharpe, 75, 123 

Langeron, 122 

Lannes, 59 

Lefebvre, 58-59, 62-63, I19 . 
Lengnich, 27, 28, 103, 113, IT5 
Leopold II, 48, 117 
Lerchenfeld, 128 

Letczkow, II, 53, 114 
Lettow-Vorbeck, 63 

Lewis, 68, 71 

Lindenowsky, 50 

Liverpool, Lord, 78 

Lojko, 111 

Léschin, 103, 105, 114, 115-122 
Louis XIV, 36 

Louis XV, 25 

Louisa, Queen of Prussia, 55 
Lubecki, 82 

Lucchesini, 45 


Maciejowski, 124 

Makarewicz, 70, 124 

Maltzan, 38, I15 

Malachowski, 64, 121 

Maria Gonzaga, Queen of Poland, 112 
Maria Theresa, 115 

Massias, 65 

Metternich, 76 

Meyer, 22 

Michel Wisniowiecki, 28 
Mickiewicz, 86, 122, 124 
Mizler-Kolof, 111, 113 

Mortier, 58 

Mraga-Mrongovius, 85, 86, 122, 124 
Miinnich, 25, 38, 87 


Napoleon I, 58, 59, 64-66, 70-72, 
80-82, 119-122 
Nicolas I, 86, 87 


INDEX 


Niedermayer, 47 
Niemcewicz, 112 


Oettingen, 128 
Oginski, 117 
Opalinski, 110 

Orlow, 39 

Ostrowski, T., 71, 122 
Ostrowski, W., 122 


Paleske, 77 

Parandier, 119 

Parys, 61, 120 

Paskiewicz, 86 

Paulucci, 68 

Peter the Great, 23, 30, 39, 73, 77, 
112 

Pitt the Elder, 38 

Pitt the Younger, 45, I17 

Platow, 68, 71 

Plauen, Count, 11 
uen, Reuss H., Commander, 11, 
10 

Plélo, 25 

Plinius, 103 

Plotho, 120 

Plotzke, 105 

Polenz, 119 

Pomponius Mela, 103 

Poniatowski, Prince J., 47, 65, 71, 119 

Pons, 119 

Pozzo di Borgo, 76, 123 

Prondzynski, 86, 124 

Przybylski, 60 

Ptolemy, 103 


Rachmanow, 73 . 
Radziwill, M., 58, 71, 72 
Rapp, 64, 71-72, 77, 122 
Raumer, 51, 52 
Reichardt, 41 
Richemont, 122 
Richter, Deacon, 55 
Richter, Deputy, 44 
Rickert, 92-93 
Robinson, 37, 115 
Romberg, 101 
Rudawski, 112 

Riidiger, 68 
Rumianzew, 67, 85, 124 
Russell, 125 


Saint Aubin, 120 
Saldern, 39 

Sapieha, 62 

Sarnicki, 111 
Sawicki-Stella, 89, 125 
Schilder, 67 

Schiller, 47 

Schleinitz, 118 
Schoen, 80, 83, 123 





131 


Schopenhauer, A., 41, 55, 119 

Schopenhauer, Jane, 41,°55, 119 

Schopenhauers, the, 55 

Schultze, 72 

Schuppelius, 47 

Schutzius, 12 

Séguf, 115 

Shichkoff, 86 

Siegfried v. Feuchtwangen, 9 

Sierakowski, 77, 78 

Sigmund I, of Poland, 28 

Sigmund III, 28 

Sigmund Augustus, 28 

Soermans, 123 

Sokolnicki, 58, 120 

Sokolowski, 118 

Solf, ror, 126 

Solikowski, r1ro 

Solly, 77 

Solms, 39 

Soult, 64 

Stadion, 76 

Stanislaw Leszczynski of Poland, 23- 
26, 32, 47, 86, 113 

Stanislaw Augustus Poniatowski of 
Poland, 38, 42, 52, 115, 117, 118 

Staszic, 46, 117 

Stein, 122 

Steinbock, 113 

Steinmeister, 126 

Stephen Batory, 17, 18, 28, 109 

Stuart, 76 

Suffolk, 38, 39, 116 

Sulkowski, 60 


Tacitus, 103 
Tchernyshew, A., 68 
Tchernyshew, Z., 31 
Tengoborski, 124 
Tikhon, 31 

Titius, 30 

Tort, 122 ‘ 
Trefurt, 65 
Trendelenburg, 123 


Vegesack, 65 
Voltaire, 35 


Warner, 104 
Weickhmann, 78, 123 
Weiss, 29 
Wernsdorff, 30, 114, 123 
Weyssenhoff, 120 
White, 91, 125 
Willebrandt, 39 
William I, 89, 96, 125 
William II, 9, 96, 104 
Williams, 38 
Wittgenstein, 68 


132 DANTZIG AND POLAND 


Wladislaw IV, 28, 112 Woyczynski, 65 
Wladislaw Jagiello, 10, 11, 27, 106, Wulfstan, 104 
IItr Wiirtemberg, Prince A., 69, 72, 73 


Wladislaw Lokietek, 7, 104 
Wolkonski, 73 





Wolski, 120 Zajontchek, 119 
Woroncow, 31, 115 Zaluski, 112 
Woroncows, the, 115 Zamoyski, 97 


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